Discussion paper

DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team?s performance and therefore on their colleagues? productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers? indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence.


Kosfeld, M and F Von Siemens (2014), ‘DP9833 Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9833. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp9833