

Assignats or Death: Inflationary Finance in Revolutionary France*

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Abstract

Between 1794 and 1796, France experienced an unprecedented hyperinflation fueled by an explosion of paper money called the *assignat*. In September 1795, the French adopted the Constitution of Year III, which we use to demonstrate how constitutional changes can have important effects on monetary phenomena. We find that the new regime had a structural effect on the demand for money that substantially weakened the link between real money balances and inflation, and that failing to account for this effect results in substantially different estimates of the seigniorage-maximizing rates of inflation. We also find that the new regime increased the volatility of inflation, suggesting that the previous regime was more effective at anchoring the public's inflation expectations. Taken together, these results lend credence to the constitutional perspective's primary theoretical insight.

Keywords: Constitutional Political Economy, Demand for Money, Inflationary Finance, French Revolution

JEL Codes: D72, E31, N13

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Let the French people know well
that they need assignat or death.

Edmond Louis Alexis
Dubois-Crancé
In front of the National Assembly
Ventôse 4, Year IV

1 Introduction

Throughout history, governments have relied on money creation to raise revenue, especially during periods of political instability. While there is a tendency to think of such episodes as a relatively recent phenomenon, the first known case of hyperinflation occurred long before the widespread adoption of discretionary fiat standards in the 20th century (Bernholz, 2016, p. 15). Between 1794 and 1796, in the midst of a revolution precipitated by unsustainable government deficits, France experienced an unprecedented hyperinflation fueled by an explosion of paper money called the *assignat* (Sargent & Velde, 1995; White, 1995). Despite a longstanding tradition of using episodes like the *assignat* to study inflationary finance, there has been comparatively little research on this topic incorporating constitutional political economy, which emphasizes the importance of the “rules of the game” in determining the strategies adopted by the public and government officials (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980). We think the *assignat* hyperinflation can help fill this gap.

In September 1795, the French adopted the Constitution of Year III. The new constitution established the French Directory, which came to power in November 1795 and subsequently abandoned the *assignat* four months later. The new constitution also included provisions intended to address the public finance crisis that had led to hyperinflation in the first place. For example, while under the Convention, a multitude of parliamentary committees appropriated public funds without much regard for the deficit and without much consent from the assembly, sometimes without a prior vote or during a time when the assembly was not in session. The new constitution, however, forced the executive branch to stipulate the use of funds before they could be allocated by the parliament (Sciout, 1895, p. 455). More importantly, this constitutional

change considerably weakened the political support for the *assignats* and made their demonetization more likely. In this paper, we use the constitutional reform to demonstrate how changes in the “rules of the game” and in the “political equilibrium” can have important effects on the monetary phenomena that are critical to the study of inflationary finance.

The basic insight that emerges from the inflationary finance literature is that there is a limit to how much revenue the monetary authorities can derive from money creation, and that the limit is reached when the demand for real money balances is unit elastic, provided the authorities can create nominal money balances at zero cost (Bailey, 1956; Cagan, 1956). This insight is analogous to the distinction between the tax rate and tax base. The monetary authorities select an inflation rate which generates a corresponding amount of inflationary tax revenue – known as seigniorage. The amount of seigniorage which can be collected, in turn, varies depending on how sensitive to inflation the public’s demand for real balances is.

The problem with framing the issue in this way is that it essentially assumes the inflationary tax base, i.e., the quantity of real balances held by the public is independent of the rules governing the monetary authorities’ behavior, which is not likely to be the case. The public’s willingness to hold positive quantities of real balances will depend on the credibility of the monetary authorities’ commitment to not engage in surprise inflation. Without a rule, either formal or informal, binding the monetary authorities to a particular policy, it will generally be in their interest to behave opportunistically (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Calvo, 1978; Sjaastad, 1976). Only when the monetary authorities internalize some of the costs of inflation is it no longer in their interest to maximally inflate (Barro, 1983).

The obvious empirical implication of the constitutional perspective is that estimates of the demand for money during hyperinflation are likely to be biased unless they account for regime or political changes. If a political regime is unstable, which seems likely because political instability is one of the primary drivers of inflationary finance, (Aisen & Veiga, 2008; Cukierman et al., 1992), the demand for money will be unstable as well. Despite an extensive empirical literature applying the standard approach to recent periods of hyperinflation, including those in Venezuela

(Pittaluga et al., 2020) and Zimbabwe (Miller & Ndhlela, 2020), we still know very little about the effects of constitutional changes on inflationary finance. The available evidence we do possess lends credence to the relevance of the constitutional perspective. For example, Thomas Sargent's (1982) analysis of the factors that contributed to the end of hyperinflation in Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland indicates that it was the rules governing the monetary authorities, rather than the quantity of money, that stopped prices from rising. Likewise, in their analysis of the German hyperinflation, Michael et al. (1994) argue that the observed breakdown in the demand for money near the end of that episode was caused by a failure on the part of researchers to account for the effects of regime change.

We contribute to this literature in several respects. First, we construct weekly series of real balances and inflation using de Nogaret's (1800) estimates of the quantity of outstanding *assignats* and Caron's (1909) estimates of the *assignat* price of gold that span the final two years of the *assignat's* existence. Using these series, we look for evidence of a breakdown in the money-demand relationship during the *assignat* hyperinflation, and find that there was in fact a structural break in the relationship between real balances and inflation that coincides with the establishment of the Directorial regime in early November 1795. Next, using Taylor's (1991) method of estimating the demand for money during hyperinflation, we find a considerable weakening of the inverse relationship between real balances and inflation once the Directory came to power, which we argue was likely the result of the regime's eventual abandonment of the *assignat*.

Moreover, we find that failing to account for the new regime's effect on the demand for the *assignat* biases the parameter estimates, leading to substantially different implied seigniorage-maximizing rates of inflation. For instance, if we ignore the regime change, our estimates imply a seigniorage-maximizing rate of 35% per 10 days; however, once we account for the regime change, the implied seigniorage-maximizing rate decreases to 19%. Next, we use Grier & Perry's (1998) method to estimate inflation uncertainty on either side of the structural break, and find that inflation was less predictable under the Directorial regime than it was under its predecessor,

suggesting that - perhaps surprisingly - the previous regime was more effective at anchoring the public's expectations of inflation than was the Directory. Taken together, these results lend credence to the constitutional perspective's primary theoretical insight.

We are not the first to apply the inflationary finance framework to the French Revolution. In their analysis of the *assignat* hyperinflation, Brezis & Crouzet (1995) found that actual inflation exceeded the seigniorage-maximizing rate by a wide margin, and concluded from this result that the government's budget deficit was much too large to finance with seigniorage. However, we think their analysis is problematic for several reasons. First, their sample spans the period between 1792 through 1796, but as Sargent & Velde (1995) have argued, only the period between 1794 and 1796 appears to be consistent with the standard hyperinflation model of money demand. The results of our structural break analysis suggest that even this restricted sample is too large, and that only the period between the end of the Terror in July 1794 and the start of the Directorial regime in November 1795 appears to be consistent with the standard hyperinflation model.

Another issue with Brezis & Crouzet's analysis is that they used domestic prices to measure inflation, which introduces an additional source of measurement error since governments often interfere with domestic prices during hyperinflation (Petrović & Mladenović, 2000). Using the price of gold to measure inflation avoids this issue because it is akin to using the exchange rate, which is a much better measure of inflation when estimating the demand for money during hyperinflation (Frenkel, 1976; Mladenović & Petrović, 2010). Finally, Brezis & Crouzet's analysis assumed the French public formed their expectations of inflation adaptively, which leads to a number of identification problems (Salemi & Sargent, 1979; Sargent, 1977). We avoid this issue by using Taylor's (1991) approach, which is agnostic with respect to the formation of inflation expectations. Contrary to Brezis & Crouzet, we find that between 1794 and 1795, the inflation rate was, with few exceptions, below the seigniorage-maximizing rate, indicating that a larger budget deficit may have been sustainable, albeit at the cost of even higher inflation.

