DP9501 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets
|Author(s):||Tobias Klein, Christian Lambertz, Konrad O Stahl|
|Publication Date:||June 2013|
|Keyword(s):||adverse selection, anonymous markets, moral hazard, reputation building mechanisms|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9501|
We study the effects of improvements in eBay's rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to increased exit of poorly rated sellers. Yet, buyer valuation of the staying sellers ? especially the poorly rated ones ? improved significantly. By our preferred interpretation, the latter effect results from increased seller effort; also, when sellers have the choice between exiting (a reduction in adverse selection) and improved behavior (a reduction in moral hazard), then they prefer the latter because of lower cost.