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Although the European Union has extended trade liberalization to
several countries of Central and Eastern Europe under the `Europe
Agreements', lobbying by various powerful interest groups has led to the
exclusion of a number of `sensitive' sectors. In Discussion Paper No.
1000, Programme Director Damien Neven reviews the literature on
the political economy of trade liberalization and finds that lobbying is
most effective when industrial interests are very narrow, or wide
but concentrated regionally, or facing inelastic import demand or highly
elastic export demand. He then examines recent trade flows to determine
the sectors that are most vulnerable to Eastern competition.
Imports into (exports from) the EU have risen (fallen) further for
Southern than for Northern members. The `sensitive' sectors are not
those that have suffered the greatest rises in import penetration at the
EU level, and these changes are poorly correlated across member states.
Intra-industry trade with the East has risen further for the Southern
members, suggesting that their relative factor endowments are similar.
Trade flows' factor content suggests the East has a comparative
advantage over all EU members in industries with high inputs of
capital and unskilled labour. Revealed comparative advantage suggests
that West European concerns about Eastern competition in `sensitive'
sectors are misplaced. |