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Financial
Markets
Rational
Accounts
Neither traditional explanations of asset price booms
and crashes as irrational outbursts of speculative mania nor more recent
explanations as cases of multiple equilibria account for why and when
such episodes occur. In Discussion Paper No. 823, Research Fellow Joseph
Zeira develops a model that abstracts from irrational speculation.
Rational speculators undergo an optimal learning process in the face of
incomplete information, leading to a unique equilibrium. Once dividends
on a stock start to rise, both its price and the expected duration of
this process rise so long as the dividends continue to increase; the
rise in expected future dividends accounts for the price boom. When this
process finally stops, the public updates its expectations of future
dividends downward and the price of the stock crashes to its long-run
level. Such `informational overshooting' may also contribute to price
volatility in real estate and currency markets.
Zeira extends this model to consider entry to the stock market, which he
assumes to be costly, gradual and characterized by increasing returns up
to an unknown level. If a reduction in entry costs induces new entry,
productivity increases until increasing returns cease to apply; again
stock prices overshoot. This also has empirical implications, since it
relates the `boom-and-bust' cycle to entry by new groups of investors.
He surveys the US stock market booms and crashes of the 1920s and 1980s
and finds that data on the numbers of securities company offices
operating in the 1920s and share ownership surveys conducted by the New
York Stock Exchange for the 1980s indicate massive new entry. Both
periods also witnessed increasing returns to scale (in the real sector
in the 1920s and the financial sector in the 1980s) and particular
developments that triggered new entry: the development of new means of
communication in the 1920s and the financial deregulation and
liberalization of the early 1980s. A brief survey of recent booms and
crashes reveals that most of them followed financial liberalizations or
deregulations.
Informational Overshooting, Booms and Crashes
Joseph Zeira
Discussion Paper No. 823, September 1993 (IM)
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