We proceed as follows. In the next section, we discuss the role of the *assignat* in the

French Revolution. Section 3 contains a simple model of the demand for money that highlights the strategic nature of inflationary finance that yields important implications for our empirical analysis. In Section 4, we describe the data. Our empirical strategy is described and our results are reported and analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 The Role of the *Assignats* During the French Revolution

The French revolution was first triggered by a fight between the King and the parliament of Paris regarding public finances. By 1788, government deficits were no longer sustainable. More than 20% of government revenue came from borrowing, while nearly 50% of government spending consisted of repaying the debt and the interest payments necessary to service it Braesch (1934). In a desperate attempt to find a solution to the regime's fiscal problems, the King summoned the Estates General, but things went from bad to worse. For instance, a member of the Committee of Finances Montesquiou (1791 8) declared that in 1789 "loans, fatal and last resource of our finances, had even become impossible."

Despite the radical change to France's political institutions following the third-estate declaring themselves the National Assembly in June, 1789, the government's fiscal situation remained dire. Over the course of the following decade, successive governments tried without success to reduce the budget deficit using any means available to them: expropriations, new taxes, looting of military-occupied regions, and inflation. The "unpleasant fiscal arithmetic" (Sargent & Velde, 1995) that gripped the *Ancien Régime*, combined with the changes in the tax system operated by the revolutionaries led to no other recourse but inflation.

In November 1789, Montesquiou (1789) spoke in front of the National Assembly, and informed its members that the debt due amounted to 557 million pounds, more than one entire year of revenue. Worse still, the government was on the wrong side of the bond finance "Laffer curve." For instance, in August 1789, Jacques Necker, the minister of Finances, tried to open two loans, one for 30 million pounds at 4.5% interest and another for 80 millions at 5%. Both

attempts failed to raise the money announced. Having recognized his mistake, Necker reported to the Asssembly on September 24 of that same year that “new loans can only increase the current deficit” (*Archives Parlementaires* 9:143).

Some members of the newly created National Assembly suggested that the assets owned by the clergy could be seized by the State and auctioned to address the deficit. On November 2, 1789, the Assembly voted for the nationalization of the ecclesiastic properties - 568 votes for and 346 against. While expropriating the Church’s assets helped the government remain solvent, resources were still needed to pay the debt due as the Church’s properties were relatively illiquid. Only one solution remained: paper money. The public were, of course, skeptical of the new paper money called the *assignat*, so the National Assembly had to provide guarantees that it would not constantly inflate its way out of trouble. To that end, the *assignats* were supposed to either be used in the auctions of national assets and then canceled or redeemed for gold that the government earned from the sale of clergy property. In other words, the *assignats* were not supposed to be used to finance the government’s budget, but rather their intended purpose was to assist with the liquidation of the existing public debt.

As Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue, it is possible for the effects of anticipated future monetary changes to offset present changes in the money supply. If the *assignats* had indeed been used only to liquidate the public debt, for which the expropriated assets of the clergy were supposed to be the collateral, the money supply would have gradually decreased as the assets were sold and the *assignats* used to purchase them burnt. Thus, the cancellation of the *assignats* after the selling of expropriated properties was, at least in theory, a way to anchor inflation expectations by guarantying a future contraction of the money supply. On the other hand, opponents of the *assignats* - such as Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre¹ or the economist Dupont de Nemours² - argued that burning the *assignats* used to buy the Church’s assets was not sufficient to limit inflation. They warned that a doubling of the money supply would lead to a doubling in prices.

According to Sargent & Velde (1995), the primary function of the *assignats* - i.e., liquidating


¹*Archives Parlementaires*. vol.19, p.276.

²*Archives Parlementaires*. vol.19, p.224-237.

the public debt - was respected until April 1792, when public spending surged following the beginning of hostilities against the first coalition. Indeed, the declaration of war in April 1792 was followed by an almost ten-fold increase in the “real” deficit (Figure 1). Once it became clear that the *assignats* were going to be used to finance the deficit, inflation started to increase. As early as in 1793, Saint-Just argued in a letter that France was already in an hyperinflation dynamic:

The enormous creations of assignats that we have made have their source mainly in the acquisition of numéraire. The more assignats we create, the more the relative value of the currency increases, and the more the currency increases, the more assignats must be created. (Gross et al., 1962, p. 225)

Figure 1: Monthly Government Deficit




Source: Archives Parlementaires.

Although we do not have data about the monthly deficit after April 1795, we do know the extent to which the government relied on inflationary finance. In Figure 2, we calculate

weekly real seigniorage expressed in December 1790 prices.³ The French government raised real seigniorage equivalent to 15.2 million pounds from December 1790 on average. In comparison, in 1790, the French government spent 690.7 million pounds (Braesch, 1934), or an equivalent of 13.3 million pounds per week - represented by the horizontal line in Figure 2. In other words, seigniorage alone was sufficient to finance a level of public spending greater than the entire 1790 budget for most of the period studied.

Figure 2: Real seigniorage in December 1790 pounds.



Inflation really started to increase after the Fall of Robespierre in June 1794, and by the beginning of 1795, France was in a hyperinflationary dynamic that would last until April 1796. By the end of 1794, the deficit was out of control, tripling from 219 to 638 million pounds from December 1794 to April 1795 (Figure 1). Tax collection at that point was virtually nonexistent. Taxes covered only 12% of total government spending in February 1795, 9.9% in March, and 6.4%

³Following Sargent & Velde (1995), we estimate real seigniorage as being equal to $\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{0.5(P_t + P_{t-1})}$. Weeks here are “revolutionary” weeks and differ from the Gregorian calendar in that they are 10 days long instead of 7.

in April.⁴

The *assignat* hyperinflation is unique in that it overlapped with a constitutional change. In the early weeks of November 1795, a new regime, with a new constitution and legislature, was established. This change was characterized by the unfolding of a long and turbulent struggle between different factions in the National Assembly, especially between the *Girondins* and *Jacobins*. The new regime reflected a change of attitude toward the *assignat* (Levasseur, 1903; Crouzet, 1993). Political support for the paper money weakened as the *Jacobins*, who had relentlessly supported the interests of those holding the *assignats*, lost their grip on the reins of power. Thus, the establishment of the Directorial regime likely meant the *assignat's* days were numbered, and in consequence, the demand for the paper money collapsed.

Sargent & Velde (1995) argue that the French Revolution can be characterized by three different monetary theories: (1) The Real-bills doctrine, (2) Legal Restriction Theory and (3) Classical hyperinflation *à la* Cagan. Only after the fall of Robespierre, Sargent and Velde argue, was the relationship between real money balances and inflation similar to that described by Cagan (1956). We argue, on the other hand, that applying Cagan's approach to the aforementioned period can be misleading if the effect of the introduction of the Directory on the public's expectations is not taken into account. Our econometric exercise in section 5 suggests that the Cagan approach seems to describe the relationship between real money balances and inflation between the fall of Robespierre and the establishment of the Directorial regime in November 1795, but does not apply to the period following the establishment of the new regime. As we show in section 5, there is at least one structural break in the relationship between real money balances and inflation around November 12, 1795, which corresponds to the establishment of the Directory. We suggest that the change of political regime was responsible for the breakdown of the Cagan relationship.

