Discussion paper

DP2520 Debt Maturity and the Global Financial Architecture

The paper starts from the premise that the debate on the ?new architecture? of the international financial system should be based on a theory that endogenizes the structure of countries' external liabilities. I present a model in which the maturity of a country's external sovereign debt is the solution to an incentives problem, which may lead to reliance on short-term debt and vulnerability to runs. I study, in the context of this model, the welfare effects of an international lender of last resort, measures aimed at coordinating creditors in crises, and a tax on short-term capital flows. These measures may increase or decrease global welfare, and always leave it strictly below the first-best level.


Jeanne, O (2000), ‘DP2520 Debt Maturity and the Global Financial Architecture‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2520. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp2520