Although empirical evidence and theoretical analyses both
overwhelmingly support the view that trade liberalization yields
efficiency gains, agricultural liberalization has made slow progress to
date. In Discussion Paper No. 624, Santiago Levy and Research
Fellow Sweder van Wijnbergen assess the effects of including
agriculture in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) now under negotiation
between Mexico and the US. They show that the efficiency gains of
liberalization tend to accrue to richer groups in both rural and urban
areas, which may explain farmers' resistance to easing agricultural
protection. They assume that there are no instruments available to
effect lump-sum transfers, so the result of standard trade theory that
winners can compensate losers and still be better off does not apply.
Indirect taxes and subsidies involve major administrative difficulties
and two incentive problems. First, compensating maize farmers in
proportion to their current production encourages them to continue the
production that the reform is intended to reduce; second, maize
liberalization has major effects on rural labour markets and migration,
which can be mitigated by rural employment programmes.
Levy and van Wijnbergen argue that these require the design of specific
adjustment programmes to accompany any major trade reform. In
particular, improvements to the productivity of assets owned by the
groups harmed by reform may break the linkage between transfer payments
and recipients' past activities and thus remove their incentives to
continue them. For Mexico, this entails investment to increase the
productivity and hence the value of rain-fed land through irrigation and
other improvements. By improving farmers' access to credit when they
most need it and increasing rural labour demand, such a programme can
credibly establish its transitory nature by providing workers with
alternatives once it ends.
Levy and van Wijnbergen advocate gradual reform, since those most
affected by reform are among the poorest social groups and are least
able to borrow to smooth consumption. Spreading the reform over five
years reduces the efficiency gains by only 5-6%, and careful timing of
the liberalization and adjustment programmes can ensure that the rural
poor always have higher utility under adjustment than under
protectionism. The commitment technology of embedding trade
liberalization in an FTA weakens the case for `cold turkey', but it also
requires assurance to potential beneficiaries that the programmes will
begin once the negotiations over trade liberalization are complete. This
can be provided by making support from external organizations contingent
on the completion of adjustment programmes.
Transition Problems in Economic Reform: Agriculture in the
Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement
Santiago Levy and Sweder van Wijnbergen
Discussion Paper No. 624, February 1992 (IT)