|
|
Do
Economists Understand Science and Technology?
Partha
Dasgupta
Recent years have
seen a disturbing slowdown in the growth of productivity in Western
industrial countries. Perhaps as a consequence the theory of market
structures in general, and of technological competition in particular,
is today one of the most active areas of economic research. Economists
have, of course, long recognized that prices are but one weapon that
firms use to compete with one another and that they are a dominant mode
of competition only in the mature phase of an industry. It is only in
the last decade, however, that economists have begun to understand the
complex range of strategies used by firms in a capitalist society, not
only to compete against one another, but also in many instances, to
prevent other firms from competing. The use of such strategies as
research and development (R & D), advertising, share issues,
capacity creation and product 'quality' result in market structures and
behaviour that differ markedly from the textbook descriptions of
competitive markets.
Much of the new industrial organization theory is concerned with the
world of technology, not science; the processes studied by the theory
have been those that result in technological change, not scientific
progress. It is therefore not surprising that if economists continue to
understand technology less well than they would wish, they understand
science even less. This is disturbing because it implies that the
science policies pursued by governments will continue to be based on an
even more fragile understanding than will their technology policies.
Both science and technology, as social organizations, are concerned with
the production and use of information. Is it then useful for economists
to distinguish between them? Can a reasonably precise analytical
distinction be drawn between the search for scientific knowledge and
those forms of technological research and discovery to which the
writings of Joseph Schumpeter first drew attention? Historians and
sociologists of science have considered the criteria for such a
distinction already. Some have argued that scientific and technological
research are to be distinguished by the characteristics of the 'research
technology': for example, the allegedly greater risk involved in
scientific research. Others have drawn the contrast on the basis of the
nature of the commodity produced by the research: for example, by
whether or not the addition to knowledge has practical applications
(often contrasted by the labels 'basic' and 'applied' research).
Finally, attention has been drawn to a distinction based on the way
science and technology, as social organizations, treat the information
they produce, in particular, the attitudes, behaviour and institutional
arrangements relating to the communication of research findings.
Science, it is argued, insists on complete disclosure, while
technological research is kept secret or is protected by patents.
In CEPR Discussion Paper No. 74, Paul David of Stanford University and I
argue that these distinctions are of limited relevance in the design of
policy. For the purposes of economic analysis, the essential difference
between science and technology lies in the respective goals the two
communities have set for themselves. Roughly speaking, the scientific
community appears concerned directly with the stock of knowledge,
and is concerned to foster its growth. The technological community, on
the other hand, is concerned with the private returns, or the economic rents,
that can be earned from this stock of knowledge. In the social role of
'scientist', a researcher views the stock of knowledge ultimately as a public
consumption good; in the social role of a 'technologist; however,
the researcher regards it as a private capital good. Each
community, quite naturally, seeks to inculcate in its members, through
training and incentives, attitudes concerning research procedures that
tend to further its particular objective. One manifestation of this
process is the greater urgency shown by scientists in disseminating
newly acquired information throughout the research community. This
emphasis is not shared by the technological community, whose members are
free to adopt information strategies ranging from disclosure (in the
case of patent acquisition) to total secrecy in regard to their
discoveries and inventions.
This distinction between science and technology enables us to explain
why, despite the strong similarities between the two communities,
individuals generally move from science to technology but not in the
other direction. We also analyze the role of priority of discovery as a
basis for allocating rewards among scientists, its compatibility with
the norm of disclosure in science, and the ambiguous status of patent
systems in technology. There are certain ineluctable conflicts between
the goals of the two research communities. These conflicts help us to
understand why the position of science in modern industrial societies is
so exalted yet so financially precarious. Although the contributions of
scientists and technologists to the search for knowledge are
interdependent, and although science and technology enjoy a symbiotic
relation, we find that science as a social entity is today in danger of
being undermined by the technological community's conception of
knowledge as a form of productive capital. If the position of science is
undermined today, however, that of technology will be undermined
tomorrow. This will result in slower growth of both public and private
knowledge, which will further constrain the possibility of economic
growth in the future.
The distinction that we draw between science and technology makes the
diffusion of scientific knowledge somewhat easier to understand than
that of technological knowledge. Many years ago Joseph Schumpeter
constructed a theory of capitalist economic development based on a chain
consisting of individual sequences of invention, innovation and
diffusion; or, in other words, on the origins, development and use
of technology. Valuable subsequent research by Edwin Mansfield and
others has given us a better idea of the nature of diffusion processes.
This earlier work, which was based on 'epidemic' learning models, has
been supplanted by research which delves deeper into the workings of
such learning processes. This is based on the hypothesis that
individuals choose rationally whether or not to adopt a new technology.
