|
|
Union
Membership
Excludable goods
The many empirical studies of union wages that have controlled for
the possible endogeneity of union membership have generally followed an
ad hoc approach that bears little relation to the small theoretical
literature on unionization. In Discussion Paper No. 884, Research Fellow
Alison Booth and Monojit Chatterji develop a formal model
of the simultaneous determination of union wages and membership.
Membership is voluntary, so union-negotiated wages apply to all workers
in the sector. A single union represents workers in competing firms with
which it bargains over wage levels, but the firms set the employment
level and choose workers regardless of union status. The union also
supplies an excludable incentive good to members only (such as
unemployment and sickness benefits, legal and pensions advice, or
support during grievance and promotion procedures). The quality and
amount of this good provided to each member are fixed, and the union is
also constrained to finance all its activities from employed members'
subscriptions.
Booth and Chatterji estimate simultaneous equations for union density
(dependent on the wage rate and the cost of providing the excludable
good) and the manual wage rate (dependent on membership, union
bargaining power, the cost of providing the excludable good, the
attractiveness of alternative employment, and demand conditions), using
data from the UK's 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) a
nationally representative sample of 2,061 establishments employing 25 or
more employees. Their results lend some support to the view that unions
face a free-rider problem. Without the `closed shop', which made union
membership a condition of employment, unions will increasingly have to
rely on the provision of excludable incentive goods to attract members,
since increasing wages alone has very little effect. They use their
model to predict that the further increases in female participation and
part-time working expected in the 1990s are likely to have only a small
effect on the (hourly) wage but lead to a pronounced fall in union
density; an end to the recession could raise wages by 14% and union
density by almost 10%.
Union Membership and Wage Bargaining when Membership is not
Compulsory
Alison L Booth and Monojit Chatterji
Discussion Paper No. 884, January 1994 (HR)
|
|