The idea that the French public considered the effects of constitutional change when making

⁴For the month of February, see *Le Moniteur Universel*, n°165, March 5 1795, p.595. For March see: *Journal des débats et des décrets*, n°912, p.134-135. For April see: *Collection générale des décrets rendus par la convention nationale* Vol. 61 (Floréal an III; 20 avril-19 mai 1795), p.58-59.

decisions about how much money to hold is far from being merely a theoretical possibility. For instance, numerous police reports and newspaper articles refer to the impact of a change in the Constitution on the value of *assignats*. For instance, on June 28, 1795, the *Courrier français*, links constitutional changes to inflation:

We must believe that the hope of a new Constitution would bring consolation in the hearts and would reduce the price of commodities. Whatever the cause, the price of goods and particularly that of edibles has increased by almost a third. This circumstance should hasten the debates to which the new plan of Constitution will give rise, and above all determine the government to put a very prompt economy in its finances. (Aulard, 1899, p. 42).

Similarly, a police report declared on June 20, 1795 that “organic laws occupy people’s minds, as well as the restoration of finances” (Aulard, 1899, p. 26) and on June 23, 1795, another police report describes how Parisians in coffee shops, after having talked of the rise in the price of gold and silver, declared that “Courage and patience is needed; it is only gradually [...] that the Constitution will be organized, that the price of foodstuffs will decrease and abundance will be reborn with trust.” (Aulard, 1899, p. 31).

Monetary affairs also received significant attention from politicians at the end of the Convention. Already in February 1795, Cambon was proposing a plan to burn 3 to 4 billion pounds of *assignats*.⁵ During the Convention’s last weeks, leading politicians became worried that out of control inflation would lead to a coup where their heads could quite literally be lost. The president of the Committee of Public Safety, Cambacérès, declared during a session that if inflation continues “well, we run the risk of being hooked to the lantern.”⁶ “Assignat or death” was not simply a rhetorical trick; it was a grim possibility for politicians at the time.

Consequently, reestablishing balance in public finances, limiting inflation, and reinstating confidence among the public became primordial concerns during the Constitutional debates

⁵*Le Messager du Soir*, n°921, February 26, 1795.

⁶Mobs used lamp posts for improvised lynchings and executions in Paris during the revolution.

preceding the establishment of the Directory. Following the debates over the institutions of the new Directorial regime, the Constitution of Year III included provisions that specified the functions of the Treasury to avoid the abuses that had existed during the Convention where a multitude of committees increased public spending without regard to the overall health of public finances. One of the first acts the new parliament undertook was to name a commission whose purpose was to find a way to return to a stable currency.

3 Rules, Seigniorage, and the Demand for Money

Before proceeding to our empirical analysis, a discussion of the relationship between inflationary finance and the rules that constrain the government's ability to create money is in order. The intuition behind our discussion in this section is straightforward: the seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation depends on the rules governing the monetary authorities' behavior. Different rules will produce different tax rates and base structures. Thus, the empirical analysis of inflationary finance must account for the effect that institutions and institutional changes have on the public's demand for money, otherwise estimates of the relevant parameters will be biased.


We use a model similar to that found in Brennan & Buchanan (1980, pp. 138-144). In this model, the time horizon is infinite, the economy is closed and in a state of stationary equilibrium, and the government possesses a monopoly over money creation.⁷ In the first period, the government creates a stock of non-interest bearing money that it offers to the public in exchange for real resources. To induce the public to accept this offer, the government permits citizens to use this money to pay their taxes in subsequent periods, conferring a benefit to the government in the form of an interest-free loan worth the real value of the money stock.

More formally, the government earns $r \cdot m$ in each period, where r is the real interest rate and m is the stock of real money balances, i.e., $m = M/P$ where M denotes the stock of nominal balances and P the price level. Since the government receives this benefit in perpetuity, the present value of its monopoly franchise is $r \cdot m/r$, or simply m . This relationship can be

⁷See Friedman (1971) for a model of inflationary finance in a growing economy.

expressed graphically. Consider the demand curve for real balances depicted in Figure 3. The horizontal axis measures the quantity of real balances (denominated in initial period dollars) and the vertical axis measures the capitalized cost of holding different quantities of those balances in perpetuity. In the zero-inflation case, the price of a dollar's worth of liquidity services provided by a unit of real balances is simply \$1; a dollar's worth of real balances must yield a dollar's worth of liquidity services at the margin. Since the monopoly franchise entitles the government to the present value of those liquidity services, the capital value of its franchise is depicted in Figure 3 as either the area $0ABC$, or simply $0C$.

Figure 3: The Demand for Real Money Balances



To make this point more concrete, suppose the government exchanges \$100 worth of newly created money for an equivalent amount of real resources from the public in the first period. Had the government borrowed via traditional means, it would have to return the principal plus

interest. However, because the public gave up the \$100 worth of real resources in exchange for the liquidity services, the government-issued money provides, the government need only return the principal. At an interest rate of 10%, the monopoly franchise confers a benefit to the government worth \$10 per period in perpetuity, or \$100 - the real value of the money stock. Thus, even with zero inflation, the present value of the government's monopoly franchise is positive.

With inflation, the price of holding a unit of real balances is higher because maintaining the same stock requires additional resources. If the inflation rate, π , is constant and accurately predicted by the public, the present value of the additional cost that must be incurred to maintain a unit of real balances in perpetuity is:

$$\frac{\pi}{1 + (\pi + r)} + \frac{\pi(1 + \pi)}{[1 + (\pi + r)]^2} + \dots + \frac{\pi(1 + \pi)^{n-1}}{[1 + (\pi + r)]^n} = \frac{\pi}{r} \quad (1)$$

Thus, with inflation, the price of maintaining a dollar's worth of liquidity services in perpetuity is:

$$\$1 + \frac{\pi}{r} \quad (2)$$

How does inflation affect the value of the government's monopoly franchise? Like the zero-inflation case, the capital value of the government's money creation powers is equal to the quantity of real balances the public holds times the price the government charges the public for those balances, except now this price includes the capitalized cost of inflation:

$$m \cdot \left(\$1 + \frac{\pi}{r} \right) \quad (3)$$

To maximize the present value of its monopoly franchise, the government must select a rate of inflation consistent with ensuring that:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \pi} m(1 + \pi/r) = 0 \quad (4)$$

In other words, the government must select the rate of inflation, π^* , where the demand for real balances is unit elastic (assuming the government can costlessly produce nominal balances). At π^* , the capital value of the government's monopoly franchise is equal to the area $0DEF$ depicted in Figure 1.

Thus far, our analysis presumes the government is bound to whatever inflation rate it selects - a commitment that the public must regard as credible. To see why, suppose the government announces that it will pursue the seigniorage-maximizing inflation rate, π^* . Once the public adjust their money balances in response to this announcement, the government is in a position to reap a capital gain by creating more inflation than the public expect. For instance, suppose it selects the inflation rate π' . As Figure 1 illustrates, the government will earn a capital gain equal to the area $DGHE$. Indeed, the additional seigniorage revenue the government can collect from higher-than-anticipated inflation in this scenario is limited only by the government's ability to issue nominal balances.

If the public believed that such a deception was an isolated event, the capital value of the government's monopoly franchise would be substantially larger than that indicated in our earlier analysis. The public, of course, are unlikely to be this myopic. What sort of expectations might they adopt in this setting? The answer depends on the public's perception of the government's objective, what, if anything, constrains its money creation powers, and the time horizon over which the public expects the government-issued money to exist.

We start off by assuming the government's sole objective is to extract the maximum amount of seigniorage revenue possible, and that there is nothing constraining its ability to create nominal balances. If the public are aware of these conditions, then their dominant strategy is to hold positive real balances if and only if they believe the government will not renege on its prior commitment regarding the future path of the money supply. Table 1 depicts the the sort of game the public and the monetary authorities are playing.