The research has followed two routes. One has concentrated on the fact
that individuals typically do not know how fruitful it will be for them
to innovate; they learn from observing the success or failure of others
who have already adopted the new technology. The second route ignores
uncertainty and concentrates instead on the differences in the costs and
benefits of the new technology. In this approach firms adopt a new
technology at different dates because the costs they incur and the
benefits they enjoy from adoption differ. As the technology becomes
cheaper over time it is diffused among those firms which were initially
more reluctant to adopt it. A central aim of this research has been to
explain the familiar S-shaped 'logistic' curve which describes the
diffusion of new technologies. In CEPR Discussion Paper No. 49, Paul
David and CEPR Research Fellow Paul Stoneman have integrated these two
approaches. They have at the same time allowed the profitability of
innovation to be determined within their model and have thus directly
linked the sequence of invention, innovation and diffusion through their
analysis.
One focus of the new industrial organization theory has been
microeconomics of technological change, but it is applicable more
generally. It departs from the earlier theory in its attempt to explain
not only industrial performance but also industrial structure. The
structure of an industry, which earlier theory had taken as given and
exogenous is now seen as endogenous. In particular, empirical
regularities such as the relationship between industrial concentration
and R & D expenditure which have traditionally been given causal
explanations are no longer necessarily seen in these terms. The new
theory treats both as jointly endogenous and subject to explanation.
This altered - and deeper - perspective has profound implications for
policies regarding research and development, and anti-trust.
A much-discussed issue in recent years has been the ability of potential
competition to serve the same role that actual competition serves
in textbook economic models. The theory of price competition, for
example, has traditionally assumed that active firms are actually
engaged in such competition. Actual competition therefore provides a
discipline for firms. Recently several economists, most notably William
Baumol of Princeton University, have argued that one does not need
actual competition, that under certain circumstances the incumbent firms
in an industry can be disciplined as effectively by potential as by
actual competition. If the incumbent firm feels threatened by rivals
'standing in the wings', it will, under certain circumstances, act in as
disciplined a manner as society would wish it to. It has been shown that
even when the incumbent enjoys large economies of scale, the threat of
entry by rivals can force it to expand its production to the point where
it prices its product at the average cost of production and earns only
normal profits. This implies that government regulation may well be
unnecessary even when an industry is a natural monopoly; that is, even
when the size of the market, relative to the economies of scale in
production, is not large enough to warrant more than one active firm in
the industry.
A key assumption in this theory is that the scale-economies are due to
indivisibilities, or fixed costs, but not sunk costs. A
firm's cost is 'fixed' if it is independent of the quantity produced so
long as production is undertaken, but is not incurred otherwise. A cost
is 'sunk' if it cannot be recovered even if the firm subsequently
decides not to produce anything. A model that incorporates sunk costs
must necessarily incorporate time explicitly. This may appear to be an
obvious requirement of a model, and it is. But most elementary textbooks
ignore the temporal sequence of production. A major achievement of the
new industrial organization theory is its explicit handling of time and
thus of history.
Now, it can be argued that all production involves some sunk
costs. In a forthcoming CEPR Discussion Paper entitled 'Welfare and
Competition with Sunk Costs', Joseph Stiglitz of Princeton University
and I demonstrate that the presence of sunk costs, no matter how small,
may serve as an effective barrier to entry for new firms. A potential
entrant, contemplating entry, will wish to estimate what its profits
will be subsequent should it enter. Suppose that it has good reasons for
believing that competition with the incumbent will be fierce; or in
other words, that the incumbent will not be accommodating, and so
profits will be negligible. If entry involves a cost that must be sunk
the firm will not enter because it expects that entry followed by
competition will result in losses. The incumbent firm can anticipate
such reasoning by its rivals and knows that the rival will not enter the
market. Safe from competition, the incumbent can thus charge a monopoly
price. Potential competition is here totally ineffective, and this
provides an argument for government regulation.
The foregoing argument suggests strongly that the more fierce post-entry
competition is expected to be, the less incentive there will be for
firms to enter. This in turn implies less actual competition and greater
security for incumbent firms. This tension between pre-entry and
post-entry competition has important implications for policy. There are
circumstances in which government policies which restrict post-entry
competition actually serve to increase welfare, by encouraging entry! In
our Discussion Paper, we show by means of a simple example that minimum
price regulations (or in other words the imposition of price floors)
can result in lower actual prices by encouraging entry. The
converse of this is also true: policies that are intended to encourage
competition, by making firms compete more vigourously within a market,
may actually reduce both competition and social welfare by discouraging
entry.
The extent to which costs are sunk is often a decision taken by the
firm. Under some circumstances firms will take actions which they would
not take in the absence of potential competition. They may sink costs
earlier, or to a greater extent, than they otherwise would, simply in
order to deter entry, and not for any other purpose. An important
example of such discretionary sunk costs is R & D expenditure. An
incumbent firm may have incentives to accelerate its R & D programme
so as to obtain a patent, not necessarily for the purpose of producing
the new product, but for preventing other firms from doing so. Thus a
patent may be taken out but not used. In extreme cases as has been noted
in some recent work, the incumbent may accelerate to R & D programme
so as to obtain a sufficient research lead and only that. That is it may
then decide not to complete the programme. The lead if sufficiently
large will discourage entry because the potential entrant will know that
if it tries to complete it will not succeed. These entry-deterrence
activities on the part of the incumbent reduce welfare, because they are
wasteful: profits are reduced and prices remain high. We present
examples in which potential competition results in everyone being worse
off than they would be were there legal barriers to entry.
