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International borders are under increasing pressure from migration. On the one hand, dramatic growth of populations in less developed countries, international economic disparities, better information in poor countries about the degree of those disparities, and reduced migration costs increase the external migration pressure on the borders of the rich countries. On the other hand, there is growing internal pressure to keep foreigners out – especially poor ones. In Discussion Paper No. 1271, Gordon Myers and Yorgos Papageorgiou study immigration control in a simple one-good model of a homogeneous population in a congested world. The authors compare quota, the predominant instrument of immigration control, with an entrance price or immigration toll. Under the quota system, countries place an upper limit on the number of immigrants they will accept. The total is then partitioned among immigration classes, say, economic migrants, political refugees and family reunification. In the model, an absence of immigration controls (a world of free movement) is first-best efficient and equitable. The paper shows that when the income disparity at the initial population is sufficiently large, a quota system is characterized by an inefficient prohibition of immigration. Tolls restore efficiency, but enable the migrant-receiving country to capture all efficiency gains from migration. It concludes that free movement dominates tolls, and tolls dominate quotas. International Migration Controls |