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A foreign exchange crisis at the beginning of 1991 forced the Indian
government to recognize the depth of the country's economic crisis and
introduce a restrictive fiscal and monetary stabilization programme. In
Discussion Paper No. 920, Research Fellow Willem Buiter and Urjit
Patel note that fiscal rectitude in the last two years has not
corrected for the profligacy of the 1980s. The overall public sector
financial and primary deficits have declined in relation to GDP, but the
debt/GDP ratio and the present discounted value of the public debt in
rupee terms have continued to rise, albeit at reduced rates. Public
spending on capital has reduced but the unreformed structure of taxation
continues to rely unduly on indirect taxes, whose severe distortions
reflect a chaotic system of overlapping tax administrations with
numerous exemptions granted at union, state and local levels. The
central government has borne the brunt of this fiscal adjustment as the
present minority administration has been unable (and unwilling) to
impose a restrictive fiscal policy on the states to the extent required.
Public sector enterprises (PSEs) remain a large net drain on the
government's financial resources, and efforts to privatize them have
been very limited. India must generate primary surpluses to stop the
present discounted value of its debt from rising further, and even
maximal use of the undesirable inflation tax could do little to bridge
the gap between expenditures and current revenues. |