DP9814 X-Games
Author(s): | Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler |
Publication Date: | February 2014 |
Keyword(s): | Contagion, Coordination, Externalities, Strategic complementarities |
JEL(s): | C72 |
Programme Areas: | Industrial Organization |
Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9814 |
What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.