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European
Monetary Union
Insuring stability
EMU will entail the loss of the exchange rate as an independent
policy instrument to cope with asymmetric shocks to the member
economies. If goods and factor prices were sufficiently flexible for
immediate relative price adjustment, this loss would pose no problem for
macroeconomic stability. Nominal rigidities, however, limit the role of
this adjustment mechanism. Costs associated with the movement of labour
and physical capital limit the effectiveness of factor mobility for
adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks that are transitory. As a
result, it is feared that EMU will aggravate the national output and
employment effects of transitory asymmetric shocks.
According to Research Fellow Jürgen von Hagen and George
Hammond in Discussion Paper No. 1170, existing monetary unions
commonly provide such stabilization through the national or federal
fiscal system. This requires a minimal size of the central government
budget to be effective, however. The authors study the alternative
potential of an such an insurance system using historical data from the
12 economies of the EU prior to the last enlargement. The evaluation
focuses on the performance of alternative arrangements rather than their
practical implementation. Each alternative is judged in terms of the
size and direction of the payments, and their budgetary and
distributional implications. The simulations show that stabilizing
asymmetric shocks around a common trend may amplify the univariate
variance of GDP for some member countries. The price of simplifying the
design of the transfer scheme can be very high, and it is suggested that
the monetary union would operate more smoothly if monetary integration
were to be undertaken after a high degree of economic integration has
already been realized. Furthermore, the EU may well be better off
without inventing an insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks.
Region Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks. An Empirical Study for
the European Community
Jürgen von Hagen and George W Hammond
Discussion Paper No. 1170, May 1995 (IM)
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