Discussion paper

DP2621 The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, ?globalization? should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.


Neven, D and L Röller (2000), ‘DP2621 The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2621. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp2621