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Changes in the institutional framework and regulation
of Hungarian banking have proved insufficient to improve the sector's
efficiency. The commercial banks' outstanding non-performing loans
largely reflect credits inherited from the old regime, while the
sector's market structure remains heavily concentrated. Extensive
ownership by the state (including the state-owned enterprises which
remain among its largest clients) impedes the rational allocation of
credit and objective classification of debtors. The largest banks'
irresponsible credit policies and widespread insolvency have seriously
reduced both the quality of their portfolios and their profitability. In
Discussion Paper No. 826, Éva Várhegyi notes the danger of a
downward spiral: forming reserve funds to cope with earlier loans
requires rising profits, which they can only obtain by financing
high-risk ventures that yield high returns. Loan consolidation is now a
precondition for recovery, since the weakness of the banks is hindering
privatization, the underdeveloped capital markets cannot finance new
business effectively, and the banks' capital base and accumulated
provisions fall short of those required to cover loan losses. |