Suppose b in Table 1 reflects the capital value of the government's monopoly franchise when $\pi = \pi^*$, and c the one-shot payout it can earn by renegeing on its commitment to the public,

Table 1: Strategic interaction between the public and the government

Taxpayer	Government	
	Maximum Inflation	Restraint
Hold cash	$(-a, +c)$	$(+a, +b), c > b$
Zero Money Balances	$(0, 0)$	$(0, 0)$

who will never accept government-issued money again if cheated. In this case, cooperation can only be sustained when the present value of the government’s monopoly franchise sufficiently exceeds the revenue from maximally inflating. Formally, cooperation can be sustained when the rate at which the government discounts future seigniorage revenue is greater than or equal to $1 - b/c$. The trouble is c may be quite large relative to b . As Figure 3 illustrates, the government can temporarily push the public off their money demand curve and reap the corresponding amount of revenue. If there is nothing constraining the government’s ability to create money, c approaches infinity. Thus, any equilibrium where the public hold positive real balances is extremely tenuous as even slight deviations from the expected future path of money growth may signal to the public that the government is trying to fool them, potentially causing the public’s demand for money to fluctuate widely.

Even during the most severe episodes of hyperinflation - including the case of the *assignat* - the observed quantity of real balances is positive, which suggests something must constrain the government’s ability to create money, whether that is resource limitations, interest group pressures, etc.⁸ The point we want to emphasize here, however, is that the tenuousness of any monetary equilibrium under such a scenario makes estimating the public’s money demand extremely difficult, precisely because it is unclear what sort of expectations would be rational in this context. As we explain in the next section, this insight requires first, determining whether the monetary regime was reasonably stable during the period under investigation, and second, utilizing an estimation technique that does not require strong assumptions about how the public

⁸Two examples that illustrate this point are the recent hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, where the monetary authorities ran out of the paper necessary to continue printing at the rate they needed, and the U.S. Civil War, where Confederate lawmakers responded to political pressure to reduce quantity of money (Cutsinger & Ingber, 2019).

form their expectations of future inflation.

However tenuous the existing monetary equilibrium is, cooperation can nevertheless be sustained provided the time horizon over which the public expects the money to exist remains indefinite. What happens if there is a known end date? In this case, cooperation becomes impossible. The public, aware the government's dominant strategy is to maximally inflate in subsequent periods, will be unwilling to hold any of the government-issued money. This insight also has an important empirical implication for the study of inflationary finance. When it becomes evident to the public that the government is going to abandon the currency - as it did in the case of the *assignat* - they will try to reduce their holdings of the currency to zero. Thus, our framework predicts that once such an announcement is made, the relationship between real balances and inflation will cease to exist.

4 Data

To test whether the constitutional reform affected the public's demand for the *assignat*, we use data from Ramel de Nogaret (1800) on the money supply that spans the period beginning on April 30, 1794 and ending on June 9, 1796, and data from Caron (1909) on the price level over that same period. We use the data copied from the Treasuries registers by de Nogaret (1800), who argues that the money supply can be derived from the difference between the number of *assignats* burnt and the number of *assignats* issued by the Treasury. Previous scholars have used the data given by de Nogaret (1800) in monthly form (Sargent & Velde, 1995), even though Nogaret's data are given at weekly intervals.⁹ As weekly data is better suited for identifying the effect of constitutional change on money demand, we use Nogaret's data in its original form. In that sense, we follow Mladenović & Petrović's (2010), work on the Serbian hyperinflation where they argue that during periods of severe inflation, people adjust their money balances more rapidly than they otherwise would, and so monthly data may lead to misleading results.

⁹The revolutionary week is not exactly a week. The idiosyncrasies of the French revolutionary calendar means that each week is 10 days long.

When converted into a monthly series, the data given by de Nogaret (1800) is nearly identical to the data used by White (1987). The correlation coefficient between the two series is 0.999 and the correlation coefficient between their growth rates is 0.973.¹⁰

Table 2: Summary statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Whole period</i> (May 10 1794 to May 10 1796)					
<i>log(Real Money balances)</i>	73	20.24178	1.089679	18.45577	21.47849
$\Delta\log(\textit{Prices})$	73	.065968	.0986267	-.1582222	.4149466
<i>First period</i> (May 10 1794 to November 2 1796)					
<i>log(Real Money balances)</i>	54	20.77258	.7093434	19.00384	21.47849
$\Delta\log(\textit{Prices})$	54	.0688343	.088452	-.0689907	.4149466
<i>Second period</i> (November 12 1796 to May 10 1796)					
<i>log(Real Money balances)</i>	19	18.73318	.1431112	18.45577	18.94592
$\Delta\log(\textit{Prices})$	19	.0578215	.1256089	-.1582222	.3566732


Caron’s (1909) data gives the quantity of nuéraire that could be purchased with 100 pounds of *assignats*. The data from the *Tableaux de Dépréciation* was collected to enable debtors who contracted their debt in *assignat* to settle their debt. The law of June 23, 1797 ordered each department to produce a table accounting for the depreciation of the paper money based on the price of: gold, foodstuff, real estate, and other commodities. (White, 1991, p. 245) argues that those tables are “a fairly accurate measure of inflation [...], particularly during the last and most rapid phase of inflation.” We use the data for prices in the department of the Seine, i.e., Paris.

Over the two-year period between 1794 and 1796, prices increased by more than 11,000%, or by an average of 6.6% every 10 days between May 10, 1794 and May 10, 1796.¹¹ Although it is difficult to know to what extent departmental figures reflect the price of gold, gold and

¹⁰In fact, the two series have a one day lag. While de Nogaret (1800) reports the money supply data on the 1, 11, and 21 day of the month, White (1987) reports the money supply on the last day of the month, (the 30th). To calculate the correlation coefficients, we matched the data from the 30th with the data from the 1st.

¹¹The average inflation rate is a geometric mean. Thus, the price index is equal to 277.778, in the first period, and 34285.699 on the last. Hence, $34285.7 = 277.8e^{73x}$, where 73 is the number of periods and solving for x gives the geometrical average of the inflation rate per period.

Figure 4: Real Balances and Inflation



commodity prices closely followed each other, giving more credibility to our measure of the price level. On a theoretical level, using the price of gold to measure the price level is adequate during periods of severe inflation because people have an incentive to separate the medium of account and the medium of exchange. For instance, while goods and services may have been denominated in gold, the *assignats* were used as the medium of exchange until 1796 - at least in Paris. Likewise, a police report from December 9, 1795, describes how “if they [Parisian Merchants] sell for *assignats*, it is only after having calculated the numéraire they worth at the stock exchange.” (Aulard, 1899, p. 489).¹² Although data about commodity prices are relatively scarce, we compare daily gold prices to daily price data for a few commodities published in *Le Moniteur* between August and December 1795.¹³ Those price series confirm that commodity

¹²See also Aulard (1899, p. 508)

¹³Those data are consistent and completed with the data published in the *Journal de Paris* during the same period.

prices closely followed the price of gold (Appendix 7.1).

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Structural Break in the demand for money and the Directory

A key implication of the theoretical approach we discussed in Section 3 is that regime change *may* affect the demand for money.¹⁴ If this conjecture is correct, estimates of the demand for money that fail to account for such changes will yield misleading results. Thus, the first step in our empirical analysis is to determine whether the constitutional reform affected the demand for the *assignat*. To do so, we test for a structural break in the relationship between the real balances and inflation series without imposing a known break date, by combining the test statistics computed for each possible break date in the sample.¹⁵ Using the supremum Wald test¹⁶, we find that there is in fact a structural break in the series that occurs around November 12, 1795, which coincides with the start of the Directorial regime a few days earlier. Table 3 reports the results of our structural break analysis.

