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Labour
Mobility
States and Regions
At a Brussels joint lunchtime meeting with the European Centre for
Advanced Research in Economics (ECARE), Université Libre de Bruxelles,
on 1 June, Michael Burda discussed recent research on European
labour markets. Burda is Professor of Economics at the Humboldt-Universität
zu Berlin and at the Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires (INSEAD),
Fontainebleau, and a Research Fellow in CEPR's International
Macroeconomics and Human Resources programmes. His talk was based in
part on his CEPR Discussion Paper No. 868, `Gross Worker and Job Flows
in Europe', written with Charles Wyplosz and produced as part of CEPR's
research programme on `Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global
Economy', supported by the Ford Foundation, and also on his forthcoming
paper, `Locational Competition versus Cooperation in Labor Markets: An
Implicit Contract Reinterpretation', written with Antje Mertens. The
views expressed by Burda were his own, however, not those of the above
institutions nor of CEPR, which takes no institutional policy positions.
Burda first noted that high and persistent unemployment in Europe in
fact masks workers' considerable mobility across labour market states of
employment, unemployment and non-participation. Total exits from
unemployment also display a countercyclical pattern, as found in the US
and Japan, are highly coherent with unemployment inflows, and most
strikingly mainly take the form of job findings rather than exits from
the labour force. These empirical patterns pose a challenge both to
conventional models of the business cycle and to `search' models in
which unemployment derives from workers' misperceptions of relative wage
offers. While all these models assume the paradigm of a `representative
agent', theory must allow heterogeneity of workers and/or firms in order
to fit the facts: either some firms fire while others hire during
downturns, or the same firms hire and fire different workers.
Burda distinguished flows of employment (which depend on workers' and
firms' satisfaction with the match) from flows of jobs (which are
assigned profitabilities independent of the match quality). The
destruction of `jobs' in this sense is strongly countercyclical, while
job creation may be mildly procyclical or even acyclical. While flows of
jobs and workers are obviously related, models adopting this simple
framework to differentiate between them (which can also distinguish
unfilled jobs from `planned positions', for which work-places have yet
to be created), can account for the stylized facts of European aggregate
unemployment patterns. This also points to the need for further research
into firm and worker heterogeneity in aggregate models.
Burda then compared and contrasted European and US experience to focus
on the implications of mobility across regions for their patterns of
wages and unemployment. The inequality of income distribution across US
regions has increased markedly during the last 30 years, while the
regional distribution of income in Western Germany (which proxies for
Western Europe as a whole) has barely changed. This increased income
inequality across the US does not really operate through wage
flexibility, however, since incomes of individual occupational groups in
different regions are remarkably similar. It reflects rather a
combination of increased geographical specialization by individual
industries and changes in the inter-industry wage structure. At the same
time, high inter-regional labour mobility has led to a constant variance
of regional unemployment in the US, which contrasts markedly with the
secular upward trend displayed in Germany since the 1960s. Since the
inter-regional variance of productivity increased over the same period
in both countries, only differences in their regional mobility can
account for their different patterns of regional unemployment.
Burda proposed an `implicit contract' model to account for these
different experiences. If labour is relatively immobile across regions
and cities, regions or nations engage in `locational competition' by
bidding to attract capital, real wages become more variable. This gives
rise to demands for insurance against such idiosyncratic, insurable
risk. This insurance may be provided by collective bargaining
institutions or government legislation on minimum wages, labour
regulations or progressive taxation. If regional labour mobility is
high, on the other hand, as in the US, shocks are mediated by migration
instead, and insurance of this type is unnecessary. This model is
therefore able to account for the dramatic variation of regional
unemployment patterns observed in Western Europe since the 1960s.
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