DP9607 First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics
|Author(s):||Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon|
|Publication Date:||August 2013|
|Keyword(s):||committees, monetary policy, signalling|
|JEL(s):||D78, E52, E58|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9607|
We provide the first direct empirical support for the relevance of signalling in monetary policy. In our dynamic model, central bankers make policy under uncertain inflationary conditions and place different weights on output fluctuations. Signalling leads all bankers to be tougher on inflation initially, but to become less tough with experience. This evolution is more pronounced for members who weight output more ("doves"), which provides an additional test of our model. We structurally estimate the model using Bank of England data and confirm both predictions. Signalling increases the probability new members vote for high interest rates by up to 35%.