

Nation-Building Through Compulsory Schooling During the Age of Mass Migration

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Abstract

By the mid-19th century, America was the best educated nation on Earth: significant financial investments in education were being undertaken and the majority of children *voluntarily* attended public schools. So why did US states start introducing *compulsory schooling* laws at this point in time? We provide qualitative and quantitative evidence that compulsory schooling laws were used as a *nation-building* tool to homogenize the civic values held by the tens of millions of culturally diverse migrants who moved to America during the ‘Age of Mass Migration’. Our central finding is that the adoption of compulsory schooling by American-born median voters occurs significantly earlier in time in states that host many migrants who had lower exposure to civic values in their home countries and had lower demand for common schooling when in the US. By providing micro-foundations for such laws, our study highlights an important link between mass migration and institutional change, where changes are driven by the policy choices of native median-voters in the receiving country rather than migrant settlers themselves.

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1 Introduction

By the mid-19th century the American population was the best-educated in the world [Black and Sokoloff 2006, Goldin and Katz 2008]. During this period, financial investments into the education system were substantial and *voluntary* attendance was high [Landes and Solomon 1972, Go and Lindert 2010]. To quantify these differences in educational development between the US and other countries, Figure 1 shows newly assembled panel data on enrolment rates for 5-14 year olds from 1830 through to 1890 by collating various sources for countries with reliable data. This highlights that US enrolment rates were always above 50% during this period, trending upwards, and diverging away from other sample countries from 1850 onwards.

This leads to the puzzle that lies at the heart of our study: why did US states start introducing *compulsory* schooling laws at a time when enrolment rates were high and trending upwards? These laws would have not been binding for the average American, nor are they considered relevant for the marginal American and thus the driving force behind ‘the educated American’ [Goldin and Katz 2003, 2008]. Nor were they targeting blacks, as legislative caveats often effectively excluded them from schools even post-compulsion [Black and Sokoloff 2006, Collins and Margo 2006].¹

Our study provides qualitative and quantitative evidence that compulsory schooling laws were used as a nation-building tool to homogenize the civic values of the numerous and diverse migrants who moved to America during the ‘Age of Mass Migration’, from 1850 onwards.

Three ideas underpin our analysis. First, that nation-building and the education system are closely interlinked. Nation building is central in historic accounts of the mass state education movement in Europe [Weber 1976, Ramirez and Boli 1987, Hobsbawm 1990] and in accounts from other disciplines of why compulsory schooling was introduced in America [Cubberley 1947, Meyer *et al.* 1979, Engerman and Sokoloff 2005]. Moreover, there are other periods of American history where the schooling system has been explicitly used to inculcate values among the foreign-born.²

Second, there is a well-established link between migration and legal/institutional change. The seminal work of Acemoglu *et al.* [2001, 2002] illustrates the how colonial settlers from Europe established institutions that had long lasting impacts on economic development. Our analysis can

¹A body of work on the development of the American schooling system has emphasized Americans became educated because of fiscal decentralization, public funding, public provision, separation of church and state, and gender neutrality [Goldin and Katz 2008]. Goldin and Katz [2003] document that compulsion accounts for at most 5% of the increase in high school enrolment over the period 1910-40, when such laws were being fully enforced.

²Tyack [1976] documents how the US government used schooling as a way to shape people conquered in war into the predetermined mold of republican citizenship in at least three other historic episodes: (i) Native American children being sent to boarding schools in the early nineteenth century; (ii) the dispatch of American teachers to Puerto Rico and the Philippines after the Spanish-American war; (iii) attempts to democratize Germany and Japan after World War II. In more recent times, Arlington [1991] describes how English became the required language of instruction in Southern US states in 1980s, in response to mass migration from Latin American.

be seen as ‘Acemoglu *et al.* in reverse’ as we analyze how the American-born population, from whom the median voter for determining state-level policies such as compulsory schooling is drawn, best responded to large migrant flows from a set of culturally diverse countries.

Third, migrants transport their values with them [Guiso *et al.* 2006, Fernandez 2007, Luttmer and Singhal 2011], hence migrants’ civic values depend on whether have been exposed to nation-building through compulsory education in their *home country* [Glaeser *et al.* 2007]. This informs our identification strategy that relies on the differential response of American-born median voters to within-migrant diversity in values, between migrants from European countries with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin.

The analysis proceeds in three stages. We first present qualitative evidence to underpin the hypothesis that American society used compulsory schooling as a tool to nation-build in response to mass migration. We highlight long-standing concerns in America over immigrants’ assimilation that were compounded during the Age of Mass Migration, when tens of millions of migrants, accounting for 10-15% of the US population by the mid-1800s, migrated to the US from a highly diverse set of European countries. We then present evidence that compulsory schooling was the key policy instrument used to nation-build, driven by the view that exposure to American public schools would instill the desired civic values among migrants, and a recognition that such values could be transmitted from children to their parents.

Second, we assemble a new data-set on the timing of compulsory schooling laws across European countries and we combine it with US Census data on state population’s by country of origin to explain the timing of compulsory schooling laws across US states. We use survival analysis to estimate whether the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling laws is associated with the composition of migrants in the state. Our central finding is that American-born median voters are significantly more likely to pass compulsory schooling laws in states with a larger share of migrants from European countries *without* historic exposure to compulsory schooling: a one standard deviation in the share of these migrants doubles the hazard of compulsory schooling laws being passed in the average decade between two consecutive Census years, all else equal. In contrast, the presence of European migrants with exposure to compulsory schooling in their home country has no impact on the timing of compulsion. This is in line with the notion that compulsory schooling was used as a nation-building tool as compulsory schooling laws were targeted to the migrants who were least likely to have brought civic values with them.

Further analysis shows that our core result is not driven by differences in enrollment rates between these migrants groups while in the US or by the endogenous location choices of migrants and natives. Moreover, while the adoption of compulsory schooling is associated with other forms of

within-migrant diversity, such as their English language proficiency, region of origin, and religion, the main dimension driving adoption is the migrants' historic exposure to compulsory schooling. Finally, we set up a horse-race between nation-building and other hypotheses why governments might impose public education *en masse*, such as redistributive motives, or due to a complementarity between capital and skilled labor. We find evidence for these alternative mechanisms, but none of them mutes the nation-building channel.

