Discussion paper

DP15711 Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis

This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where
senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the
receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous
experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and
receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous
literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our
findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to
avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself.


Cabrales, A, F Feri, P Gottardi and M Meléndez-Jiménez (2021), ‘DP15711 Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 15711. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp15711