|
|
Trade
Policy
Rules of service
Rules of origin have long been tools of trade policy for governments
seeking to distinguish different foreign sources of supply of products.
In Discussion Paper No. 821, Research Fellow Bernard Hoekman
reviews the literature on rules of origin for products and also for
producers, which has recently assumed increased importance in
international agreements over liberalization of services. Increased
attention to rules of origin by policy-makers and analysts reflects both
the spread of regional trade agreements and some governments' attempts
to increase the local processing and sourcing of intermediate
components, as reflected in the trend towards tariff protection for
producers of intermediate as well as final goods.
While the economic impact of preferential rules of origin on trade flows
within free trade areas is limited by the tariff, their protectionist
effects limit the benefits of accession, and they may be even more
severe vis-à-vis third countries if users of imported intermediate
inputs shift from efficient non-member to inefficient member suppliers.
The successful pursuit of restrictive preferential rules of origin by
import-competing intermediate goods industries in the `hub' countries of
free trade areas reflects their influence over the choice of rules.
Instruments of contingent protection may help them too, by reducing
opposition from adversely affected users of intermediate products, to
whom antidumping or similar procedures offer an `insurance' scheme.
Rules of origin for producers of services are less restrictive than
those for goods, since they are more transparent and uniform across
sectors. This may reflect governments' belief that foreign firms'
production of services in their territories creates sufficient local
value. Available empirical evidence on subsidiaries of transnational
corporations tends to support this view, but recent technological
changes have greatly enhanced the tradability of many services: liberal
origin rules for service producers will increasingly imply liberal rules
for their products and further divergence of the treatment of goods and
services.
In Discussion Paper No. 822, Hoekman focuses explicitly on services to
relate the draft General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that has
emerged from the Uruguay Round to many developing countries' pursuit of
more market-oriented domestic policies since the late 1980s. They
perceived liberalizing access to service markets as a potentially
low-cost and effective means of improving the quality and efficiency of
their domestic service sectors. This also increased their incentives to
participate as a group in the Uruguay Round negotiations, which in turn
enhanced the likelihood of achieving a far-reaching multilateral
agreement on services.
Hoekman explores the extent to which the draft final outcome of the GATS
may contribute to their pursuit of service-sector efficiency through
regulatory reform and liberalization. To the extent that external forces
rather than domestic pressure groups drove their
liberalization-cum-privatization programmes, their credibility may be
reduced, so membership in a binding multilateral agreement may bolster
reform efforts by raising the cost of `backsliding'.
Many developing countries have participated actively in the Uruguay
Round negotiations on services and offered several specific
liberalization commitments, while many have yet to bind their tariffs in
the parallel GATT negotiations. They continue to insist, however, that
the draft GATS allow them to liberalize less than the industrialized
countries, which appears inconsistent with their current policy trends.
Moreover, developing country provisions in the GATS are options, not
requirements. Governments engaged in unilateral reform or seeking to
liberalize access to service markets are free to schedule their entire
service sectors on accession to the GATS, but very few have offered to
schedule as much as 50% even though the cost is quite small. Hoekman
attributes this to inertia, the lack of resources they devote to
determining the appropriate regulatory regime, and the mercantilist,
reciprocal nature of the international bargaining process.
Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round Negotiations on
ServicesRules of Origin for Goods and Services: Conceptual Issues and
Economic Considerations
Bernard M Hoekman
Discussion Paper Nos. 821-2, October 1993 (IT)
|
|