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Eastern
Europe
Foreign aid
Those calling for Western aid to hasten macroeconomic stabilization
and structural reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
argue that it will support living standards during the painful
transition, allay distributional conflicts and thus reduce political
resistance. Others maintain that foreign transfers can only endow vested
interests with additional resources with which to resist reform and
delay the adoption of the policies required to contain inflation,
balance budgets and introduce market forces. In Discussion Paper No.
961, Research Fellows Alessandra Casella and Barry Eichengreen
study the impact of foreign aid by adopting the AlesinaDrazen model, in
which the need to collect higher taxes delays stabilization and
competing distributional interests engage in a war of attrition to
impose the tax burden on each other.
Foreign aid transfers typically take effect only after a period of high
inflation, an extended debate in the donor country and a further delay
after the decision has been taken. Casella and Eichengreen investigate
the effects of these stages' timing on the transfer's effects. Foreign
resources may be used to underwrite government spending, so the
announcement of aid hastens stabilization by reducing future public debt
and hence the fiscal burden borne by the faction that will eventually
surrender, but any delay between the announcement and disbursal of aid
creates incentives to postpone concessions until it arrives.
If the transfer is announced at an early stage, any distributional
faction that faces high inflation costs concedes at once; failing that,
all groups deduce that none suffers severely from inflation, and optimal
individual decisions interact with the game's structure to hasten the
release of information and the stabilization. If the announcement takes
place at a late stage, however, all groups know that all will prefer to
wait for the disbursal, so the announcement can only delay the flow of
information and the ensuing stabilization. Casella and Eichengreen
conclude that the donor country's timing of an aid transfer plays a
critical role in determining its outcome.
Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?
Alessandra Casella and Barry Eichengreen
Discussion Paper No. 961, May 1994 (IM)
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