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Industrialized economies now expect large-scale migration of poor and
unskilled labour from Eastern Europe and the Third World into Western
Europe. Standard competitive models indicate that governments should
only intervene in the distribution of gains from the free movement of
such labour, but with minimum wages in receiving countries, their
governments may do better to intervene directly, minimize the migrant
flow, and avoid unemployment. In Discussion Paper No. 727, Anette
Gehrig, Research Affiliate Christoph M Schmidt and Programme
Director Klaus F Zimmermann consider a country with fixed
endowments of native factors of production, a combination of capital,
skilled labour and unskilled labour in the production of a single good,
a single union for all native workers, and perfect substitutability
between migrant and unskilled native workers. Immigration leads to an
outward shift of the labour supply schedule. The union unilaterally sets
wages on both markets and employers then set employment levels.
Additional immigration reduces the proportion of employment held by
natives to the detriment of the unskilled; the union forgoes their wages
if it can increase skilled wages. They find that immigration has
potentially beneficial allocative effects, regardless of whether skilled
and unskilled labour are complements or substitutes. |