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Conventional
economic wisdom holds that elected politicians misuse the power to
create money in the face of electoral competition. In Discussion Paper
No. 752, Michele Fratianni, Research Fellow Jürgen von Hagen
and Christopher Waller assess whether giving central bankers
similar powers also creates problems. They develop a principal-agent
model in which the electorate makes decisions on the basis of observed
economic performance but cannot directly observe current changes in the
incumbent government's `competence'. Contracts fix nominal wages for a
period, so the central bank can use surprise inflation to increase real
output, but the public's welfare depends on price and output stability.
The central banker derives a private gain from office, while the
incumbent wants monetary surprises to improve its re-election chances.
If the private sector forms its expectations rationally, there is an
inefficient, positive `inflation bias', whose size depends on the degree
of electoral uncertainty, whenever the central banker has an incentive
to accommodate the incumbent's desires. Also, if the incumbent's
re-election chances are strong (weak), the central bank will
overstabilize (understabilize) shocks. Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller
find that complete personal independence of the central banker from
government or performance-orientated compensation packages can achieve
optimal stabilization and eliminate the inflation bias, in contrast to
Friedman-type policy rules or the appointment of `conservative' central
bankers. |