Discussion paper

DP15398 Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.


Bennedsen, M, V Mehrotra, J Shim and Y Wiwattanakantang (2020), ‘DP15398 Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 15398. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp15398