The third part of our analysis provides direct evidence on the migrants' demand for American common schools that underpins the nation-building channel. Only if their desire to attend American schools and be taught civic values was sufficiently low would compulsory schooling bind and be required to change migrants' values. We develop a model of schooling provision to pin down the demand for American common schools in various migrant groups and test its predictions using cross-county data from 1890 that contains detailed information on investments and attendance at American common schools. This links with the earlier analysis by establishing the counterfactual of what would have been migrants' exposure to American schooling absent compulsion.

The revealed relative demands across migrant groups for American common schools match up closely to what is implied by the cross-state survival analysis. More precisely, we find that European migrants from countries without compulsory schooling, have significantly lower demand for American common schools relative to European migrants from countries with compulsory schooling. Furthermore, we document a significant convergence in demands for common schooling between natives and both groups of European migrants in counties with state compulsory schooling laws. The evidence thus suggests that compulsory schooling did indeed lead European migrants to be more exposed to American common schools. Moreover, this was especially so for Europeans from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling and hence most in need of being taught the virtues of civic participation and homogenizing their values towards those of the American median voter.

Our paper contributes to the emerging economics literature on nation-building that emphasizes societies have incentives to compel citizens to go through the same schooling system for a variety of reasons: (i) to build national identity [Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Alesina and Reich 2013]; (ii) to encourage civic participation and underpin democracy [Glaeser *et al.* 2007]; (iii) to shape preferences related to the acceptability of welfare transfers [Lott 1999]; (iv) state capacity is easier to raise in more homogenous societies in which the common good is more easily identifiable and political institutions are inclusive [Besley and Persson 2010]; (v) in face of external military conflict [Aghion *et al.* 2012]. Our finding that the introduction of compulsory schooling was driven by the need to foster the assimilation of migrants complements the literature that studies the individual

determinants of migrants’ economic and cultural assimilation during this period [Abramitzky and Boustan 2014, Abramitzky *et al.* 2014]. By providing micro-foundations for the adoption of compulsory schooling, our findings also have implications for the literature examining the impacts of compulsory schooling on the human capital of American-borns. As summarized in Stephens and Yang [2014], this literature has found rather mixed evidence. Our results suggests this is partly because American-borns were not the intended marginal beneficiary. Our findings are consistent with Lleras-Muney and Shertzer [2015] who show that compulsory schooling laws had significant impacts on the enrolment rates of migrant children (increasing them by around 5% overall), with smaller impacts on native children.

Finally, we complement the literature that studies the impacts of legislation introduced towards the end of the Age of Mass Migration, designed to change the scale and composition of migrant inflows [Goldin 1994, Angrist 2002].³ At the core of our analysis is the recognition that Americans also responded earlier to mass migration through other legislative changes, foremost among them the introduction of compulsory schooling across states from the 1850s onwards.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents qualitative evidence on the use of compulsory schooling as a nation-building tool during the Age of Mass Migration. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework describing how a society can use compulsory schooling to nation-build. Section 4 describes the state level data. Section 5 presents evidence on the link between the composition of migrant groups and the passage of compulsory schooling. Section 6 develops and tests a model of investment into education to estimate the relative demand for American common schools across migrant groups using county data. Section 7 concludes by discussing directions for future research. The Appendix provides proofs, data sources and robustness checks.

2 Qualitative Evidence

The fact that American society used compulsory schooling as a tool to nation-build during the Age of Mass Migration has been recognized in other disciplines, including in leading accounts of the development of the American schooling system written by educationalists [Cubberley 1947], sociologists [Meyer *et al.* 1979] and economic historians [Engerman and Sokoloff 2005]. In this Section we combine multiple sources of qualitative evidence to underpin this fact. We first review how long-standing concerns over immigrants’ assimilation informed the political debate, and how the education system was viewed as the key policy tool to deal with these concerns. This was driven by the view that exposure to American public schools would instill the desired values

³Examples include the Literacy Act 1918 and the Immigration Acts of 1921, 1924 (that effectively introduced quotas on inflows) [Goldin 1994, Angrist 2002].

among migrants, and a recognition that such civic values could then be transmitted from children to parents. We then provide evidence that nation-building motives informed the architects of the common school movement, both as a general principle and to foster the assimilation of migrants in particular. We conclude by providing some evidence of curricula in common schools, as this relates directly to the inculcation of particular values.

2.1 Migrants and Compulsory Schooling in the Political Debate

American society’s anxieties over immigrant assimilation have been well documented for each wave of large-scale migration, starting from the wave from Northern Europe in the 18th century [Hirschman and Daniel Perez 2010]. These concerns became politically salient from the 1850s onwards. Most famously, in 1855 the *Native American Party* (also referred to as the ‘Know Nothing Party’) elected six governors and a number of Congressional representatives. The party’s core philosophy was one of ‘Americanism’, consistently communicating the fear of the unAmericanness of immigrants [Higham 1988].⁴

Much of the political debate and concerns of American-borns over migrants’ assimilation are crystallized in the Dillingham Report, widely regarded as the most comprehensive legislative study on immigration ever conducted. The Report was drafted over 1907-11 by a Commission of senators, members of the House of Representatives and Presidential appointees. The Commission was established as a response to concerns over the assimilation of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and produced a 41-volume report, including a number of volumes solely dedicated to the role of the education system in the assimilation process. Throughout its work, the Commission highlighted the importance of *Americanizing* immigrants. The English language and learning were central to becoming an American citizen: *“Most of the societies lay particular stress upon influencing the immigrant to become acquainted with the duties and privileges of American citizenship and civilization. Teaching the English language and the primary branches of learning is a prominent feature in most of this work. It does not appear that the Federal Government can directly assist in this work, but where possible effort should be made to promote the activities of these organizations.”* [p.43, Volume 29].

Moreover, the Commission explicitly recognized the role that children played in the wider long run process of inculcating values in the entire migrant population:⁵ *“The most potent influence*

⁴Lobby groups, who held the same concerns over assimilation, also existed. Chief among them was the *Immigration Restriction League*, who argued for the introduction of a literacy test during the Age of Mass Migration because Southern and Eastern European countries were sending an “*alarming number of illiterates, paupers, criminals, and madman who endangered American character and citizenship*” [Higham 1988].

⁵This view also matches with historic evidence on the inter-generational transmission of human capital, especially language skills, from children to parents [Ferrie and Kuziemko 2015].

in promoting the assimilation of the family is the children, who, through contact with American life in the schools, almost invariably act as the unconscious agents in the uplift of their parents. Moreover, as the children grow older and become wage earners, they usually enter some higher occupation than that of their fathers, and in such cases the Americanizing influence upon their parents continues until frequently the whole family is gradually led away from the old surroundings and old standards into those more nearly American. This influence of the children is potent among immigrants in the great cities, as well as in the smaller industrial centers.” [p.42, Volume 29].

