DP9836 Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization
|Author(s):||Nicola Gennaioli, Enrico C Perotti, Giacomo AM Ponzetto|
|Date Revised:||July 2014|
|Keyword(s):||contracts, imperfect enforcement, legal evolution, precedents, standardization|
|JEL(s):||D86, K12, K40, K41|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics, Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9836|
In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use of innovative contracts and legal evolution that improve verifiability and contracting over time. We find, however, that the cost of judicial bias also grows over time because the unpredictable application of precedents becomes costlier as the law matures. Contract standardization avoids this cost, statically improving enforcement; but it crowds out innovative contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shed light on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth century in many common-law countries during a period of booming long-distance trade.