Papers - ESSET 2015

Week One Week Two
Monday 29 June Monday 6 July
Tuesday 30 June Tuesday 7 July
Wednesday 1 July Wednesday 8 July
Thursday 2 July Thursday 9 July
Friday 3 July Friday 10 July


Week One

Monday 29 June

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Hide or Surprise? Persuasion without common support priors

*Simone Galperti (University of California, San Diego)

10.00 - 11.00 Political Disagreement and Information in Elections

*Ricardo Alonso (London School of Economics and CEPR) with Odilon Câmara (University of Southern California)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Consumer private experimentation

*Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn)

Correlation Neglect in Group Communication

*Gilat Levy (London School of Economics and CEPR) with Ronny Razin (London School of Economics and CEPR)


Tuesday 30 June

Focus Session on Persuasion and Information Acquisition I


08.30 - 09.30 Selling Experiments

*Alessandro Bonatti (MIT and CEPR) with Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR) and Alex Smolin (Yale)

09.30 - 10.30 Broad Terms and Organizational Codes

*Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego)

11.00 - 12.00 Communication with endogenous information

*Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Evening Session


20.30 - 21.30 Competitive Information Disclosure and Consumer Search​

*Simon Board with Jay Lu (both UCLA)


Wednesday 1 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 A Conversational War of Attrition

*Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (UCLA) with Katalin Bognar (Private Sector) and Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin)

10.00 - 11.00 Quid pro Quo: friendly information exchange between rivals

*Andreas Blume (University of Arizona) with In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Bayesian Persuasion with privately informed receiver

*Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Pittsburgh) with Anton Kolotilin (University of New South Wales), Ming Li (Concordia University) and Andriy Zapechelnyuk (University of Glasgow)

Consistent Good News and Inconsistent Bad News​

*Rick Harbaugh (Indiana University) with John Maxwell (Indiana University) and Kelly Shue (University of Chicago)


Thursday 2 July

Focus Session on Persuasion and Information Acquisition II


08.30 - 09.30 Informational environments and the impact of competition on information provision

*Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago) with Matthew Gentzkow (University of Chicago)

09.30 - 10.30 Bayesian persuasion with exogenous information leakage​ (abstract only)

*Eduardo Perez-Richet (Ecole Polytechnique)

11.00 - 12.00 Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device

*Péter Esö (University of Oxford)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


The organization of persuasion: Wald deconstructed

*Emeric Henry (Sciences-Po Paris and CEPR) with Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)

Information aggregation in search committees

*Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) with Nageeb Ali (University of California, San Diego)


Friday 3 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Categorization and investment strategy: An equilibrium perspective

*Philippe Jehiel (PSE, UCL and CEPR)

Morning Parallel Session (10.00 - 11.00)


Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission

*Alexander Frug (Tel Aviv University)

Is Ignorance Bliss? Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing

*Anne Katrin Roesler (University of Bonn)


Week Two

Monday 6 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Evidence Games: Right to Remain Silent, Left to Disclose

*Ilan Kremer (University of Warwick) with Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and Motty Perry (University of Warwick) 

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


The Role of Memory in Lemons' Markets

*Sergei Kovbasyuk (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) with Giancarlo Spagnolo (University of Rome Tor Vergata, SITE-Stockholm School of Economics, EIEF & CEPR)

Discriminatory Information Disclosure

*Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto) with Hao Li (University of British Columbia)


Tuesday 7 July

Focus Session on Reviews and Feedback Mechanisms I


08.30 - 09.30 Implementing the Wisdom of the Crowd (Slides)

*Motty Perry (University of Warwick) with Ilan Kremer (University of Warwick) and Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University)

09.30 - 10.30 Motivational Feedback

*Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR) with Nicolas Lambert (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

11.00 - 12.00 The Limits of Reputation in Platform Markets: An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment

*Steve Tadelis (University of California, Berkeley) with Chris Nosko (University of Chicago and eBay Research Labs)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Information Choice and Diversity: the Role of Strategic Complementarities

*Sidartha Gordon (Sciences Po, Paris) with Catherine Gendron-Saulnier (Université de Montréal and CIREQ)

Relational Knowledge Transfers

*Luis Rayo (University of Utah) with Luis Garicano (LSE and CEPR)


Wednesday 8 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

*Ginger Zhe Jin (University of Maryland) with Michael Luca (Harvard Business School) and Daniel Martin (Paris School of Economics)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

*Takuro Yamashita (Toulouse School of Economics) with Moriya Fumitoshi (Kobe City University of Foreign Studies)

The Value of Feedback: An Analysis of Reputation System

*Maryam Saeedi (The Ohio State University) with Zeqian Shen and Neel Sundaresan (both eBay)


Thursday 9 July

Focus Session on Reviews and Feedback Mechanisms II


08.30 - 09.30 How to evaluate recommender systems? (Slides)

*Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics and CEPR)

09.30 - 10.30 User reviews when quality is dynamic and managers respond

*Dina Mayzlin (University of Southern California) with Yaniv Dover (Dartmouth College) and Judy Chevalier (Yale)

11.00 - 12.00 How to Combine Reviews in Expert Panels

*Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR) with Peter Norman Sørensen (University of Copenhagen)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

*Konrad Stahl (University of Mannheim and CEPR) with Tobias Klein (University of Tilburg) and Christian Lambertz (University of Mannheim)

Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information

*Nicolas Lambert (Stanford) with Christopher Chambers (University of California, San Diego)


Friday 10 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs

*Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR) with Paul Heidhues (ESMT and CEPR) and Philipp Strack (University of California, Berkeley)

10.00 - 11.00 False Advertising and Consumer Protection Policy

*Andrew Rhodes (Toulouse School of Economics) with Chris Wilson (Loughborough University)


* Indicates the presenter