One worry could be that our results are sensitive to the choices over both the start and end dates. Hence, we use both a restricted and more comprehensive sample in each of our econometric exercises. The more comprehensive sample starts on May 10th, 1794 and ends on May 10th, 1796, after which it was announced that the *assignats* would soon lose their legal tender status. Sargent & Velde (1995) claim that the *assignats* can be analyzed as an hyperinflation *à la* Cagan only for the period after the execution of Robespierre and ending in March 1796. Hence, we restrict our sample from July 29th, 1794 (the first observation after the

¹⁴We say “may” here because some cases of reform may be nothing more than a change in the de jure rules leaving the de facto rules unchanged.

¹⁵See Andrews (1993), Kim & Siegmund (1989), and Quandt (1960) for additional details on this approach.

¹⁶We chose the supremum of a set of Wald statistics because it allows for error heteroskedasticity, persistent errors, and unknown break points. See Vogelsang (1997). The first two are present in the data, and the latter is an artifact of this being an investigation. Incidentally, the Chow test, often used to test for structural breaks in linear regressions, does not accommodate those two allowances. See Hansen (2001). Finally, an LM test, as seen in Andrews (1993), offers a similar framework to the Wald test. However, according to Vogelsang (1997) the Wald test is relatively conservative in the presence of persistent errors, which we find using ARIMA models.

fall of Robespierre) to March 22th, 1796 (after which date the supply of *assignats* started to fall). Our results are robust to changes in both the start and end dates. The structural break test is also corroborated visually. The Directorial regime’s effect on the demand for *assignats* can be seen in Figure 5, by the divergence of periodic observations of demand.

Table 3: Evidence for Structural Break

Wald Test for a Structural Break		
Sample	May 10, 1794 - May 10, 1796	July 29, 1794 - March 22, 1796
Supremum Wald Statistic	657.1485***	421.1725***
P-value	0.000	0.000
Break Date	November 12, 1795	November 12, 1795


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

We also used the supremum Wald test to look for structural breaks across either side of the November 12th divide. We did find evidence for an additional break around June 9th, 1795. Careful inspection of Figure 5 supports this finding. This structural break seems to correspond with the failed *Montagnard* insurrection at the end of May 1795 (see Appendix 7.2). According to Crouzet (1993, p. 386) the failure of this insurrection and the disarmament of the faubourg Saint-Antoine “could leave the way to a new politics” *vis-à-vis* finances and the *assignats* as the *Jacobins* lost control of the assembly.

Since our purpose in this paper is to assess the effect of constitutional reform on the demand for money, and not about the number of structural breaks, for simplicity, we felt including an additional break on June 9th, 1795 was out of scope. Yet qualitative evidence corroborates the effect of the failed *Montagnard* coup on the *assignats*, and therefore gives additional support to our thesis that changes to the political equilibrium may affect the demand for money. After the obliteration of the *Montagnard* opposition and much political unrest, the public expected a new constitution to be enacted, and thought this would affect inflation. The Parisian police report that on June 15, 1795 people “would still see with the greatest satisfaction [...] the *assignats* take back a credit considerable enough to let go of anxiety. It has also been noted that what mainly occupies the minds, but without agitation, is the expectation of the new government,

whose mode must be soon proposed.” (Aulard, 1899, p. 15). Yet one growing worry was that the government would default on the *assignats*. For instance, on June 17, 1795, we read in a police report: “Dufresnoy says he heard several individuals say they were not surprised at the loss the *assignats* felt, since during the course of next month France was to have a chief, and bankruptcy would be declared” (Aulard, 1899, p. 20). Similarly, On June 13, 1795, a police agent reports that he heard in a coffee shop that “the project of the Convention was to demonetize the *assignats* of ten thousands and five hundred pounds and that people added that several members of parliament did not hesitate to say in their societies that there was no other ways to bring in seven or eight billion of *assignats* on the fifteen which are circulating.” (Aulard, 1899, p. 12).


Figure 5: Scatterplot of Real Balances and Inflation



The new Directorial Congress met for the first time on October 30th, 1795, and the first Director was nominated on November 1st. The identified structural break in the relationship between money balances and inflation (Table 3) happened around November 12. Since our data was collected over 10 day periods, and since this structural break does not correspond to either

changes in economic regulations or major military events (Appendix 7.2), we are confident that the decline in the demand for money was the result of the change in political regime. The structural break we identified also corresponds to a sudden and sharp increase in bond prices. Figure 6 shows the market price for a perpetual bond yielding an annuity of 100 pounds. Those *inscriptions* refer to the consolidation of the public debt in 1792, which led all the contracts of the creditors of the state into an inscription in a great book, which was called the “Great Book of the Public Debt.” This reform transformed different claims into perpetual annuities yielding the same interest rate (Thiers, 1845, p. 320). The establishment of the new Constitution matches with a more than 7 fold increase in the price of perpetual bonds between October 28 and November 4. This suggests that the structural break in the demand for money we identified corresponds with a radical change in people’s expectations vis-à-vis fiscal and monetary policy.

Figure 6: Perpetual Bond Prices During the Regime Change



Why did the enactment of the Directorial regime have such a dramatic negative effect on the demand for *assignats*? Mostly because the change of institutions was accompanied with

a weakening of the *Jacobin* left, which strongly opposed the demonetization of the *assignats* (Lefebvre, 1977, p. 104), and because a constitutional change in a period of exacerbated political instability is an extremely uncertain endeavor. As long as the *Jacobin* remained a major political force, demonetization was out of the question as evidenced by the fact that the Convention avoided engaging in monetary reform during the entire summer of 1795. The Directorial regime, on the other hand, was eager to return to a metallic currency, even if it was at the expense of the owners of the *assignats*. The new lower chamber, the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, was not as committed to avoiding a de facto default on the *assignats* (Levasseur, 1903, p. 126).

The successful establishment of the Directory was far from certain even in the first week of its existence. On October 3rd 1795, 7 Parisian sections were declared to be in a state of insurrection. On October 5th, the monarchists attempted a failed coup. With both the *Jacobins* and the monarchists crushed, the Directory was now able to emerge. The faith of the new Constitution, however, remained uncertain until the very end. As Director de La Révellière-Lépeaux (1895, pp. 257-263) explains in his memoirs, the attempted coup by the monarchists gave some *Thermidorians* an excuse to stop the establishment of the Constitution of Year III and to reestablish the Revolutionary government. A secret agent reports that on October 24th, two days before the official start of the Directorial regime, some people in Paris “manifested the fear that the work of the Convention would continue beyond the 5th of this month [Brumaire], which would further delay the organization of the constitutional government.” (Aulard, 1899, p. 335). Even after the official start of the regime, the threat of a *Jacobin* coup remained acute (Lefebvre, 1977) and Director de La Révellière-Lépeaux (1895) remembered being seized with “mortal anguish” during the first few days of the Directory. The remaining *Jacobins* in the Directorial Congress such as Dubois-Crancé or Lindet fiercely defended the interests of the bearers of *assignats* by opposing their demonetization (Crouzet, 1993; Lefebvre, 1977). Yet their influence was now too limited to determine the course of monetary policy, and the Directors “were decided to abandon the assignats” (Crouzet, 1993, p. 399).

