Discussion paper

DP15401 Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote

Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive
legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party
that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts.
We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design
perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties
who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve
two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the
popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.


Bierbrauer, F and M Polborn (2020), ‘DP15401 Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 15401. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp15401