Discussion paper

DP12443 Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Structure

Capital reallocation from unprofitable to profitable firms is a key source of productivity gain in an innovative economy. We present a model of credit reallocation and focus on the role of banks: Weakly capitalized banks hesitate to write off non-performing loans to avoid a violation of regulatory requirements or even insolvency. Such behavior blocks credit reallocation to expanding industries and results in a distorted investment process and low aggregate productivity. Reducing the cost of bank equity, tightening capital requirements, and improving insolvency laws relaxes constraints and mitigates distortions.


Keuschnigg, C and M Kogler (2017), ‘DP12443 Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Structure‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 12443. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp12443