One day after the directorial Congress was constituted, on October 31st, 1795, the *Conseil*

des Cinq-Cents immediately ordered a report to be written on how to reform the monetary constitution, by which we mean the constraints placed on the money creation process. The report, directed by Eschassériaux was presented in front of the parliament on November 13, 1795. Eschassériaux' project was to limit the ability of the government to inflate the currency. He asked for the quantity of *assignats* to be made public (T1, art.1), to limit the total supply of *assignats* permanently to 30 billion pounds (T1, art. 3), to break the printing press on January 5th, 1796 (T.1, art.2) and to convert the *assignats* into what would have been devalued bonds (T.2, art.1). Eschassériaux also complained that the depreciation of the *assignats* “made tax revenue almost null.” Hence, Eschassériaux' commission proposed to fix taxes in gold and accept either gold or *assignats* at its market price to pay them.¹⁷

Eschassériaux' plan to go back to metallic currency was tantamount to a de facto default on the *assignats*, which would have lost their legal tender status. The left of the political spectrum fought back. Dubois-Crancé argued the choice was between “assignats or death” while Lindet argued that demonetization was no different from bankruptcy. Although Eschassériaux' plan was voted against by the *Conseil des Anciens* on December 5th, the worry that the *assignats* would soon be demonetized became pervasive. On November 13th, 1795, a secret agent reports people “fear that the assignats will be demonetized” (Aulard, 1899, p. 382). Similarly, on November 15th, 1795, another police report claims that some people “pretend that assignats of less than 100 pounds are going to be demonetized” (Aulard, 1899, p. 388) and another, the same day, warns that the public sees the *assignats* “annihilation as proximate” (Aulard, 1899, p. 389). Paradoxically, given that the government could not easily raise more revenue through taxes or loans, limiting its ability to collect revenue through seigniorage increased the probability of demonetization.¹⁸

¹⁷*Le Moniteur Universel*, November 24 1795, n6, p.51

¹⁸This point is similar to that made in (Sargent & Wallace, 1981).

5.2 Constitutional change and the demand for money

The presence of a structural break on November 12th, 1795 suggests that the successful establishment of the Directorial regime did affect the demand for the *assignats*. To determine exactly how it did, we now turn to estimating the demand for the *assignats* on either side of the structural break, treating each period as its own sample. To do so, we use the following Cagan-style money demand function:

$$(m - p)_t = -\alpha \Delta p_{t+1}^e + \psi_t \quad (5)$$

where m and p denote the natural logarithms of the money supply and price level, respectively, Δ denotes the difference operator, e denotes the public's expectations formed at time t , and ψ_t denotes factors - such as real income and interest rates - whose effect on the demand for money are assumed to be relatively small compared to the those of expected inflation when prices are rapidly increasing (Cagan, 1956, p. 25). The primary variable of interest in equation 5 is α - the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to expected inflation. Once we obtain an estimate for α , we can determine whether French officials were maximizing the revenue from seigniorage, which, as we noted in our theoretical discussion of inflationary finance, occurs where the demand for money is unit elastic. In the case of equation 5, unit elasticity occurs where $\Delta p_{t+1}^e = 1/\alpha$.

We adopt the approach first introduced by Taylor (1991) to estimate the demand for *assignats* that produces an estimate of α that does not require us to make restrictive assumptions about how the public form their expectations of inflation.¹⁹ Instead, this approach allows us to estimate α using ordinary least squares, provided the real balances and inflation series possess certain qualities. To see what those qualities are, we begin by substituting expected inflation in equation 5 with actual inflation:

$$(m - p)_t = -\alpha \Delta p_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1} \quad (6)$$

¹⁹See Salemi & Sargent (1979) and Sargent (1977), for discussions of how the assumptions regarding expectations affect Cagan's approach to hyperinflation. See Phylaktis & Taylor (1993) for an application of the approach we use in this paper to episodes of money mischief in Latin America.

where $\mu_{t+1} = \psi_t + \alpha(\Delta p_{t+1} - \Delta p_{t+1}^e)$.²⁰

Suppose that the growth rates of both real balances and inflation are first-difference stationary, and that μ_{t+1} is stationary, i.e., both ψ_t and the public's forecast errors of inflation are $I(0)$. Adding $\alpha\Delta p_t$ to both sides of equation 6 yields:

$$(m - p)_t + \alpha\Delta p_t = -\alpha\Delta^2 p_{t+1} + \mu_{t+1} \quad (7)$$

If both terms on the right-hand side of equation 7 are stationary, the linear combination of real balances and inflation must also be stationary, despite the fact that each series individually is not.²¹ That is, the two series are cointegrated with a cointegrating parameter, after normalizing on real balances, equal to Cagan's α . Thus, a sufficient condition for the applicability of Cagan's model of hyperinflation is for real balances and inflation to be cointegrated. If satisfied, this condition allows us to estimate equation 6 using ordinary least squares.

Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests

Note: This table represents results on the sample from May 10th, 1794 through May 10th, 1796. The results from our contrasting sample, from July 29th 1794 through March 22th, 1796, have similar results and can be furnished by the authors.

Variable	t-Statistic	1% Critical Value	p-Value for Z(t)
1st Difference in Change in Money Demand	-6.668	-3.551	0.0000
1st Difference in Change in Prices	-14.305	-3.551	0.0000

Table 4 reports the results of our unit root tests for stationarity. Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, where the null hypothesis supposes a unit root and the alternative suggests that the variable was generated by a stationary process, we can test to see if real balances and inflation are stationary. That is, if we can reject the null, the two series can be said to have a tendency toward a constant mean, allowing for asymptotic modelling. As the results indicate²²,

²⁰Note that the second term is simply the public's forecast errors of inflation.

²¹Note that the first term on the right-hand side of is the first difference of the inflation series, or equivalently, the second difference of the price series.

²²The results in this table represent those for the whole sample. We re-tested the sample using each break period, finding similar results.

at a 99.9% confidence level, we can reject the null.

Table 5 reports the results of our cointegration tests. Our findings indicate that, from May 10th, 1794 to May 10th, 1796, or as we have defined the whole period, real balances and inflation are cointegrated. However, the statistical strength of the cointegrating parameter increases when we test the periods individually. That is, period 1 and period 2 have at least one cointegrating equation with greater statistical power than the two periods combined. This suggests that estimating Cagan's α across the whole period introduces bias.

Table 5: Johansen Tests for cointegration Across Periods

*Note:*The table represents results on the sample from May 10, 1794 through May 10, 1796. The results from our contrasting sample, from July 29, 1794 through March 22, 1796, have similar results, with one exception. That is, despite having cointegration for both the first period and the whole sample, the second period is not cointegrated across the whole period at the 5% level. This is to be expected, as there are fewer observations to swamp the effects of the structural break.

Period	# of Obs.	Max Rank	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	1% Critical Value
1	52	0	.	26.4951	20.04
		1	0.34174	4.7513*	6.65
		2	0.08732		
2	19	0	.	56.4976	20.04
		1	0.93324	5.0719*	6.65
		2	0.23428		
Period	# of Obs.	Max Rank	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	5% Critical Value
1-2	70	0	.	16.6470	15.41
		1	0.21164	0.0012*	3.76
		2	0.00002		

There are several reasons that may explain why the cointegrating relationship dissipates across the periods individually and that of the whole period. The first is that the establishment of the Directorial regime ultimately led to the abandonment of the *assignat*. Recall that our model of inflationary finance indicated that cooperation between the monetary authorities and the public would break down once the time horizon becomes finite. Once people expected the demonetization of the *assignats*, they started worrying that the government would try to deceive the public to raise additional seigniorage revenue. The Directory suffered from extreme

credible commitment problems.²³ On December 3, 1795, a policeman reports the discontent of the Parisian public which complained that “the Legislature made a law ordering that the printing press be broken in Nivose, and today, it proposes to create more *assignats*” (Aulard, 1899, p. 458). Another police report on December 4th claims that the public was critical of the parliament’s secret sessions (called general committees) and that Parisians saw them as partly responsible for “the rise of gold, the rise of commodities and the daily discredit of the *assignats*” (Aulard, 1899, p. 462). Secrecy during periods of high inflation is likely to be interpreted as the government trying to “cheat” their citizens through even higher rates of inflation. If the public expect the government to cheat, they will reduce their holdings of real money balances regardless of the current inflation rate. While our evidence is only suggestive, we suspect that the decrease in the relationship between real balances and inflation in the second period was caused by the decision to abandon the *assignats*.