2.2 Nation Building and the American Common Schools Movement

2.2.1 General Principles

The American common school movement laid the foundations of the public school system. The key individuals driving this movement were Horace Mann (1796-1859), Henry Barnard (1811-1900) and Calvin Stowe (1806-1882). They were united in a belief that schooling was the instrument, *“by which the particularities of localism and religious tradition and of national origin would be integrated into a single sustaining identity”* and could foster *“goals of equity, social harmony, and national unity”* [p9, p39, Glenn 2002].

Horace Mann is widely regarded as the most prominent figure of the common school movement, becoming the first secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education in 1837 (the earliest adopter of compulsory schooling). He believed common schools would, *“promote moral education”* and *“unite the country by teaching common values”* [p147, p150, Jeynes 2007]. Like many advocates for the common school movement, he recurrently emphasized the link between education and the civic virtues necessary for effective participation in a democracy. This view entered public conscience and is neatly summarized in a New York Sun Editorial from 1867, stating, *“One of the essential requisite of good citizenship is a fair elementary education. . . It would be well, therefore, if parents and guardians were compelled by law to send their children between certain ages to public or other schools.”* [p185, Eisenberg 1989].

Henry Barnard was the secretary of the Connecticut Board of Education, and was very much influenced by what he had seen of the European education system. His motives for building the public school system have been described as follows: *“Despite the challenges that Barnard faced, he, like Mann, was tenacious in maintaining the view that the common school cause was for the good of the country. He believed that democracy and education went together “in the cause of truth, justice, liberty, patriotism, religion.””* [p154, Jeynes 2007].

Finally, Calvin Stowe was a key driver of the common school movement in the Midwest. Stowe, like Mann, believed moral education was the most important aspect of schooling. His views were

shared by other leaders of the common school movement, as illustrated by the following quote: *“In his defense of his state’s controversial schooling law, State Superintendent of Public Schools in Illinois, Richard Edwards, restated the argument: The compulsory law is right in principle. The state taxes the citizen for the support of the public schools because Universal Education is necessary to the preservation of the state and the institutions of civilization.”* [p185, Eisenberg 1989].

2.2.2 The Role of Schools in the Assimilation of Migrants

It has been argued that all these central figures ultimately saw schools as *the key tool* for social control and assimilation.⁶ Certainly, advocates of common schools came to emphasize their role as an alternative to families to foster the assimilation of immigrant children. As Tyack [p363, 1976] argues, *“Advocates of compulsory schooling often argued that families—or at least some families—like those of the poor or foreign-born—were failing to carry out their traditional functions of moral and vocational training...reformers used the powers of the state to intervene in families to create alternative institutions of socialization.”* One of the most noted advocates for common schools in Philadelphia was E.C.Wines who argued that, *“it is among the most solemn and imperative of obligations resting on government, to provide by law for the thorough instruction of all the children in the community because of its connection with the purity and perpetuity of our civil institutions”* [p738, Wines 1851]. He most forcefully articulated the link between compulsory schooling and immigration, when discussing the political benefits of education: *“We refer to that overflowing tide of immigration, which disgorges our shores its annual tens of thousands of Europe’s most degraded population—men without knowledge, without virtue, without patriotism, and with nothing to lose in any election...Are these persons fit depositaries of political power? The only practicable antidote to this, the only effectual safe-guard against the other, the only sure palladium of our liberties, is so through an education of all our citizens, native and foreign, as shall nullify the dangerous element in immigration.”* [p742-3, Wines 1851].

Gradually, over the Age of Mass Migration, a wider set of educational policies, including compulsory schooling but also encompassing language requirements in schools and citizenship classes, came together to be known as the *Americanization Movement*. It is well recognized that the primary motive of this movement was to assimilate migrants. The core of our analysis studies whether nation-building motives provide credible micro-foundations for the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling laws from the 1850s onwards, the first pillar of this movement.

⁶Describing the motives of another key figure in the common school movement, William Maxwell, Brumberg [1997] writes that, *“In his view, the school brings all social classes together in a common effort for improvement. It accustoms people of different creeds and different national traditions to live together on terms of peace and mutual good will. It is the melting pot which converts the children of the immigrants of all races and languages into sturdy, independent American citizens. It is the characteristic American educational institution.”*

2.3 Compulsory Schooling and Civic Values

A key element of the debate on how the curricula of common schools should develop was the distinction drawn between instruction versus education [Chapters 4-6, Glenn 2002]. American educators wanted their schooling system to place relatively more emphasis on the role of schooling in shaping the character, values and loyalties of students as future participants in political and social life. As a result, some of the legislative acts that introduced compulsory schooling make explicit references to civic values. For example, in Connecticut the law states the curriculum must cover “US history and citizenship”, and in Colorado it states that instruction “must cover the constitution”. In detailing how compulsory schooling laws were implemented to provide insights on the values to be taught, it is important to note that American school districts have always had a high degree of autonomy. This has led to considerable heterogeneity in practices, making it almost impossible to track curriculum changes over time by district [Goldin 1999a]. Subject to this caveat, we highlight the following.

First, states differed as to whether English should be the main language of instruction. Some states imposed clear English language requirements early on, while in others bilingualism was first accepted and then banned from public schools.^{7,8} Eventually the *Americanization Movement* led to further legislative iterations making language and instruction requirements more explicit [Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015], ultimately being followed by the introduction of citizenship classes targeted to the foreign-born from 1915-16 onwards [Cubberley 1947].

Second, a potential alternative source of education to common schools were parochial and private schools. According to Lindert [2004], in 1880 12% of all pupils were enrolled in such schools. Migrant specific shares are not available but were presumably higher given that the language

⁷For example, a 1919 law in Minnesota reads: “Every child between 8 and 16 years of age shall attend a public school, or a private school, in each year during the entire time the public schools of the district in which the child resides are in session; . . . A school, to satisfy the requirements of compulsory attendance, must be one in which all the common branches are taught in the English language, from textbooks written in the English language and taught by teachers qualified to teach in the English language. A foreign language may be taught when such language is an elective or a prescribed subject of the curriculum, not to exceed one hour each day.” [Minnesota, Laws 1919, Ch. 320, amending Gen. Stat. 1914, sec. 2979 as described in Ruppenthal 1920].

