Discussion paper

DP5067 Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players? decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.

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Citation

Rosenkranz, S and U Weitzel (2005), ‘DP5067 Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5067. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp5067