We now turn to estimating the demand for *assignats* using equation 7. The first two columns in Table 6 report our results for periods 1 and 2, from May 1794 to May 1796, respectively. Both period’s estimates of α are significant. The first period has a seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation of 19.5% per 10 day period. It is a plausible estimate –the average inflation rate during that period was equal to 6.9%– and offers a sharp contrast to that of the second period. According to an F-test, there is no overlap in the two estimates of α . Moreover, the second period suggests a relatively astronomical seigniorage-maximizing rate. One, well above the inflation rate, which we will explain and visualize in Figure 7.

To avoid introducing bias in the estimates with data prior to that of the inflationary period, we also restricted the same as a robustness check. Columns 4 to 6 in table 6 restrict the sample by deleting the observations before the death of Robespierre (July 28 1794) and the observations after the end of March 1796. Again, in the period before the structural break, our estimate of α is statistically significant and of a plausible magnitude. It implies that the seigniorage-maximizing

²³For instance On December 10 1795, some people in Paris argued that the forced loans was set to bring 60 billions of *assignats* out of circulation (twice as much as the total money supply) as “a political trick from the part of the government to furtively issue 30 billion of new assignats” (Aulard, 1899, p. 492).

Table 6: Estimating Money Demand Using Change in Inflation

Note: This table displays the results of the OLS regressions of the log of real money balances on the first difference of the log of prices (Prices=1 in December 1790). The first three columns use the data of de Nogaret (1800) from May 10, 1794 to May 10, 1796, which is the last observation before the announcement that the *assignats* would lose their legal tender status. Columns 4 to 6 restrict the sample by deleting the observations before the death of Robespierre (July 28 1794) and the observations after the end of March 1796, for which the money supply is shrinking. In all cases, the separation between the first and second period occurs on November 12 1795 -i.e. the date of the structural break identified in Table 3.


	<i>May 10 1794 to May 10 1796</i>			<i>July 29 1794 to March 22 1796</i>		
	(1) 1st Period	(2) 2nd Period	(3) Entire Period	(4) 1st Period	(5) 2nd Period	(6) Entire Period
Inflation	-5.1329*** (0.9461)	-0.5215* (0.2492)	-2.7998** (1.3746)	-4.6019*** (0.9551)	-0.3512 (0.3057)	-2.2419 (1.4421)
Intercept	21.1259*** (0.1001)	18.7633*** (0.0320)	20.4265*** (0.1799)	21.0198*** (0.1202)	18.7535*** (0.0339)	20.3727*** (0.1983)
Seigniorage Maximizing Rate	19.5%	191.7%	35.7%	21.7%	284.8%	44.6%
<i>N</i>	54	19	73	46	14	60
<i>R-Squared</i>	0.4097	0.2095	0.0642	.3575	.1022	.0494

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

rate of approximately 22 percent per 10 days, or roughly 80 percent per month. Figure 7 plots actual inflation during this period against our estimate of the seigniorage-maximizing rate. Inflation during this period was clearly well below that which would have maximized seigniorage revenue, although near the end of the period there were a few weeks where actual inflation surged past the seigniorage-maximizing rate.

Contrasting the results of Table 6’s two samples, an interesting result emerges. We would expect that as we move from the larger sample on the left (columns 1, 2, and 3) to the restricted sample on the right (columns 4, 5, and 6), that we would gain explanatory power because the restricted sample focuses on the period of hyperinflation. When estimating the demand for money during hyperinflation, the standard approach treats the growth in prices as the primary determinant of the public’s demand for money, which means that our R-squared values should increase with the restricted sample. However, we did not find this to be the case, suggesting that the regime change was in fact a conflating factor.

Figure 7: Inflation and the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate



We began this section by noting that failure to account for regime changes could confound efforts to estimate the demand for money. To illustrate this point, we applied the same tests to the whole period. Table 6's third and sixth columns lists our results.²⁴ As before, the estimate of α is statistically significant and of plausible magnitude. Note, however, that the seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation implied by this estimate - nearly 36 percent and 45 percent, per 10 days respectively - is nearly double that implied by our analysis of the first period, regardless of the sample. This difference illustrates the importance of accounting for regime changes in the analysis of money demand during periods of hyperinflation.

²⁴We applied F-tests that suggest that each intercept, that of the individual periods and of the entire sample, is statistically different. This suggests that the regime change, at the very least represents a money demand shock. Moreover, we see a similar result when we compare to the first period's coefficient with those of the other columns of Table 6, despite the lack of statistical confidence in those estimates.

5.3 Estimating The Variation in Inflation Uncertainty

Finally, we consider the likelihood that inflation expectations would become more or less uncertain under a new constitution. Specifically, we do not make the case that uncertainty in inflation expectations increases or decreases. There are arguments for both. On the one hand, we could argue that under some regimes, we would expect additional uncertainty, as the price of holding money undergoes a new discovery process. Conversely, it is possible that a particular regime change is met with such credibility, that the price of holding money becomes more stable. Instead of supporting one or the other, we simply argue that changes in the demand for money, due to regime change, likely changes the ability for demanders to predict inflation. Thus, in this section we use a GARCH model²⁵ to test the hypothesis that a regime change would lead to changes in the uncertainty of inflation expectations.


There is a substantial literature that models the variation in prices, which they term as Relative Price Dispersion (RPD), according the part of inflation that is expected and that which is unexpected. According to Grier & Perry (1998), their application focuses “on separating the effects of trend inflation from inflation uncertainty. Other examples include Vining & Elwertowski (1976) and Parks (1978). All are extensions of the work done by Bollerslev (1986) and Engel (1982). We consider the aspect of those models that are relevant for our hypothesis. That is, we borrow the technique used in modelling unexpected inflation, controlling for the periods of regime change.

Before examining the model, it is worth visualizing the data. In Figure 8, we see volatility in expected inflation, one peak in June of 1795, but then consistently more volatile alongside our statistical structural break²⁶. Note, the figure depicts the variance in the predicted inflation error.

²⁵GARCH stands for generalized, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Based on the work of Engle (1982) these models assume that the conditional error variance can be described by a time- series model. Moreover, the GARCH estimate of the conditional variance of inflation, allows us to capture uncertainty, as opposed to variability.

²⁶The early blip is consistent with the testing of additional structural breaks. We describe that process and their omission in an earlier footnote.

Figure 8: Residual Variance



To model these graphical representations, we use two stages of modeling. In the first, we use an ARMA process to estimate the conditional variance of inflation and a residual component, which signifies the aspect of inflation unexplained by prior inflation knowledge. Then we use a GARCH model to estimate the variance of inflation uncertainty.

$$\pi_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1\pi_{t-1} + \beta_2\epsilon_{t-2} \quad (8)$$

$$\sigma_{\epsilon_t}^2 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1\epsilon_{t-2}^2 + \alpha_2\sigma_{\epsilon_{t-1}}^2 + \alpha_3\text{RegimeChange} \quad (9)$$

Equation 8 describes the inflation rate as a function of the first lag of inflation and a second-order moving average term. This specification was determined using auto-correlation and partial auto-correlation tests. ϵ_t represents the part of inflation unexplained or unexpected, by prior inflation. The intercept and autoregressive component is statistically significant at the

99% level. ²⁷ ²⁸

$$\pi_t = \underset{(.0220)}{.0668} + \underset{(.0917)}{.2325}\pi_{t-1} + \underset{(.1388)}{.2647}\epsilon_{t-2}$$

Equation 9 is a GARCH model of the conditional variance of of inflation uncertainty. The GARCH (2) specification implies that the conditional variance of inflation at time t depends on the prior period’s conditional variance and the squared residual, or unexpected inflation from Equation 8. In accord with the literature, we use this estimated conditional variance as our time series measure of inflation uncertainty. Table 7 contains our results.

