DP9963 When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector
|Author(s):||Gani Aldashev, Esteban Jaimovich, Thierry Verdier|
|Publication Date:||May 2014|
|Keyword(s):||altruism, charitable giving, foreign aid., non-profit organizations, occupational choice|
|JEL(s):||D5, D64, J24, L31|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics, Development Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9963|
We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model of an economy with the non-profit sector financed through private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher income in the for-profit sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non-profit sector. If motivated donors give more than unmotivated ones, there exist two stable (motivational) equilibria. Linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-profit sector or a tax-financed public funding of non-profits can eliminate the bad equilibrium.