Discussion paper

DP13260 A Nazi ”Killer” Amendment

We study killer amendments under various informational regimes and
postulated voter behavior. In particular, the success chances of killer
amendments are shown to differ across several well-known binary, sequential
voting procedures. In light of this theory, we describe a remarkable
instance of a motion-proposing and agenda-setting strategy by the Nazi
party, NSDAP, during the Weimar Republic. Their purpose was to kill
a motion of toleration of the new 1928 Government, and they were supported
by their fiercest enemies on the far left, the communist party. The
combined killer strategy was bound to be successful, but it ultimately
failed because of another agenda-setting counter-move undertaken by the
Reichstag president.


Moldovanu, B (2018), ‘DP13260 A Nazi ”Killer” Amendment‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13260. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp13260