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Post-war
Growth
The West German
paradox
Popular perceptions of West Germany's economic growth are polarized
between those based on its continuing role as the miracle economy of
post-war Europe and those emphasizing its institutional sclerosis, with
inflexible labour and capital markets contrasting sharply with those of
the dynamic US. In Discussion Paper No. 896, Research Associate Wendy
Carlin assesses these contrasting perspectives in a comparative and
historical perspective. She first estimates cross-country growth
equations to provide a bench-mark to evaluate West German growth
performance from 1945 to reunification in 1990. These suggest that its
exceptional growth in the 1950s cannot be fully explained by the growth
of factor inputs and `catch-up', which was common to the rest of Europe
and Japan. During 1960-73 the unexplained residual disappears and growth
is well explained by the investment share, `catch-up' and the decline in
labour input; after 1973 growth slows dramatically, with Germany's
performance close to the OECD average.
Carlin accounts for the `super-growth' of the 1950s by relating it to
the Weimar Republic's poor growth record and policy moves after 1945
that allowed West Germany to join the `convergence club', including an
increased openness to foreign trade and the demise of the traditional
pro-cartel stance of industrial policy. Growth slowed in the 1960s as
the West German economy adjusted to the labour shortage after the
construction of the Berlin Wall, although unions played a significant
role in exercising bargaining restraint and supporting recruitment of
foreign workers. She then considers the major paradox about West German
economic performance after 1979. Comparative productivity performance
was very weak in manufacturing, and convergence towards US productivity
levels stopped; Germany nevertheless maintained its shares of world
export markets, even in branches whose relative productivity performance
was particularly weak. Carlin relates this paradox to contrasting views
of Germany's performance as an example of institutional sclerosis or of
dynamic adaptation, and she explores the links between growth and the
peculiarities of West Germany's economic institutions. She concludes by
considering the implications of this analysis for the current prospects
for growth in the East.
West German Growth and Institutions, 1945-90
Wendy Carlin
Discussion Paper No. 896, January 1994 (HR)
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