⁸Daniels [pp.159-60, 1990] discusses the variation across states: “Beginning in 1839 a number of states, starting with Pennsylvania and Ohio, passed laws enabling (or in some cases requiring) instruction in German in the public schools when a number of parents, often but not always 50 percent, requested it, and these laws were copied, with inevitable variations, in most states with large blocs of German settlers. The Ohio law authorized the setting up of exclusively German-language schools. In Cincinnati this option was exercised so fully that there were, in effect, two systems, one English, one German, and, in the 1850s, the school board recognized the right of pupils to receive instruction in either German or English. In Saint Louis, on the other hand, the use of bilingualism was a device to attract German American children to the public schools. In 1860 it is estimated that four of five German American children there went to non-public schools; two decades later the proportions had been reversed. In Saint Louis all advanced subjects were taught in English. So successful was the integration that even before the anti-German hysteria of World War I, German instruction as opposed to instruction in the German language was discontinued.”

of instruction in these schools was not necessarily English. To understand the implications of compulsory schooling for these parts of the education system, we note that there are several examples of states regulating parochial and private schools by specifying standards they had to comply with to meet compulsory schooling requirements. For instance, the standards set in Illinois and Wisconsin aroused fierce opposition because of their provisions that private schools teach in the English language and that they be approved by boards of public education [Tyack 1976]. Finally, another aspect of the debate relevant to the regulation of parochial schools was the concern that pupils were being segregated by gender among Jewish immigrants [Brumberg 1997], something that went against long held views of the American public schooling system [Goldin 1999a].

3 Conceptual Framework

We present a framework to conceptualize the notion of nation-building, closely based on Alesina and Reich [2013]. This succinctly describes how a society made up of native and migrant groups, with heterogeneity in values across groups, can use compulsory schooling to nation-build.

Consider a state comprised of two groups: (i) American-borns, normalized to mass 1; (ii) newly arrived immigrants of mass $\gamma \leq 1$. Individuals have heterogeneous civic *values* represented by a point on the real line. Let $f(j)$ be the density of American-borns with values $j \in \mathbb{R}$, and $g(j)$ be the corresponding density among immigrants. Denote by d_{ij} the ‘distance’ between values i and j , $d_{ij} = |i - j|$, and let c denote private consumption. An American-born individual with values $i \in \mathbb{R}$ is assumed to have utility:

$$u_i = c - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} f(j) d_{ij} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) d_{ij} dj. \quad (1)$$

The first term in (1) measures the difference between her values and those of other American-borns; the second term measures the difference between her values and those of immigrants. This utility function then reflects the fact that American-borns prefer to live in a more homogenous society in which individuals share similar values. This is an *intrinsic* preference held by natives: homogenizing the population might have other *indirect* economic benefits, as has been argued for in the literature linking ethnic fragmentation and macroeconomic outcomes, but the underlying nation-building motive is that natives prefer to live with others that share their values.

To see how schooling might affect the homogeneity of values held in society, assume first that some voluntary schooling system is in place, attended by American-borns. We assume the school curriculum matches the values of the median American, i_m . The school system teaches curriculum i_m which has the effect of shifting individual values towards i_m by degree λ . As mentioned earlier,

schooling can impact a variety of specific values [Lott 1999, Glaeser *et al.* 2007], and contemporary evidence suggests that the content of school *curricula* do indeed influence beliefs and values held later in life [Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013, Cantoni *et al.* 2014].

The population then decides by majority rule whether to make this schooling system compulsory. γ is sufficiently small so the median voter is always an American-born (as is empirically borne out across US states during our study period). As American-borns already attend school, the direct effect of implementing compulsory schooling is on the migrant population who are homogenized towards the values of the median American, i_m . Assuming a fixed cost of implementing compulsory schooling, the policy increases the tax burden for all by an amount T . Hence the utility of an American with median values, i^m , if compulsory schooling were to be introduced is,

$$u_{i^m} = c - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} f(j) d_{i^m j} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j)(1 - \lambda) d_{i^m j} dj - T. \quad (2)$$

Proposition 1 *Suppose all immigrants have values $j > i^m$ to the left of the median American, then a majority of Americans vote for compulsory schooling if and only if,*

$$\int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) d_{i^m j} dj \geq T/\lambda. \quad (3)$$

The Proof is in the Appendix.⁹

The framework makes precise the intuitions that whether a state votes for compulsory schooling depends on: (i) the size of the migrant group, $g(j)$; (ii) how different the migrant population is from the median American, $d_{i^m j}$; (iii) the effectiveness of schooling in shifting preferences, λ ; (iv) the fiscal cost of making schooling compulsory, T . Section 4 makes precise how we proxy pre-held values among migrants and hence measure $d_{i^m j}$, and Section 5 takes this to the data to explain the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling.

Finally, a necessary condition for natives to prefer to make schooling compulsory is because it binds on migrants, exposes them to American values, and this exposure shifts migrant values towards American values. Absent compulsory schooling, migrants would therefore become less Americanized, all else equal. This is at the heart of the analysis in Section 6 that estimates the relative demand for American common schools among migrant and native groups. In Section 7 we return to link our findings to the literature examining the *impact* of compulsory schooling on economic and social outcomes.

⁹The assumption $j > i^m$ simplifies the algebra and best describes our setting. Allowing for overlapping preferences of Americans and migrants implies that if compulsion is introduced, this moves the values of some immigrant *further* from the preferences of some Americans. The condition under which the majority of Americans then vote for compulsory schooling depends on the entire distribution of preferences among them.

4 Data and Methods

We test the hypothesis that the introduction of compulsory schooling laws across US states was driven by the American median voter’s desire to homogenize migrants whose civic values differed from their own. We begin by establishing that during our study period the median voter was American born in each state: Figure A1 uses IPUMS 1880 census data (a 100% sample) to show that while migrants account for a sizeable share of each state’s population, they remain a minority in each state. This fact also holds on subsamples that better reflect those eligible to vote, such as the share of the male population, those in the labor force, and those residing in urban areas.¹⁰

Next, the top half of Figure 2 illustrates the variation we seek to explain: the timing of the adoption of compulsory schooling by US states. The data, from Landes and Solomon [1972], shows that the variation is substantial. The first state to adopt, Massachusetts, did so in 1852, the last, Alaska, did so in 1930. Economic historians have argued that compulsory schooling laws were initially weakly enforced [Clay *et al.* 2012], and that they become more effective over time.¹¹ To be clear, our analysis focuses on understanding what drove the *adoption* of compulsory schooling across states. The existing literature has focused greater attention on measuring the *impacts* of this legislation on various outcomes: a question for which the enforcement of compulsory schooling is more first order. We later return to discuss the related literature on the impact of compulsory schooling on economic and cultural outcomes.

