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Non-tariff
Barriers
Welfare costs of
trade restrictions
The recent rise in the US trade deficit has led to widespread
questioning of the benefits of free trade and increased non- tariff
barriers to trade, of which the most important have been voluntary
export restraints (VERs) on imports of steel and of Japanese autos, and
the quotas on textiles and clothing imports negotiated under the multi-fibre
arrangement. These have been the subject of several recent studies using
partial equilibrium models, which have provided useful estimates of the
costs of individual non-tariff barriers. Aggregating the costs of such
restrictions requires a general equilibrium approach, however, for three
reasons. First, it removes an upward bias by including a
balance-of-trade constraint; second, it accounts for the effects of
income transfers to and from the rest of the world, particularly the
effects of quota rents on resource allocation; and third, it takes into
account economy-wide resource constraints and inter-industry linkages.
In Discussion Paper No. 401, Research Fellow Jaime de Melo and David
Tarr use a static ten-sector computable general equilibrium model of
the US economy to estimate the costs of these protectionist measures
using previous estimates of the elasticities of capital/labour
substitution, import demand and export supply, and of the `premium
rates' paid
to the exporters of the three types of good facing trade restrictions.
The authors break up the costs of restrictions into the direct costs of
income or rent transfer to foreigners and the distortionary costs
arising from the divergence of the prices faced by US consumers (and
producers) from the world prices they would otherwise face. They find
that capturing the rents accruing to foreigners for the three sectors
considered, taken together, would result in an annual welfare gain of
about $15 billion. Eliminating the distortionary costs of quantitative
restrictions would result in a further $6 billion welfare gain, while
eliminating the remaining tariff protection would yield a further $0.5
billion.
They also estimate that the simultaneous removal of the restrictions on
all three sectors would lead to the loss of some 170,000 jobs in
textiles and steel, but that the autos sector would gain 1,700 jobs,
first because of the reduction in the price of steel, and second because
of the increased demand for autos in response to the effects on consumer
income of the removal of restrictions. They estimate the net benefits of
removing restrictions to amount to $104 billion over six years.
Finally, they estimate that the distortionary (and total) costs of the
quantitative restrictions estimated for the three sectors are equivalent
to those implied by average tariff levels of 13% (and 20%), which have
not been seen since the early days of multilateral tariff negotiations.
Welfare Costs of US Quotas in Textiles, Steel and Autos
Jaime de Melo and David Tarr
Discussion Paper No. 401 (IT)
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