ESSET 2016 - Papers

Back to home page

Download programme (PDF)

Week One Week Two
Monday 4 July Monday 11 July
Tuesday 5 July Tuesday 12 July
Wednesday 6 July Wednesday 13 July
Thursday 7 July Thursday 14 July
Friday 8 July Friday 15 July


Week One: Developments in Mechanism Design

Monday 4 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design I


08.30 - 09.30 Information and Market Power (Slides)

*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

09.30 - 10.30 Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

*Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA) joinyt with Pavel Andreyanov (UCLA)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms

*Hans Gersbach (ETH Zürich and CEPR) joint with Volker Britz (ETH Zürich)

Dynamic Adverse Selection with a Patient Seller

*Marc Möller (University of Bern) joint wiith Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)


Tuesday 5 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design II


08.30 - 09.30 Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions

*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR) joint with Carolina Manzano (Universitat Rovira i Virgili Tarragona)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Sophisticated Sincerity under Incomplete Information

*Andreas Kleiner (University of Bonn) joint with Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Selecting Applicants

*Alexander Frankel (Booth, University of Chicago)


Wednesday 6 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

*Margaret A Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) joint with Florian Ederer (Yale) and Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Dynamic Demand and Sequential Monopoly: A Model of Endogenous Screening

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Texas at Austin and CEPR) joint with Nikita Roketskiy (University College London)

A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard *Roland Strausz (Humboldt University and CEPR)


Thursday 7 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design III


08.30 - 09.30 Efficient Bilateral Trade

*Marek Pycia (UCLA) joint with Rod Garratt (UCSB)

09.30 - 10.30 Social Learning and Information Design with Model Misspecification

*Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) joint with Daniel Hauser (University of Pennsylvania)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Selection by Selection: The Case of University Admissions

*Ian Jewitt (University of Oxford and CEPR) joint with Esteban Ortiz Ospina (Oxford)

Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms

*Alia Gizatulina (University of St Gallen)


Friday 8 July

Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design IIII


08.30 - 09.30 Information Design

*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Morning Parallel Session (10.00 - 10.30)


Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games

*Andreas Blume (University of Arizona)

Selling to Advised Buyers

*Anton Tsoy (EIEF) joint with Andrey Malenko (MIT)


Week two: Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective

Monday 11 July

Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective I


08.30 - 09.30 Even Up: Maintaining Relationships

*Larry Samuelson (Yale) joint with Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University)

09.30 - 10.30 Bargaining with One-Sided Asymmetric Information and Nonstationary Behavioral Types

*Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University) joint with Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) and David Pearce (New York University)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Exit game with information externalities

*Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin)

Incentives for Endogenous Types: Taxation under Learning-by-Doing

*Miltiadis Makris (University of Southampton) joint with Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)


Tuesday 12 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game

*Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin) joint with Ben Sperisen (Tulane University)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration

*Anne-Katrin Roesler (Northwestern University) joint with Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)

Information delays and cycles

*Chantal Marlats (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) joint with Sidartha Gordon (Paris-Dauphine University) and Lucie Ménager (Paris 2 University)


Wednesday 13 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Recruiting Talent

*Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (UCLA) joint with Simon Board (UCLA) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)


Residual Deterrence

*Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn) joint with Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)

Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signaling Model

*Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin)


Thursday 14 July

Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective II


08.30 - 09.30 Bayesian Experimentation and Learning Treatment Sets​

*Martin William Cripps (University College London)

09.30 - 10.30 Implementation in Dynamic Environments

*Johannes Hörner (Yale and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Session (20.30 - 21.30)



Optimal Adaptive Testing: Informativeness and Incentives

*Rahul Deb (University of Toronto) joint with Colin Stewart (University of Toronto)

Experimenting with Career Concerns

*Marina Halac (Columbia University, University of Warwick and CEPR) joint with Ilan Kremer (The Hebrew University and University of Warwick)


Friday 15 July

Morning Session


08.30 - 09.30 Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention

*Konrad Mierendorff (University College London) joint with Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)

Morning Parallel Session (10.00 - 11.00)


Incentive Compatibility with Endogenous States

*Suehyun Kwon (University College London)

Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons

*Piero Gottardi (EUI) joint with Sarah Auster (Bocconi University)