Discussion paper

DP4198 Does the Market Provide Sufficient Employment Protection?

This Paper examines the role of employment protection when firms learn over time about the value of the match. When parties can commit to future wages, equilibrium contracts stipulate positive severance payments as an instrument to induce efficient lay-off decisions and there is no room for public intervention. When parties cannot commit to future wages, ex-post bargaining leads to excessive dismissals, and therefore the market provides insufficient employment protection. In this case, a Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme will correct the inefficiency by enhancing employment protection.

£6.00
Citation

Caminal, R and R Burguet (2004), ‘DP4198 Does the Market Provide Sufficient Employment Protection?‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4198. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp4198