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1992
When will it end?
The Cecchini Report estimated that, by making the allocation of
resources within the EC more efficient, 1992 would produce a 2.5-6.5%
increase in the level of EC output. But 1992 could have even more
dramatic effects on real standards of living, Richard Baldwin
told a CEPR lunchtime meeting on 8 November, if one takes into account
the impetus these one-off efficiency gains will give to investment and
growth.
Richard Baldwin is a Research Fellow in CEPR's International Trade
programme. His talk was based on pioneering research reported in `The
Growth Effects of 1992', published in November in Economic Policy No. 9,
the first of two special issues of the journal devoted to 1992. Issue
No. 9 is available for £10.50 from The Journals Publicity
Department, Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building,
Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge, CB2 1BR, tel. 0223 325807. Financial
support for the meeting at which he spoke was provided by the Economic
and Social Research Council, as part of its support for the Centre's
dissemination programme. The opinions expressed by Baldwin were his
alone, however, and not those of the ESRC or of CEPR, which takes no
institutional policy positions.
1992 aims to remove all barriers to the free movement of goods, people
and capital in the EC and to eliminate distortions that prevent
efficient allocation of resources, such as cross-country variations in
indirect taxation and regulation. The Cecchini Report estimated that
these efficiency gains would lead to a one-off rise in total EC income
of 2.5-6.5%, fully realized after 5-7 years. Though this is not
negligible, Baldwin noted, it hardly matches up to the radical nature of
the programme. But there are good reasons to expect the improvements in
resource allocation after 1992 to be at the lower end of the Cecchini
range, which is much higher than consensus estimates of the impact of
other major liberalizations, such as the Kennedy and Tokyo Round tariff
cuts or the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
These apparently conflicting responses can be reconciled, according to
Baldwin: 1992 will not only bring a one-off jump in the level of EC
income, it will also have dynamic effects on the rate of output growth,
which the Cecchini Report did not estimate. The efficiency gains from
improved resource allocation will mean that Europe can get more output
per input of labour and capital. As the returns to capital increase, so
the investment climate in Europe will improve. The resulting rise in
investment will increase the EC's capital stock and thereby create a
knock-on effect on the level of GDP.
The keys to quantifying this `medium-run growth bonus' are the
relationships among investment, productivity and output, and in
particular the capital-output elasticity the increase in output stemming
from a 1% increase in the stock of capital. It is very difficult to
estimate these relationships. Baldwin had specified a relatively simple
model of investment, productivity and output, taking estimates of
capital-output elasticities for several EC countries from the work of
other researchers. He `calibrated' his model by finding values for the
remaining parameters that enabled it most closely to reproduce observed
data. Calibration techniques are far from ideal because they cannot be
subjected to conventional tests of precision, but they represent the
best way of dealing with data inadequacies in exercises such as this.
The growth effects of 1992 will be proportional to the size of the
one-time gains. Baldwin's estimates suggested that they could be large,
40% to 200% over the one-time effects. So, taking the upper and lower
bound of Cecchini's estimates, the one-time and growth effects of 1992
together could eventually add anything between 3.5% and 19.5% to
Europe's real standard of living, about half of it within 10-15 years.
This implied a rise in the rate of EC growth of around 0.2 percentage
points a year over this period. After that the effect would fall off due
to diminishing returns to capital. The calculations are in many ways
quite exploratory, Baldwin cautioned, so the actual numbers should be
taken with a grain of salt. But the conclusion that the growth effects
of 1992 will be significantly greater than the one-time estimates
produced by Cecchini is robust; eventually even very small growth
effects will far outweigh one-time gains.
The assumptions underlying Baldwin's calculations are taken from the
conventional, `neo-classical' view of growth. But economists such as
Paul Romer have recently challenged the validity of the neo-classical
model, claiming that it provides no convincing explanation of why Japan
grows faster than the United Kingdom or of why growth slowed down
worldwide in the 1970s. This has led to the development of the `new
growth economics', which emphasizes economy-wide increasing returns to
scale.
The hypothesis of economy-wide increasing returns to scale is based on
the intuition that investments in R&D depend on the size of the
market faced by firms. As demand rises, a higher marginal return to
capital increases the returns to innovation; as more is invested in
R&D, the process of innovation itself accelerates. Baldwin had
conducted econometric tests of this hypothesis using historical data on
capital per worker and productivity for the six major industrial
countries in the period 1880-1980. Though the results were not
conclusive, neither they nor other estimates suggest that the new growth
economics should be dismissed out of hand, he maintained.
Economy-wide increasing returns to scale would mean that a one-off
increase in EC economic efficiency and output could have yet further
beneficial effects. Unlike the `medium-run growth bonus', which will
eventually taper off, economy-wide increasing returns to scale would
translate the one-off gains into a permanent, sustainable increase in EC
growth. Further calibration exercises conducted by Baldwin using two
such new growth models suggested that 1992 might permanently add 0.25 to
1 percentage point to the annual rate of EC output growth. Though highly
controversial, if these numbers are even close to correct, the impact of
1992 on Europe's standard of living could eventually be enormous.
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