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Banking
Sector
Market-Oriented
Reform
The EPI Forum meeting in Warsaw on 27/28 January 1996, the first in
the Forum series, centred on a preliminary draft of the first EPI
Report, `Banking Sector Development in Central and Eastern Europe',
written by Ronald Anderson (Université Catholique de Louvain and
CEPR), Erik Berglöf (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles and
CEPR) and Kálmán Mizsei (Hungarian Export-Import Bank).
Erik Berglöf presented the main themes of the Report,
acknowledging the importance of economic growth for the Central and East
European countries (CEECs), and pointing out the intimate relationship
between growth and the development of a financial system. He identified
three interwoven aims of CEEC banking reform: the enhancement of
corporate finance; the creation of liquid asset markets; and the
facilitation of the withdrawal of the state. He drew the outlines of a
desirable system of financial institutions could be established. He
suggested that the distinction between control-oriented and arm's length
financial systems could further organize the discourse surrounding the
policy agenda, and closed by evaluating developments in the region in
terms of this distinction. The discussion revolved around the need for a
specification of how banks can influence corporate governance.
Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos (Princeton University and CEPR), then
addressed bank privatization, entry and competition, and began by
drawing some lessons from the recent privatization processes. Three
prevailing methods of privatization have been employed - direct sales,
voucher privatization, and the use of initial public offerings - roughly
corresponding to the favoured techniques of Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Poland respectively. All three, he claimed, carry inherent
limitations, which should be overcome by establishing a privatized
banking sector, rather than focussing on privatizing all previously
state-owned banks. Then he addressed the salient aspects of competition
policy in banking, arguing that universal licences should be granted to
banks, while avoiding monopoly positions to emerge. Slawomir Sikora (Powszechny
Bank Kredytowy, Warsaw), pointed out the manifold successes of the
privatization process, and gave a rich account of the complexities
competition and privatization policy must face during transition.
Kálmán Mizsei discussed bad loan management and bank bankruptcy
in the region. He described the complexities of navigating between the
two requirements of maintaining the credibility of the whole banking
sector, and avoiding sustained moral hazard in the relationship between
governments and banks. Finally, he urged that the ultimate goal of
public policy in banking should be the creation of a competitive banking
sector, and proposed an assessment of banking services as commodities.
István Székely (United Nations, New York) then looked at the
problem of finding an appropriate place for savings banks in the banking
sector. These banks are `too large to fail', and given their privileged
access to household savings should be treated with great care by
governments. He drew attention to the need for an effective regulatory
policy, and the necessary adequate human capital for the regulatory
agency. He was sceptical about the dangers of excessive monopolization
of important markets by the savings banks, maintaining that innovation
in the financial markets could well undermine traditional sources of
monopolization. His discussant, José Lloveras (Commission of the
European Communities) stressed the significance of savings banks in
economies still relying excessively on cash transactions. He provided an
engaging argument about savings banks' disposal of an overwhelmingly
large part of the pool of financial information about economic actors in
these countries.
Ronald Anderson outlined the policy recommendations of the
Report. He characterized a stable banking system first, then enumerated
the intrinsic dangers threatening this stability. These include the
misallocation of human and physical capital, and the fact that trade
patterns, industry structures, and institutions supporting the market
economy are in a state of flux. He formulated the guarantees that should
underwrite any attempt to recapitalize banks and grant them universal
licences. He stressed the role of effective enforcement of public policy
and depicted the state as a de facto (rather than de jure)
stakeholder of bank securities even after privatization. John Bonin (Wesleyan
University) warned against allowing political influence to interfere in
the operation of banks, and stressed the debilitating effects of
inherited bank-client relationships.
In the panel discussion, Jan Bielecki (EBRD and CEPR), Amir
Nacqvi (Commission of the European Communities, Ljubljana) and Richard
Portes (London Business School and CEPR) focused on how the prospect
of accession to the EU affects financial reform in the region. Each
emphasized that accession should be exploited by policy-makers to
support and ensure the enforcement of desirable policy actions. Jan
Mládek (Czech Institute of Applied Economics) argued against
pessimistic reading of the situation in the Czech banking sector, and Rumen
Dobrinsky (21 Century Foundation, Sofia) recommended decision-makers
in individual countries learn from the other countries in the region.
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