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Interest
Groups
Benefits to growth
In The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argued that
political stability fosters institutional `sclerosis' through the
formation of interest associations that damage long-term growth; greater
numbers of such `distributional coalitions' increase particularism in
public policy; and their formation takes time, which war and political
instability can disrupt. In Discussion Paper No. 894, Brigitte Unger
and Frans van Waarden use the results of various previous studies
of business interest associations and cross-country data on long-term
growth and sectoral corporatism to dispute all these sub-theses. They
maintain that a rise in the number of interest associations may reduce
their political influence; asymmetries in their ability to organize need
not favour business interests (which oppose each other while other
groups organize over time); and asymmetries in the capacity to organize
need not entail asymmetries in political influence.
Unger and van Waarden also show that the number of associations does not
increase steadily over time; and World War II tended to strengthen
rather than break up `distributional coalitions'. Such interest
associations may even promote inefficiency or spur growth by
compensating for other market failures. Even such measures as entry
barriers and price cartels can sometimes have positive effects (as in
the Dutch construction sector, which performs well compared with other
countries in terms of static and dynamic efficiency); such market
restrictions reduce volatility of prices and profits, market entry and
exit and destructive competition. Some business associations also
provide public goods such as R&D and vocational training, which
allow long-term planning and foster growth by reducing intertemporal
market failure and uncertainty. Whether the positive or negative effects
dominate in a given sector depends on characteristics such as the extent
of domestic and international competition. Finally, relating national
growth rates over 1929-94 to the extent of countries' sectoral
corporatism indicates that regulated sectoral markets are not associated
with lower growth over the long term.
Interest Associations and Economic Growth. A Critique of Mancur
Olson's `Rise and Decline of Nations'
Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden
Discussion Paper No. 894, March 1994 (HR)
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