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European
Integration
Protectionist bias?
Studies of the European Community and world protectionism that focus
on its tariffs and those it induces elsewhere tend to neglect the
effects of its decision-making procedures. In Discussion Paper No. 897,
Programme Director L Alan Winters reviews the theoretical
literature on the formation of regional blocs and examines possible
biases arising from committee decision-taking and the Commission's
relationship with national governments. In simple models of regional
integration, tariffs fall as bloc size increases, while the trade-off
between the immediate benefits of defection and the eventual costs of a
trade war depend on the discount rate. While the period before
retaliation in individual tariff disputes is too short for defection to
yield significant gains, it may bring important benefits if periods
correspond to GATT rounds and policy weapons include the discretionary
application of antidumping legislation and health and technical
regulations.
Winters also considers the effects of integration and decision processes
on protectionism. While acceptance of a proposed trade policy requires a
qualified majority of Council votes, its rejection requires only a
minority of votes to maintain the status quo ante. The Commission must
therefore broker compromises among national governments, which causes a
drift towards generalized protection and strengthens lobbies with
influence in Brussels and several national capitals. The best-known
failure of the committee approach is the `restaurant bill' problem that
afflicts annual price-fixing in agriculture: while the costs of high
prices are proportional to member countries', their benefits are
proportional to production, so governments seek to raise the prices of
all commodities in which their production shares exceed their GDP
shares. Liberal member countries cannot credibly both oppose
protectionism and safeguard their shares of the rents arising if such
opposition proves unsuccessful. The European Commission's adoption of a
protectionist position to secure control of trade policy has headed off
national protectionist pressures but also spread such sentiments more
widely and provided them with a firmer legal foundation.
The EC and World Protectionism: Dimensions of the Political
Economy
L Alan Winters
Discussion Paper No. 897, February 1994 (IT)
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