Finally, to bring the theoretical predictions to the data we need to identify a source of *within-migrant* diversity in values that matches d_{imj} , that is the difference in civic values between Americans and different migrant groups. Our strategy relies on the fact that the European schooling model was itself driven by nation-building concerns and American educators were familiar with, and influenced by, this.^{12,13} Importantly, during this time period, civic values in many European

¹⁰Given the dominance of the American-born population at the state level, this implies we cannot much exploit changes in voting rights of the foreign-born, or voting restrictions that were designed to disenfranchise blacks, but had the unintended consequence of changing voting rights among the foreign-born [Naidu 2012]. Such changes in voting right will affect the composition of voters but not dramatically shift the values of the median voter.

¹¹In particular, there were gradual extensions in operation to cover: (i) the period of compulsory schooling each year; (ii) precise age and poverty requirements for children to attend; (iii) the application of schooling laws to private/parochial schools; (iv) increased requirements of cooperation from schools in enforcement; (v) the appointment of attendance officers, and then the institution of state supervision of local enforcement; (vi) and the connection of school-attendance enforcement with the child-labor legislation of States through a system of working permits and state inspection of mills, stores, and factories.

¹²On nation-building through compulsion in Europe, Ramirez and Boli [p3, 1987] write, “*European states became engaged in authorizing, funding, and managing mass schooling as part of an endeavor to construct a unified national polity. Within such a polity, individuals were expected to find their primary identification with the nation, and it was presumed that state power would be enhanced by the universal participation of citizens in national project.*”

¹³On the influence of the European education model on American common school reformers, when Calvin Stowe reported back to American education leaders about European practices, he emphasized that “*public education in Europe was having a civilizing effect on that continent because it was bringing Christianity and the teachings of*

countries and the US were aligned and geared towards democracy and nation-building. The evidence that migrants carry their values from home to destination countries [Guiso *et al.* 2006, Fernandez 2007, Luttmer and Singhal 2011] then suggests a natural distinction between migrants who have been exposed to nation-building efforts in their home country and those who have not. We therefore distinguish two types of European migrant: those from countries that had compulsory schooling laws (CSL for brevity) in place before the first US state (Massachusetts in 1852) and were thus exposed to civic values at home, and those from countries that introduced compulsory schooling later than 1850 and were therefore less likely to have been exposed to civic values.

To this purpose we assemble a new data-set on the timing of the adoption of compulsory schooling by European sending countries, which is shown in the bottom half of Figure 2. In the Appendix we detail the sources used to compile the relevant dates for compulsory schooling by country. Using our preferred definitions, Figure 2 and Table A2A show the European countries defined to have compulsory schooling in place by 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Figure 2 makes precise that the adoption of compulsory schooling in Europe is not perfectly explained by geography, language or religion. In particular, within each group of European countries that adopted compulsory schooling pre and post 1850, there are countries in Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe, and countries where the main religion is Catholicism or Protestantism. This variation enables us to separately identify the impact on the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling of within-migrant diversity in values from differences along other dimensions.¹⁴

Table A2B discusses in finer detail the coding for those countries in which there can exist within-country variation in compulsory schooling. Table A2A then also provides the earliest and latest dates by which compulsory schooling might reasonably be argued to have been passed in that country, given the sources cited and ambiguities/regional variations within a country. For our main analysis we focus on the preferred dates shown in Figure 2. We later provide robustness

democracy to the most remote parts, where despotism often ruled” [Jeynes 2007]. Glenn [p100, 2002] writes, “*The influence of foreign models, especially that of Protestant states of the Continent, Prussia and the Netherlands, was of critical importance in shaping the goals and the arguments of the education reformers. It was through the nation-building role of popular schooling in those countries that key ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789 became central elements of what was virtually a consensus program along elites in the United States throughout the century and a quarter beginning around 1830*”, and, “*that the alternative model offered by England, where education remained essentially in the hands of private, ecclesiastical, and charitable enterprise until the 20th century, did not have more appeal suggests how strongly Enlightenment concerns for national unity and uniformity dominated the thinking of the leaders in the common school movement.*”

¹⁴If we consider the time series for GDP per capita, again split between European countries with and without compulsory schooling in place in 1850, we find that European countries without compulsory schooling are richer than those with compulsion, consistent with nation-building rather than economic development driving compulsion in Europe [Ramirez and Boli 1987]. Moreover, the relative GDP per capita between the two types of European country remains almost fixed over the entire period. This reinforces the previous point that there is considerable heterogeneity within each group of countries.

checks on our results using alternative codings of dates for compulsory schooling using these lower and upper bounds.¹⁵

Finally, Table A3 probes the link between compulsory schooling laws and enrolment rates *in Europe*. We exploit five secondary data sources on enrolment rates in Europe in the 19th century: these differ in the coverage of countries, years, and the precise definition of enrolment. Despite this, in general we find higher enrolment rates among in countries with compulsory schooling than without, supporting the hypothesis that migrants from the former set of countries are drawn from a population that has more exposure to civic values through the education system.¹⁶

4.1 Descriptives

Figure 3 illustrates the variation we use to identify the effect of interest. We combine US Census data on state population by country of birth with our data on the timing of the adoption of compulsory schooling by European sending countries, to compute the population share of migrants from European countries with and without compulsory schooling before 1850. Data limitations prevent us from dividing non-Europeans migrants between those with and without compulsory schooling at home: thus they are grouped in one category throughout. Figure 3 shows the share of the population in each group (Europeans with and without compulsory schooling, and non-Europeans) by state, averaged across census years before the passage of compulsory schooling laws in each state.

There is considerable variation in the size of the different migrant groups across states: the share of Europeans with compulsory schooling ranges from .05% to 18%, the share of Europeans without compulsory schooling from .3% to 29%, the share of non-Europeans from .03% to 32%. European migrants account for the large majority of the migrant population in 46 out of the 49 states. The population share of migrants is sizeable in all regions except South Eastern states. Importantly for our purposes, the correlation between the three migrant series is positive but not strong: the smallest of the three pairwise correlations is .24, the largest .50. This variation is what

¹⁵We define countries using pre-1914 borders, that can be matched into US census place of birth codes. Except for Canada and Japan, we were unable to find detailed sources for all non-European countries to accurately divide them into those with and without historic experience of compulsion.

