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Less educated workers suffer a disproportionate share of
unemployment, which many economists and policy-makers have therefore
proposed to reduce through increased training programmes. The secular
trend towards a higher proportion of educated workers has been
accompanied, however, by rises in both the relative unemployment rate of
the unskilled and its aggregate level. In Discussion Paper No. 921,
Research Fellow Gilles Saint-Paul develops a model of
malfunctioning labour markets, in which a rise in the proportion of
skilled workers can lead to further deterioration of the unskilled's
employment prospects and possibly increase aggregate unemployment, which
may be self-reinforcing if the net returns to education (taking into
account the likelihood of being unemployed) increase with the proportion
of skilled workers. High- and low-education equilibria therefore
coexist: in the first, the unskilled's high probability of being
unemployed generates high returns to education; in the second, the
converse applies. `Workers' are ex ante worse off under the
high-education equilibrium, while `capitalists' are better off. |