An important form of technological progress is learning-by-doing, in
which a firm's productivity increases with production experience. There
is now extensive empirical evidence of this learning effect, for example
in the semiconductor industry. One way of formulating this effect is to
assume that the firm's cost per unit of production declines with its
cumulative output. Of course, learning effects may spill over to other
firms, so that a firm's unit cost tomorrow may also to some extent
depend on the output of rival firms today. Industry managers call this
the learning curve. Learning provides an interesting form of
increasing-returns-to-scale, one which operates only through time. It in
fact creates a natural monopoly, since industry-wide unit cost falls
fastest if production is restricted to a single firm. Learning also
involves sunk costs. A firm cannot 'unlearn' and recoup the expenditure
it incurred acquiring (past) production experience!
Learning-by-doing provided economists such as Mill and Bastable with a
loose argument for protecting domestic 'infant industries' against
foreign competition, an argument which has been revived in recent years
in the United States and Western Europe. But to date economic theory has
told us very little about the industrial structure one might expect if
there is a learning curve. Presumably, such an understanding is a
pre-requisite for policy debates.
In another forthcoming CEPR Discussion Paper entitled 'Learning-
by-Doing, Competition and the Infant Industry Argument', Joseph Stiglitz
and I explore the effect of learning-by-doing on the structure, conduct
and performance of an industry.
We find that learning provides a nationalized industry with a reason for
pricing its product below current marginal production cost, for
learning provides the link through which today's higher production leads
to tomorrow's lower costs. We also develop formulae for giving optimal
pricing policy when the nationalized industry must break even over its
planning horizon. Setting price below current marginal (or unit) cost is
still the right policy in the infant phase, though in the more mature
phase price must exceed the then current unit cost so as to cover the
losses incurred in earlier years. We also derive production and pricing
rules that a protected private monopolist would follow and show that
monopoly output is less in each period than the optimal output of a
revenue-constrained nationalized industry.
The central case we examine, however, is one where market structure is
not given, but is influenced by the learning process. We consider the
case of an incumbent firm which is threatened by a rival possessing the
option of entering the market now or at any time in the future. Entry
involves an arbitrarily small fixed cost that must be sunk. We produce
examples in which, as in our earlier paper, the presence of the potential
entrant has absolutely no effect on the behaviour of the incumbent. In
the presence of sunk costs, the invisible hand is not merely weak, it is
paralysed! These examples also provide a formal demonstration that small
historical accidents (such as which firm was the first to innovate) can
have a large cummulative role in the temporal unfolding of an industry.
We then examine government policies for such an industry, exploring the
implications of two policies often advocated, both reflections of
anti-trust legislation in the United states. We first analyse the effect
of the imposition of a ceiling on the market share that a given firm can
enjoy - an application of the 'per se' doctrine. We also examine the
effect of the government's setting current marginal costs as the lower
bound on the price that the incumbent firm can charge - the rationale
being that a lower price is symptomatic of predatory pricing. We find
that both these policies can reduce social welfare in a wide variety of
circumstances, because they severely reduce the extent to which learning
in fact occurs in the resulting market.
We also examine optimum trade policies in the presence of
learning-by-doing. Learning provides a government with an argument for
subsidizing domestic production, not for imposing an import tariff on
foreign competition. In fact if foreign firms face a learning curve and
if domestic production is possible only at a high cost there is a case
for subsidizing imports! Import subsidies coax greater output from the
foreign exporter and thus reduce future production costs. Provided that
import subsidies are suitably chosen, future import prices may be
lowered to such an extent that the importing country is better off!
Recent developments in the theory of industrial organization have been
for the most part in the field of positive economics. As noted earlier,
our understanding of appropriate regulatory policies is vastly
imcomplete. This is especially so in the field of technology policy.
For this reason CEPR is organizing a major conference on The
Economics of Technology Policy in September 1986. The conference
agenda will address the following questions:
(1) What might one mean by appropriate rates of technological advance?
(2) Under what circumstances will the optimal rate of technological
advance be generated?
(3) How should governments intervene to correct sub-optimality? (4) How
does government policy aimed at one part of the Schumpeterian sequence
of invention-innovation-diffusion affect the other parts?
(5) What are the links between trade and technology policies?
This is one
of a series of articles describing research relevant to economic policy.
Partha Dasgupta is Professor of Economics at Cambridge University and a
Fellow of St John's College. He is Director of CEPR's programme on
Developments in Applied Economic Theory and Econometrics. Further
details of the research described in this article can be found in CEPR
Discussion Papers Nos. 49 and 74. CEPR is organising a major conference
on The Economics of Technology Policy in September 1986. Further
information on this and other CEPR initiatives in science and technology
policy can be obtained by contacting Professor Dasgupta at the Centre.
|
|