European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

CEPR’s 1998 European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory was held in Gerzensee, Switzerland, from 29 June to 10 July. The symposium was organized with financial support from the Review of Economic Studies and was hosted by the Studienzentrum Gerzensee. The organiszers were Mark Armstrong (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR), Philippe Bacchetta (Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Université de Lausanne and CEPR), Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR) and Klaus Schmidt (Universität München and CEPR).

The symposium brought together a diverse range of papers in economic theory. Many of the papers, however, were based on the themes of international trade, competition policy and regulation. The papers presented were as follows:

‘Prices and the Winner’s Curse’
Jeremy Bulow (Stanford GSB) and
Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford)

‘Does Symmetry Help Firms Collude?’
Massimo Motta (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)

‘Optimal Trade Policy in the Presence of DFI and Internal Tax Competition’
Laurel Adams (Northwestern University) and
Pierre Regibeau (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona, and CEPR)

‘GATT-Think’
Kyle Bagwell (Columbia University) and
Robert Staiger (University of Wisconsin-Madison and NBER)

‘International Competition for Multinational Investment’
Jan Haaland (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and CEPR) and
Ian Wooton (Glasgow University and CEPR)

‘Incomplete Social Contracts’
Philippe Aghion (University College, London, EBRD and CEPR) and
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)

‘Information Aggregation, Strategic Behaviour and Efficiency’
Xavier Vives (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona)

‘The Search for Fit: Learning from Others and Organizational Design’
Kai-Uwe Kühn (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona) and
Peter Zemsky (INSEAD)

‘Anti-Trust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property
Richard Gilbert (University of California at Berkeley) and
Carl Shapiro (University of California at Berkeley)

‘Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion’
Olivier Compte (CERAS-ENPC, Paris)
Frederic Jenny (ESSEC, Paris) and
Patrick Rey (University of Toulouse, GREMAQ, IDEI and CEPR)

‘Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy’
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)
Joseph Bradley (Boston University) and
Michael Riordan (Boston University) 

‘The Effects of Anti-trust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation’
Joseph Farrell (University of California at Berkeley) and
Michael Katz (University of California at Berkeley)

‘Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market’
David Newbery (University of Cambridge)

‘Capacity Investment and Competition in Decentralised Electricity Markets’
Nils-Henrik von der Fehr (University of Oslo) and
David Harbord (David Harbord and Associates, Oxford)

‘Team Play in the War of Attrition’
Jon Dworak (MIT)
Justin Johnson (MIT) and
David Myatt (Nuffield College, Oxford)

‘The Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem: Frequent-Monitoring Contracts’
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR) and
Christopher Harris (University of Cambridge)

‘On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions’
Olivier Compte (CERAS-ENPC, Paris) and
Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC, Paris)

‘Allocation of Effort in Government Bureaucracies
Maija Halonen (University of Bristol) and
Carol Propper (University of Bristol)

‘Narrative Evidence on the Dynamics of Collusion: The Sugar Institute Case’
David Genesove (MIT and NBER) and
Wallace Mullin (Michigan State University and NBER)

‘Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optimal Calling Plans’
Eugenio Miravete (INSEAD and Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona)

‘Horizontal Mergers: A Free-Entry Equilibrium Analysis’
Luís Cabral (London Business School)

‘Regulating Telecommunications: A Dynamic Perspective’
Michael Riordan (Boston University) and
Gary Biglaiser (University of North Carolina)

‘The Transition to Competition in Telecommunications’
Gary Biglaiser (University of North Carolina) and
Michael Riordan (Boston University)

‘The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transactions Costs’
David Martimort (ESR-INRA and IDEI, Toulouse)

‘The Design of Markets and the Solution to Hold-Up Problems’
Hans Gersbach (Alfred-Weber-Institut, University of Heidelberg)

‘The Sale of Intellectual Property: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts’
James Anton (Fuqua School, Duke University) and
Dennis Yao (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

‘A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs’
Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Jean-Jacques Laffont (IDEI-GREMAQ Toulouse) and
David Martimort (ESR-INRA and IDEI, Toulouse)

‘Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Good Duopoly’
Godfrey Keller (London School of Economics) and
Sven Rady (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

‘Sequential Investments and Options to Own’
Georg Nöldeke (Universität Basel) and
Klaus Schmidt (Universität München and CEPR)

The conference also incorporated an Anti-Trust Roundtable chaired by Richard Gilbert (University of California at Berkeley), with contributions from David Newbery (University of Cambridge), Xavier Vives (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Barcelona) and Joseph Farrell (University of California at Berkeley).