European Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics

CEPR’s annual European Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics was held in Tarragona on 27/31 May 1998, with Banco de España acting as hosts. The symposium organizers were Daniel Cohen (CEPREMAP and CEPR), Francesco Giavazzi (IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, and CEPR) and Philippe Weil (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles and CEPR), and the proceedings were opened by Jose Luis Malo de Molina (Banco de España), who outlined his views on the main problems still facing European Monetary Union.  The following papers were presented:

‘Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises: Empirical Regularities’
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (IMF and CEPR) and
Assaf Razin (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)

‘The Macroeconomic Effects of German Unification: Real Adjustments and the Welfare State’
Fabio Canova (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, University of Southampton, Università di Modena and CEPR) and Morten Ravn (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)

‘Current Accounts in Debtor and Creditor Countries’
Aart Kraay (The World Bank) and
Jaume Ventura (MIT and CEPR)

‘Informational Speculative Attacks: Good News is No News’
Roberto Rigobon (MIT Sloan School of Management)

‘The Preferences of the Representative American’
Roger Farmer (European University Institute, Firenze, and CEPR) and
Lee Ohanian (University of Minnesota)

‘Ruling out Indeterminacy: the Role of Heterogeneity’
Berthold Herrendorf (University of Warwick and CEPR)
Akos Valentinyi (University of Southampton) and
Robert Waldmann (Università Bocconi, Milano)

‘Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technological Change and Wage Inequality’
Daron Acemoglu (MIT and CEPR)

‘Wage Inequality and Technological Change’
Andreas Hornstein (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)
Per Krusell (University of Rochester) and
Gianluca Violante (University College London)

‘Fluctuations, Bilateral Trade and Exchange Rate Regime’
Jean Imbs (New York University and Université de Lausanne)

‘Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: the Role of Financial Intermediation’
Gilles Saint-Paul (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)

‘The Evolution of Modern Educational Systems’
Graziella Bertocchi (Università di Modena and CEPR) and
Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway College, London.

‘IQ, Social Mobility and Growth’
John Hassler (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, and CEPR) and
José V Rodriguez Mora (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

‘Why Vote for Losers?’
Micael Castanheira (IGIER, Università Bocconi)

‘Mass Media Competition, Political Competition and Public Policy’
David Stromberg (Princeton University and Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm)

‘Growth Cycles and Market Crashes’
Michele Boldrin (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, and CEPR) and
David Levine (UCLA)

‘Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts’
Alberto Bisin (New York University) and
Danilo Guaitoli (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)

‘Irreversible Investment and Changes in Regime’
John Driffill (University of Southampton and CEPR) and
Martin Sola (Birkbeck College, London, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, and London Business School)

‘Political Risk and Irreversible Investment’
Sumru Altug (Koç University and CEPR)
Fanny Demers (Carleton University) and
Michel Demers (Carleton University)

‘Employment and the Distributional Effects of Restricting Working Time’
Ramon Marimon (European University Institute, Firenze and CEPR) and
Fabrizio Zilibotti (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and CEPR)

‘Federalism and Distributional Conflict’
David Spector (MIT)

‘What are the Effects of Monetary Policy? Results from an Agnostic Identification Procedure’
Harald Uhlig (CentER, Tilburg University, and CEPR)

‘Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals’
Jon Faust (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and
Lars Svensson (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, and CEPR)

‘Measuring the Effects of Fiscal Policy’
Antonio Fatás (INSEAD and CEPR) and
Ilian Mihov (INSEAD and CEPR)

‘Insurance, Moral Hazard and the Stability and Growth Pact’
Roel Beetsma (Rijksuniversiteit Limburg and CEPR) and
Henrik Jensen (University of Copenhagen).

‘A Coalition Theory of Social Security’
Vincenzo Galasso (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, and CEPR).