ESSET 2018 - Programme

European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) 2018

Hosted by the Study Center Gerzensee (Foundation of the Swiss National Bank)

Gerzensee, Switzerland

Monday 2 July - Friday 13 July 2018

PROGRAMME (pdf)
 

WEEK 1

Monday, 2 July

Focus Session on Markets for Information

08.30 - 09.30
 

09.30 - 10.00

10.00 - 11.00

Test Design and Minimum Standards
* Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

Coffee break

Quantifying information and uncertainty
* Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30

Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes​
*Alex Smolin (University of Bonn)

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
*Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University) and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)


Tuesday, 3 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion
*Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University), with Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim and Konrad Mierendorff

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30

Cookie Design
*Vasiliki Skreta (University College London and CEPR)

Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs. opt-out
*
Simon Anderson (University of Virginia and CEPR)


Wednesday, 4 July

Focus Session on Markets for Information

08.30 - 09.30

 

09.30 - 10.00

10.00 - 11.00

 

Privacy Protection and Consumer Retention
*Bruno Jullien (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Mike Riordan (Columbia University)

Coffee Break

Price Customization and Targeting in Platform Markets
*Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30

Information aggregation and the efficiency of emissions markets
*Estelle Cantillon (ECARES and CEPR)

The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
*Piotr Dworczak (University of Chicago)


Thursday, 5 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

TBC
*David Myatt (London Business School)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30

Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment​
*Benjamin Golub (Harvard University), with Krishna Dasaratha (Harvard University) and Nir Hak (Harvard University)

Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Heterogeneous Markets
*Alex Tahbaz-Salehi (Northwestern University)


Friday, 6 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity
*Margaret A Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR) 

Morning Session

10.00 - 11.00

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
*Benjamin Brooks (University of Chicago), with Stephen Morris and Dirk Bergemann

 

The Effect of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, Price Efficiency and Liquidity
*Ilan Kremer (Hebrew University), with Sivan Frenkel (Tel Aviv University)  and Ilan Guttman (NYU)

* Indicates the presenter


WEEK 2

Monday, 9 July

Focus Session on Misspecified Models

08.30 - 09.30
 

09.30 - 10.30
 

10.30 - 11.00

11:00 - 12.00

TBC
*Sylvain Chassang (New York University)

Overabundant Information and Learning Traps
*Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University)

Coffee break

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30

Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics
*S. Nageeb Ali (Penn State University)

I Don't Know
*Matthew Backus (Columbia University)


Tuesday, 10 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning
*Philipp Strack (University of California, Berkeley and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30

The Culture of Overconfidence
*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Texas, Austin and CEPR) with Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin

Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies
*Klaus M. Schmidt (University of Munich and CEPR)


Wednesday, 11 July

Focus Session on Misspecified Models

08.30 - 09.30
 

09.30 - 10.30

10.30 - 11.00

11:00 - 12.00

Causal Narratives and Political Polarization
*Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)

Learning (Not to Trade?) in Large Worlds
*Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

Coffee break

Competing Models
*Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30

Modeling Ignorance without Bayesian Beliefs
*Olivier Compte (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economique) SLIDES

Investigation with forgetful liars
*Philippe Jehiel (University College London)


Thursday, 12 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Information Design in Misspecified Social Learning Models
*Daniel Hauser (Aalto University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30

The Value of a Coordination Game
*Willemien Kets (University of Oxford)

An Explanation-Based approach to Combining Forecasts
*Ronny Razin (London School of Economics and CEPR)


Friday, 13 July

Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30

Incentive compatible estimators
*Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 - 11.00

Equilibrium Counterfactuals
*Gilles Chemla (Imperial College, London and CEPR)

Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
*Heidi Thysen (London School of Economics)

* Indicates the presenter

ESSET 2018 Organisers:

Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR)
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan and CEPR)
Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton)
Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)
Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)

Standing organising committee for ESSET:

Chair: Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR), Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR), Stephen Morris (Princeton University), Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR), Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR), Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR), Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR), Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego), Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR) and Lucy White (Boston University and CEPR)

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