¹⁶Two further points are of note. First, these data sources make clear that even in European countries with compulsion, enrolment rates remained well below 100% on average. Hence, as with US states, there appears to be imperfect enforcement. Second, whether these differences in values then translate to differences in values held by Europeans that migrated to the US depends on the nature of migrant selection. The few studies that have examined the question for this period provide somewhat mixed evidence, and highlight that selection varies across entry cohorts and countries. For example, Abramitzky *et al.* [2012] link US and Norwegian census records to provide evidence on the negative selection of Norwegian migrants. At the same time, Abramitzky *et al.* [2014] document that on arrival to the US, the average migrant did not face a substantial occupation based earnings penalty, experienced occupational advancement in the US at the same rate as natives, and those migrants that left the US were negatively selected.

allows us to separately identify the response of American-born median voters to the presence of the three migrants types.

Table 1 compares the traits of the different groups of migrants to Americans on state-census years before compulsory schooling is introduced. The first row describes the relative population share of each group and highlights again the considerable variation in these shares across states in a given year, as well as the variation in shares within a state over time.

The next two rows in Panel A highlight differences in human capital across groups. Among adults (aged 15 or over), the share of illiterates is significantly higher among Europeans from countries without compulsory schooling than among European-born adults from countries with compulsory schooling (Column 5).¹⁷ These differences are significant even if we condition on state fixed effects (Column 6). This is in line with the ‘first stage’ evidence provided in Table A3 comparing enrolment rates in Europe among countries with and without compulsory schooling. The next row in Table 1 shows these patterns persist across generations. More precisely, comparing enrolment rates in any type of school in the US (public, private, parochial) for children aged 8-14 in each group (the cohort for whom compulsory schooling typically related to), these are significantly *lower* among migrants groups from European countries *without* compulsory schooling than for children from European countries with compulsory schooling in place by 1850. As expected both migrant groups trail behind the enrolment rates of American-borns, and enrolment rates of non-Europeans lie somewhere between the levels of the two European groups. This evidence raises a clear alternative explanation of why the passage of compulsory schooling might correlate to the presence of different European migrants: the laws might have been introduced to raise the skills of migrants, rather than to instill civic values. We will be able to disentangle these two explanations by exploiting variation in enrolment rates within each European group.

The remaining rows of Panel A highlight that the two groups of European migrants do not significantly differ from each other on several other characteristics that include the share of young people in the group (aged 15 or less), labor force participation rates, the share of the group residing on a farm, and an overall measure of the groups economic standing in the US as proxied by an occupational index score available across US census years.¹⁸

¹⁷Illiteracy rates among American-born adults are higher than for any of the migrant groups. This is because the age composition of migrant groups differ considerably from the native population: migrants are much younger on average. This fact combined with the strong upward time trend over the 19th century in the educational attainment of Americans shown in Figure 1, means that their adult illiteracy rates of natives are higher than for migrants because older cohorts of American-borns are included.

¹⁸The score is based on the OCCSCORE constructed variable in IPUMS census samples. This assigns each occupation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of \$1950) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950.

4.2 Empirical Method

We estimate the hazard rate, $h(t) = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}$, namely, the probability $f(t)$ of compulsory schooling laws being passed in a time interval from census year t until census year $t+10$, conditional on compulsory schooling not having been passed in that state up until census year t , $S(t)$. This approach allows for duration dependence in the passage of legislation by states (so that history matters), and corrects for censoring bias without introducing selection bias. The unit of observation is the state-census year where we use census years from 1850 through to 1930. In this survival analysis set-up, ‘failure’ corresponds to the year of passage of compulsory schooling. As that is an absorbing state, state-years after compulsory schooling is passed are not utilized as they provide no information relevant to determine when compulsory schooling is actually passed.

We then estimate the following Cox proportional hazard model:

$$h_s(t|\mathbf{x}_s) = h_0(t) \exp(\sum_j \beta_j N_s^j + \sum_j \gamma_j X_s^j + \lambda X_s), \quad (4)$$

where the baseline hazard $h_0(t)$ is unparameterized, and t corresponds to census year. This model scales the baseline hazard by a function of state covariates in pre-adoption years. In particular, we consider how the composition of various migrant groups j in the state correlate to the passage of compulsory schooling. The division of population groups j we consider is between European migrants in the state from countries with and without historic exposure to compulsory schooling, as well as non-European migrants. N_s^j is the share of the state population that is in group j : this is our key variable of interest; X_s^j includes the same group characteristics shown in Table 1. X_s includes the total population of the state, and the state’s occupational index score, a proxy for the state’s economic development.

The coefficient of interest is how changes in the composition of the state population group j affect the hazard of passing compulsory schooling laws, $\hat{\beta}_j$. As population sizes across groups j differ, we convert all population shares N_s^j into effect sizes (as calculated from pre-adoption state-census years). $\hat{\beta}_j$ then corresponds to the impact of a one standard increase in the share of group j in the state on the hazard of passing compulsory schooling law. As hazard rates are reported, we test the null that β_j is equal to one, so that a hazard significantly greater (less) than one corresponds to the law being passed significantly earlier (later) in time, all else equal.

5 Results

5.1 Core Findings

Table 2 presents our core results. The first specification pools foreign-borns into one group: we find that a one standard deviation increase in the share of the population that is foreign-born significantly increases the hazard rate of compulsory schooling being passed between two Census dates by 29%. Column 2 then splits the foreign-born into European and non-Europeans and Column 3 splits European migrants along the key margin relevant for nation-building. We find that the presence of European migrants from countries that do *not* have historic experience of compulsory schooling at home significantly brings *forward* in time the passage of compulsory schooling: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of such Europeans is associated with a 64% higher hazard rate. In contrast, the presence of Europeans with a long history of compulsory schooling at home does not influence when compulsory schooling is passed by states. The effect sizes across these types of European migrant are significantly different to each other, as shown at the foot of the Table [p-value=.005].

Column 4 controls for group and state characteristics (X_s^j, X_s). X_s^j includes the enrolment rates of 8-14 year olds for American and foreign-borns (the age group for whom compulsory schooling in US states was most relevant for), and we present the impacts of these human capital related controls (in effect sizes) in addition to the coefficients of interest, $\hat{\beta}_j$. To interpret this finding it is important to note that Census data does not allow to distinguish between enrollment in American common schools, where American civil values are taught, and private or parochial schools. Thus while enrollment measures investment in human capital it does not necessarily imply exposure to American civic values. In Section 6 we use county level data to show that migrants from countries without compulsory schooling had indeed lower demand for American common schools.

