Political Macroeconomics
Optimum Electoral Areas

In the literature on politics and macroeconomics, the issue of political business cycles has been widely studied. Research has identified two different types of cycles. One school postulates that governments generate `opportunistic' cycles in order to be re-elected. The other assumes that parties voted into power produce `partisan' cycles in order to pursue their ideologies. Opportunistic cycles are related to elections, while partisan cycles are connected to changes in government. In Discussion paper No 1290, Research Fellow Andre Sapir and Khalid Sekkat present ideas that lay at the intersection between the literature on macroeconomics and politics and the literature on coordination. It uses models of political business cycles in an open economy setting to investigate the costs and benefits of forming electoral areas, i.e. regions where countries share the same electoral calendar. Both opportunistic and partisan models are considered. The main finding of the paper is that the desirability of an electoral area between two countries is enhanced when the spillovers between these countries are large and positive, and when they face symmetric shocks. Hence, if a group of countries constitutes an optimum currency area it is also likely to be an optimum electoral area.

The paper sheds light on the situation in the European Union (EU), a collection of fifteen highly interdependent states, each with its own electoral calendar. In the context of `political macroeconomics' with fifteen economically interdependent, but politically independent, states, the coordination problem discussed earlier can be solved in two ways. One solution would consist of preventing governments from manipulating economic policies, for instance by making central banks independent and/or by limiting public deficits as envisaged in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. Another solution would be to adopt a single election day throughout the EU, like in the United States. The analysis can also be instructive in the context of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), where coordination problems also arise due to increasing interdependence.

Optimum Electoral Areas
André Sapir and Khalid Sekkat

Discussion Paper No. 1290, November 1995 (IM)