Discussion paper

DP14595 Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity

We examine whether optimization incentives --- incentives to best-respond --- have an effect on behavior in finitely repeated two-player dilemma games with strategic complements. We run an experiment in which we increase optimization incentives in two different ways compared to a baseline treatment. In the first treatment, the increase in optimization incentives is created by an increase in payoffs on the best-response curve, while its slope remains unchanged. In the second treatment, the increase in optimization incentives takes the form of an increase in the slope of the best-response curve, while best-response payoffs remain unchanged. We find that the impact of optimization incentives is overshadowed by the effect of the slope of the best-response curve. Although an increase in optimization incentives leads subjects to best-respond more frequently when the best-response curve is relatively flat, it leads to more cooperative behavior if it is accompanied by an increase in the slope of the best-response function.

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Citation

Potters, J and S Suetens (2020), ‘DP14595 Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 14595. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp14595