Two key results emerge. First, the distinction between the two types of European migrants is robust to controlling for other dimensions along which the groups differ [p-value=.004]. The magnitude of the effect is larger: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of Europeans without compulsory schooling at home doubles the probability that the US state passes compulsory schooling. Conditioning on group and state characteristics, the presence of non-European migrants has very similar qualitative and quantitative impacts on the timing of compulsory schooling as the presence of European-borns from countries without historic experience of compulsory schooling [p-value=.505]. The second key result in Column 4 is that the enrollment rates of migrants' children in the US have no impact on whether American-born voters introduce compulsory schooling. We note that higher enrollment rates among the children of natives speed up the adoption of

the laws, as shown in the earlier literature [Landes and Solomon 1972]. This might reflect the demand for civic values by American-borns increases when more of them are enrolled, that there is a complementarity between American enrollments and the need for civic values to be instilled among migrants, or the result might proxy for differences in wealth across states.

Finally, Column 5 estimates (4) in full, splitting migrant childrens' enrollment rates into the three migrant groups to test whether the estimated differences between these groups are driven by the fact that they make different investments in their children's human capital. The estimates show that the population share coefficients remain stable and the differences precisely estimated. The enrollment rates themselves have no significant impacts on the hazard rate except higher enrolment rates among children of Europeans without historic exposure to compulsory schooling reduce the likelihood of passing the laws by 18% in the average time period [p-value=.077]. We keep the specification in Column 5 as our baseline throughout the remaining analysis.

In short, it is the civic values held by migrants, as proxied by their historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home, rather than migrants' investment in the human capital of their children in the US that largely drive the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling. Mapping this back to the conceptual framework is informative of the precise role compulsory schooling plays in nation-building. The framework highlighted that American-borns have a desire to homogenize those migrants that are more distant from them in values. The American median voter *could* have targeted those with compulsory schooling in their country of origin because compulsory schooling generates country-specific identities and so these individuals are most in need of being re-indoctrinated with uniquely American values. This is not what the evidence suggests. Rather, we find American-borns target those Europeans without historic experience of compulsory schooling in their country of origin (as well as towards non-Europeans who are also unlikely to have compulsory schooling back home). This is consistent with compulsory schooling being a nation-building tool because of its impact on civic values that are common (and transportable) across countries, akin to the arguments given in Glaeser *et al.* [2007].

5.2 Other Sources of Migrant Diversity

We have emphasized the within-migrant diversity in values, as measured by migrants' historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin. However, American-born voters might be sensitive to other sources of diversity across migrants. For instance, the Dillingham Report highlighted the divide between 'old' (from Northern and Western Europe) and 'new' (from Southern and Eastern Europe) immigrants with respect to their skills, economic conditions at arrival and migratory horizon. We now examine these alternative sources of within-migrant

heterogeneity in parallel with the diversity in values emphasized thus far.¹⁹

We first consider English language as the key source of within-migrant diversity. To do so, we subdivide European-born migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin, between those from non-English speaking countries and those from English speaking countries. As Figure 2 makes clear, the latter group is comprised of migrants from Britain and Ireland. Furthermore, for European migrants from countries with compulsory schooling already in place by 1850, all such migrants originate from non-English speaking countries. Hence only a three-way division of European migrants is possible when considering English language as the additional source of within-migrant diversity over and above differences in values.

Column 1 of Table 3 shows the result, where the following points are of note: (i) among European migrants from countries that do not have compulsory schooling in place by 1850, the estimated hazards are above one for both subsets of Europeans (namely those from English speaking countries and those non-English speaking countries); (ii) these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.555]; (iii) for Europeans with a long established history of compulsory schooling the hazard rate remains below one; (iv) within European migrants from non-English speaking countries, there remain significant differences in the hazard rate for compulsory schooling between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin [p-value=.057]. In short, American-born median voters appear more sensitive to diversity in values among European migrants than diversity in their English speaking abilities. Indeed, the evidence suggests a one standard deviation increase in the population share of English speaking migrants (i.e. British and Irish migrants) significantly increases the hazard of compulsory schooling by 66%, all else equal. As highlighted by the evidence below when we consider migrant diversity along religious lines, this result is most likely picking up the fact that Irish migrants were Catholics, and this was an important divide in values with the median American.

The second source of within-migrant diversity considered is European region of origin. As highlighted in the qualitative evidence, especially that in the Dillingham Report, the public debate often drew an important distinction between migrants from ‘old’ Europe (Northern Europe and Scandinavia) versus more recent migration waves from ‘new’ Europe (essentially Southern and Eastern Europe). We can subdivide both groups of European migrant with and without historic exposure to compulsory schooling between these from old and new Europe, so defined. Column 2 shows the result, where we note the following: (i) among European migrants from countries

¹⁹Two other proximate causes behind a lack of assimilation were also highlighted by the Dillingham Report: (i) that migrants were predominantly young men without their families, who would be later joined by their wives and so be less likely to marry Americans, undermined the process of assimilation; (ii) temporary migration further weakened the assimilation process as migrants had fewer incentives to become Americanized.

without compulsory schooling by 1850, the hazards are above one for both subsets of Europeans; (ii) these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.269]; (iii) for Europeans with a long established history of compulsory schooling the hazard rates remain below one for both groups of European by region of origin, and again these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.348]; (iv) within European migrants from Northern Europe/Scandinavia, there remain significant differences in the hazard between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin [p-value=.066]; (v) within European migrants from Southern/Eastern Europe, exactly the same source of diversity remains significant in explaining the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling [p-value=.003]. In short, the evidence suggests while American-born voters are sensitive to the region of origin of European migrants, the over-riding source of diversity the median voter is sensitive to is differences in migrant values.²⁰

The third dimension we consider is religion: this is prominent in much of the public debate described earlier and during the study period, the Catholic church remained the most significant rival to governments in the provision of education [Glenn 2002, West and Woessmann 2010]. We consider the US as a majority Protestant country, and use the Barro and McCleary [2005] data to group European countries into whether their majority religion is Protestant or Catholic/Other. Column 3 shows the result, where the following points are of note: (i) among European migrants from countries that do not have compulsory schooling by 1850, the estimated hazards are above one for both religions, although the hazard for migrants from Catholic/Other countries is significantly higher than for migrants from Protestant countries [p-value=.013]; (ii) for Europeans with a long history of compulsory schooling the hazard rate remains below one again for both groups of migrant by religion, and these hazards are not significantly different from each other [p-value=.289]; (iv) within European migrants from Protestant countries, there remain significant differences in the hazard between those with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin [p-value=.052]; (v) within European migrants from Catholic/Other countries, exactly the same source of diversity remains significant [p-value=.000]. In short, there