Table 7: Estimating Inflation Uncertainty

	GARCH Model Conditional Variance of Inflation Uncertainty
Inflation Uncertainty	
Regime	0.0501*** (0.0203)
Intercept	0.0405*** (0.0043)
1st-Order ARCH i.e., Lagged Inflation Uncertainty	.9698*** (.2810)
2nd-Order GARCH i.e., 2nd Lag - Residual Inflation Variation	0.3538*** (0.1021)
Intercept	0.00009 (.0002)
<i>N</i>	73
<i>AIC</i>	-165.1

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results suggest that there are autoregressive and moving average components. In other words, inflation uncertainty is a function of both expected and unexpected priors. More impor-

²⁷The second-order moving average corresponds with a p-value of .056. While just below the 95th percentile threshold, its inclusion is substantiated with autocorrelation, Chi-squared, and AIC tests. Moreover, its usage becomes statistically significant in the forthcoming GARCH model. That is, slight unexplained persistence in inflation uncertainty contributes to relevant persistence in the conditional variance of inflation uncertainty.

²⁸Standard Errors are in parenthesis. Robust variance estimates are not generally robust to ARMA components. See Hamilton (1994)

tantly, we see that the regime change²⁹ increased the variation in inflation or inflation uncertainty. This increased uncertainty after the establishment of the Directorial regime is corroborated by qualitative evidence. Parisians in the last months of 1795 and early months of 1796 constantly complained about the uncertainty relative to the fate of the *assignats*. For instance, on November 12, 1795, a report to the minister of the Interior indicates that: "The waiting of the general committee relatively to finances put speculators in a state of uncertainty which has a terrible influence on foodstuffs. We expect a partial demonetization of the assignats."³⁰ (Aulard, 1899, 376).

6 Conclusion

While economists have come to recognize the importance of the “rules of the game” in shaping economic and political behavior, this insight has received comparatively little attention in the inflationary finance literature despite the critical role that rules play in monetary affairs. In this paper, we used the *assignat* hyperinflation during the French Revolution to highlight the effect that regime changes can have on the demand for money. We found that the establishment of the Directory led to a substantial change in the relationship between real balances and inflation that was consistent with the model of money we presented in this paper, namely, that the relationship between the two variables broke down, resulting in more volatile inflation. Moreover, our results indicate that prior to the establishment of the Directorial regime, inflation was below the seigniorage-maximizing rate, and that failing to account for the regime change leads to biased estimates of the demand for money and thus the seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation.

A word of caution is in order, however. We focused on only one episode of severe inflation, which limits the lessons that can be gleaned from the *assignat* hyperinflation. Future research on inflationary finance should incorporate the insights from constitutional political economy as

²⁹Here regime represents a binary variable, 1 if the period is after the structural break and 0 otherwise.

³⁰The "general committee" was the name given to the secret sessions of the *Corps Législatif*.

we have tried to do here to determine the empirical relevance of constitutional change. As we see the matter, progress can be made along two margins. First, episodes of hyperinflation that economists have already examined should be revisited. Doing so may help resolve “Cagan’s paradox” - the empirical finding that governments often inflate well beyond the seigniorage-maximizing rate. This paradox may have less to do with “irrational” policymakers and more to do with a failure to account for regime change during periods of hyperinflation. Second, those periods of severe inflation that economists have not yet analyzed should be examined through a constitutional lens. We believe that incorporating a constitutional perspective will yield a much richer understanding of hyperinflation.

Long ago, Philip Cagan (1956, p. 25) motivated his seminal work on hyperinflation by noting that episodes like the *assignat* provide a unique opportunity to examine monetary phenomena. We agree with this sentiment, but think it can be extended to include constitutional factors as well. Hyperinflation often occurs in unstable political environments, which are the product of weak institutions. Weak institutions make regime change more likely, thus periods of severe inflation provide a unique opportunity to apply constitutional political economy to inflationary finance, which we have endeavored to do in this paper.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Price of gold relative to commodity prices




Figure 9: Price of coffee and price of gold during the hyperinflation period.




Figure 10: Price of Marseilles soap and price of gold during the hyperinflation period.




Figure 11: Price of candles and price of gold during the hyperinflation period.

7.2 Timeline

Date	Date index	Distance from nearest break	Economic regulations	Military events	Constitutional and political changes
June 10, 1794	5	-36	“Laws of Prairial” reinforcing the Terror.		
July 28, 1794	9	-32			Fall of Robespierre.
October 7, 1794	16	-25			Proposition in front of the Assembly for the return of 73 <i>Girondins</i> .
November 9, 1794	20	-21	The Maximum for grain is increased to $\frac{2}{3}$ the 1790 prices. The use of forced sales of grain (Réquisitions) are restricted.		
December 24, 1794	24	-17	Abolition of the Maximum.		
January 2, 1795	25	-16	The Convention abolishes the interdiction to export metallic currency.		
April 23, 1795	36	-5			The Convention creates a commission composed of 11 parliamentarians to discuss Constitutional reform.
April 25, 1795	36	-5	Selling and buying metallic currency is legalized and stock exchanges are re-opened.		
May 16, 1795	38	-3	Demonetization of the Royal Assignats.		
May 21, 1795	39	-2	Mettalic currency is once again forbidden (decree of April 5 is repealed).		

May 20 to 24, 1795	39	-2			Major montagnard insurrection which lasted 4 days and ended up with the defeat of the insurgents.
June 9, 1795	41	0	POTENTIAL STRUCTURAL BREAK		
June 14, 1795	41	0			Parliamentarians who were involved in the attempted coup of Prairial (May 20 to 24) are executed.
June 17, 1795	41	0	Reubell in the name of the Committee of public safety proposes to index tax payments to the amount of <i>assignats</i> issued.		
June 21, 1795	42	1	Taxes and payments are indexed on the amount of <i>assignats</i> issued.		
June 23, 1795	42	1		Landing of royalist forces in Quiberon leading to their resounding defeat.	Boissy d'Anglas proposes to the assembly the preliminary project for the Constitution of Year III.
July 1, 1795	43	2		Annexation of Belgium to France.	
July 20, 1795	45	4	The <i>Contribution foncière</i> must be paid half in grain.		
July 22, 1795	45	4		Paix de Bale - Peace with Spain.	
August 30, 1795	49	-6	Selling and buying metallic currency is legalized definitely.		
September 6, 1795	49	-6			The new Constitution is adopted by plebiscite.
October 5, 1795	52	-3			Royalist insurrection in Paris.

October 26, 1795	54	-1			The Directorial regime is officially instituted.
October 30, 1795	54	-1			The two chambers of the new regime's parliament are in session for the first time.
November 1, 1795	54	-1			The first Director (i.e. the first member of the executive branch) is nominated.
November 12, 1795	55	0	STRUCTURAL BREAK		
December 10, 1795	58	3	The parliament votes in favor of a 600 million forced loan. The loan is a total failure.		
December 23, 1795	60	5	The <i>Conseil des 500</i> decides that the printing press will be destroyed once the total value of the <i>assignats</i> printed reaches 40 billion pounds.		
February 19, 1796	65	10	The printing press is publically destroyed.		
March 19, 1796	68	13	Creation of a new paper money, The <i>Mandats</i> .		
May 23, 1796	75	20	Assignats above 100 pounds stop to be legal tender after the end of June.		