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European
Integration
Spanish steps
Since 1986, Spain's economic performance in the EC has been highly
successful, partly on account of a very favourable external environment.
In Discussion Paper No. 388, Research Fellow José Viñals
argues, however, that Spain has still to experience a large part of the
combined `EEC-cum-1992' shock, which involves opening up the current and
capital accounts. Viñals focuses on transmission mechanisms in the real
and financial sectors, arguing that Spain could enjoy significant
long-term gains from full integration into the EC by exploiting its
comparative labour cost advantage and existing scale and scope
economies.
Successful adjustment will,however, require the reallocation of
productive resources from contracting to expanding sectors. Given
rigidities in factor markets, the short- to medium-term result may be
idle capacity and more unemployment. To realize the gains while
minimizing the adjustment costs, Viñals concludes, it is essential that
steps be taken to improve the functioning of the labour market, to
develop long-term capital markets, and to let fiscal policy share with
monetary policy the burden of achieving internal and external balance.
This paper was produced for the CEPR project on `Economic Integration in
the Enlarged European Community', described more fully in Bulletin No.
36.
In June 1989, the Spanish peseta entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism of
the EMS, subject to a transitional 6% band, wider than for existing
member currencies. The claimed advantages of obeying formally the rules
of the System, compared to the former, managed floating policy, relate
to the reduction of short-run exchange rate volatility and of long-run
misalignments; the stabilizing effects of such reduced fluctuations; and
the role of the System in enhancing the credibility of monetary policy.
In Discussion Paper No. 389, Viñals argues that EMS membership may well
be the best available exchange rate arrangement for Spain, since it will
reduce the size of short-run, unpredictable and self-reversing exchange
rate fluctuations, and accommodate medium-run exchange rate movements.
This will bring important benefits, since the EC accounts for 57% of
Spain's imports, 66% of exports and a large portion of registered
capital flows. A theoretically optimal exchange rate regime would
maintain parities in response to monetary shocks, ensuring they are
accommodated in money markets without affecting the real side of the
economy, while allowing adjustments in relative prices in response to
real shocks, but such a regime may be too complex to design and operate
in practice.
Viñals argues that EMS membership may be particularly beneficial in
altering the constraints on macroeconomic policy. By reducing the
incentives to inflationary policies and allowing further doses of fiscal
and wage discipline, it could provide the increased discipline needed to
reduce inflation further. It will therefore ensure that the
disinflationary benefits of the last decade are not lost and also help
achieve lower and more stable inflation in the future, with lower output
and employment costs. Achieving the necessary stability of the peseta
exchange rate within the EMS will also require better coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies. Though in the past EMS membership has not
fostered fiscal discipline, Viñals argues, the large increase in
capital mobility and the abolition of exchange controls will
considerably increase the costs of fiscal indiscipline.
On optimistic growth assumptions, it may be sufficient to hold the
structural primary budget deficit below 0.1-0.7% of GDP. On pessimistic
growth assumptions, however, a surplus of 0.5% of GDP may be required to
maintain the peseta exchange rate against the Deutschmark. EMS
membership will therefore help Spain not only in the monetary field, but
also in assisting fiscal reform. It would be desirable, Viñals
concludes, to shift the mix of policy towards a less expansionary fiscal
stance and less contractionary monetary policy, so that price and
exchange rate stability can be achieved without capital controls.
Spain and the `EEC cum 1992' Shock
José Viñals et al.
The EMS, Spain and Macroeconomic Policy
José Viñals
Discussion Paper Nos. 388 and 389, March 1990 (IM)
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