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Public
Debt
Sustaining Spain
Spanish macroeconomic policy appears to have been highly responsive
to developments in the external account during 1974-7 and 1980-2.
Following these periods, the Democratic Centre government devalued the
peseta by 15% and tightened monetary policy in July 1977, and the
Socialist government embarked on a 10% devaluation accompanied by a
further tightening of monetary policy and a set of structural
supply-side reforms to improve production potential in 1982. Since this
policy shift and entry into the European Community in 1986, Spain has
experienced strong output growth and gradual disinflation, accompanied
by a serious deterioration of the current account. Spain has now become
a net creditor and the peseta is appreciating in both nominal and real
terms. Much debate currently surrounds the possible need for corrective
policy measures to sustain Spain's current external position.
In Discussion Paper No. 505, Research Fellows Juan Dolado and José
Viñals focus on the `long-run' external constraint: that the
present values of spending on domestic and foreign goods plus net
external debt equal domestic income. They distinguish movements of net
external liabilities associated with total investment, which need not be
repaid in the event of a financial crisis, and net debt assets or
liabilities, which must always be repaid. They argue that the
authorities should target the economy's `fundamental' account balance to
stabilize debt as a proportion of GDP, and they test for solvency on
this basis. They find the Spanish economy is now perfectly solvent and
even shows signs of dynamic inefficiency, which they attribute to the
authorities' application of policy rules designed previously to avoid
debt explosions. Since the Spanish economy is presently overheated, the
continued application of these rules might lead to a severe loss of
competitiveness over time and to falling rates of return on foreign
direct and portfolio investment.
Dolado and Viñals use a simple model of fundamental exchange rates to
show that the peseta was severely and persistently overvalued in real
terms during 1974-7 and 1980-2 and that most of its recent real
appreciation is an equilibrium phenomenon, which is driven by large
inflows of foreign direct investment in industry. Nevertheless, there
are signs of real over-appreciation during the last two years, which
calls for policy measures to adjust the economic fundamentals to
eliminate `real output gaps' permanently. The authors propose that this
be achieved through policies to promote saving rather than to restrain
investment, which may be supplemented by selective supply-side policies.
Macroeconomic Policy, External Targets and Constraints: The Case
of Spain
Juan Dolado and José Viñals
Discussion Paper No. 505, January 1991 (IM)
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