Discussion paper

DP5564 Screening Disability Insurance Applications

This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.


Lindeboom, M, B van der Klaauw and P de Jong (2006), ‘DP5564 Screening Disability Insurance Applications‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5564. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp5564