ESSET 2016 - Papers
| Week One | Week Two |
| Monday 4 July | Monday 11 July |
| Tuesday 5 July | Tuesday 12 July |
| Wednesday 6 July | Wednesday 13 July |
| Thursday 7 July | Thursday 14 July |
| Friday 8 July | Friday 15 July |
Week One: Developments in Mechanism Design
Monday 4 July
Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design I
08.30 - 09.30 Information and Market Power (Slides)
*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
09.30 - 10.30 Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange
*Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA) joinyt with Pavel Andreyanov (UCLA)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
*Hans Gersbach (ETH Zürich and CEPR) joint with Volker Britz (ETH Zürich)
Dynamic Adverse Selection with a Patient Seller
*Marc Möller (University of Bern) joint wiith Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)
Tuesday 5 July
Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design II
08.30 - 09.30 Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions
*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR) joint with Carolina Manzano (Universitat Rovira i Virgili Tarragona)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Sophisticated Sincerity under Incomplete Information
*Andreas Kleiner (University of Bonn) joint with Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR)
*Alexander Frankel (Booth, University of Chicago)
Wednesday 6 July
Morning Session
08.30 - 09.30 Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision
*Margaret A Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) joint with Florian Ederer (Yale) and Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Dynamic Demand and Sequential Monopoly: A Model of Endogenous Screening
*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Texas at Austin and CEPR) joint with Nikita Roketskiy (University College London)
A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard *Roland Strausz (Humboldt University and CEPR)
Thursday 7 July
Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design III
08.30 - 09.30 Efficient Bilateral Trade
*Marek Pycia (UCLA) joint with Rod Garratt (UCSB)
09.30 - 10.30 Social Learning and Information Design with Model Misspecification
*Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) joint with Daniel Hauser (University of Pennsylvania)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Selection by Selection: The Case of University Admissions
*Ian Jewitt (University of Oxford and CEPR) joint with Esteban Ortiz Ospina (Oxford)
Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms
*Alia Gizatulina (University of St Gallen)
Friday 8 July
Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design IIII
08.30 - 09.30 Information Design
*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
Morning Parallel Session (10.00 - 10.30)
Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games
*Andreas Blume (University of Arizona)
*Anton Tsoy (EIEF) joint with Andrey Malenko (MIT)
Week two: Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective
Monday 11 July
Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective I
08.30 - 09.30 Even Up: Maintaining Relationships
*Larry Samuelson (Yale) joint with Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University)
09.30 - 10.30 Bargaining with One-Sided Asymmetric Information and Nonstationary Behavioral Types
*Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University) joint with Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) and David Pearce (New York University)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Exit game with information externalities
*Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin)
Incentives for Endogenous Types: Taxation under Learning-by-Doing
*Miltiadis Makris (University of Southampton) joint with Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
Tuesday 12 July
Morning Session
08.30 - 09.30 Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game
*Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin) joint with Ben Sperisen (Tulane University)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration
*Anne-Katrin Roesler (Northwestern University) joint with Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)
*Chantal Marlats (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) joint with Sidartha Gordon (Paris-Dauphine University) and Lucie Ménager (Paris 2 University)
Wednesday 13 July
Morning Session
08.30 - 09.30 Recruiting Talent
*Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (UCLA) joint with Simon Board (UCLA) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Residual Deterrence
*Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn) joint with Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)
Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signaling Model
*Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin)
Thursday 14 July
Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective II
08.30 - 09.30 Bayesian Experimentation and Learning Treatment Sets
*Martin William Cripps (University College London)
09.30 - 10.30 Implementation in Dynamic Environments
*Johannes Hörner (Yale and CEPR)
Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)
Optimal Adaptive Testing: Informativeness and Incentives
*Rahul Deb (University of Toronto) joint with Colin Stewart (University of Toronto)
Experimenting with Career Concerns
*Marina Halac (Columbia University, University of Warwick and CEPR) joint with Ilan Kremer (The Hebrew University and University of Warwick)
Friday 15 July
Morning Session
08.30 - 09.30 Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention
*Konrad Mierendorff (University College London) joint with Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
Morning Parallel Session (10.00 - 11.00)
Incentive Compatibility with Endogenous States
*Suehyun Kwon (University College London)
Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons
*Piero Gottardi (EUI) joint with Sarah Auster (Bocconi University)