²⁰This result reinforces the earlier finding that concerns of American voters over the human capital or enrolment rates of migrants were not an important factor driving the cross-state adoption of compulsion, as migrants from Southern/Eastern Europe would have had the lowest levels of human capital accumulation. The differences in migrant characteristics between these European regions of origin might capture a host of other factors including: (i) differential propensities to out-migrate [Abramitzky *et al.* 2012, Bandiera *et al.* 2013]; (ii) ties to second generation immigrants in the US (who are then American-born but with foreign born parents). On the first point, we have also taken implied out-migration rates of nationalities from Bandiera *et al.* [2013] and then created a four way classification of European migrants by their historic exposure to compulsory schooling, and whether they have above/below median out-migration rates. The results confirm that within-migrant diversity in values as captured by historic exposure to compulsion remains the key source of variation across migrants. On the second point, in the Appendix we discuss the robustness of our core result to splitting the American-born population between second generation immigrants and those whose parents are both American-born.

are important differences in how American voters respond to the presence of European migrants of different religions, being especially sensitive to Europeans from Catholic/Other countries. This helps explain the earlier impact of English speaking countries, that was likely picking up the impact of Irish Catholics. However, after accounting for religious diversity of migrants, we continue to find that the key source of diversity that American-born voters are sensitive to is migrant values.

5.3 Alternative Mechanisms Driving Compulsory Schooling

Nation-building motives are not the only reason why governments might intervene in education provision. Standard normative and positive arguments can be used to justify state provision of education, including: (i) on efficiency grounds, as individuals cannot typically borrow against their human capital and so productive educational investments might not be undertaken; (ii) on redistributive grounds as the poor gain from education and it is financed by all; (iii) human capital externalities; (iv) the complementarity between capital and skilled labor that is key for the process of industrialization. While none of these necessarily require compulsory schooling laws, we now assess whether our core finding is robust to additionally accounting for the basic predictions of those alternative mechanisms.

To examine if redistributive motives might drive the passage of compulsory schooling, we estimate (4) and additionally control for the standard deviation in the state occupational income score (the mean occupational income score is already in X_s). This proxies the redistributive pressures the state faces. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that although there is a positive correlation between inequality so measured and the hazard of passing legislation, the coefficient is not significantly different from one. The impacts of the population shares of interest remain almost unchanged from the baseline specification from Column 5 in Table 2, suggesting the presence of migrant groups and inequality in a state are not correlated.

In Column 2 we examine the industrialization hypothesis by controlling for the share of workers in the state’s labor force working in different occupations: professions, craft and operative. We find that as a greater share of workers are engaged in the middle-skilled craft occupations, the hazard of introducing compulsory schooling significantly increases (the point estimate on the hazard is below one for the least-skilled operative occupations). Hence there is evidence on compulsory schooling being related to industrialization, but this additional mechanism operates in parallel with the nation-building motives embodied in our core finding.²¹

²¹This is in line with the evidence presented in Galor and Moav [2006] from England, on how members of Parliament voted for the Balfour Act of 1902, the proposed education reform that created a public secondary schooling system. They find Parliamentarians were more likely to vote for the legislation if they represented more skill intensive constituencies (even accounting for their party affiliation). For the US, Goldin and Katz [2001] argue

Galor *et al.* [2009] make precise how the industrialization process interacts with land inequality in determining the level of state provision of education. More specifically, they argue there exists a conflict between the entrenched landed elite (who have little incentive to invest in mass schooling) and the emerging capitalist elite, who do have such incentives given the complementarity between capital and skilled labor. To proxy the relative balance of power in this conflict they propose a measure of land inequality, that is the share of land held by the top 20% of all land holdings. We then additionally control for this same measure in (4). The result in Column 3 shows that the effect goes in the expected direction but the ratio is not significantly below one. Moreover, the coefficients relevant for the nation-building hypothesis remain stable, further suggesting the composition of the migrant population is not related to land inequality.²²

The remaining Columns focus on the explanation that political parties were key to compulsory schooling. Indeed, much has been written about the Republican-Democrat divide over compulsory schooling, with the policy often being seen to be driven by a faction of the Republican party.²³ In line with this we find that a one standard deviation increase in the vote share for Republicans in Congressional elections significantly increases the hazard rate. Given that significant third parties existed for much of the 19th century, Column 5 repeats the analysis controlling for Democrat party vote shares: as implied by the qualitative evidence, a greater vote share for Democrats does indeed significantly reduce the hazard of passing compulsory schooling law. However, Republican or Democrat vote shares do not explain the effect of the migrant population shares whose coefficients remain stable throughout.

that over 1890-1999 the contribution of human capital accumulation to the US growth process nearly doubled, and Goldin [1999b] describes how the changing industrial structure of the US economy drove changes in the content of what was needing to be taught in secondary schools.

²²This land inequality measure is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for other state-census years. Galor *et al.* [2009] show that state schooling expenditures are significantly correlated to land inequality.

²³The contours of the debate are neatly summarized as follows: “*When Republicans began to promote compulsory attendance legislation in the 1870s, they ignited a national controversy that made compulsory attendance a defining political issue for both parties. Throughout the 1870s, Democrats opposed the passage of any compulsory attendance law, claiming that such legislation would mark the end of the republic and herald the birth of autocratic state government that would not stop at merely requiring some education but would, one day, dictate what children should learn (and not learn) and how parents should raise their children. Their opposition during the years of Reconstruction and throughout the late 1870s succeeded in blocking passage of compulsory attendance bills in various states*” [p318, Provasnik 2006]. On the changing stance of Democrat opposition, “*Democratic invectives against compulsory attendance peaked between 1875-77...can be explained by political developments at large. Republicans abandoned their national campaign at the end of 1876 after Democrats won control of the US HoR...Democrats co-opted the last Republican initiative of the 1870s - the Blaine amendment to forbid state funding of sectarian schools and, to the Republican’s great embarrassment, used the issue to demonstrate their dedication to the cause of public education. Once Democrats were able to get on the public education bandwagon, the issue of compulsory education lost much of its partisan overtones.*” [p157-9, Provasnik 2006]. Finally, on other potential barriers to adopting compulsory schooling and the effective and relatively quick end of the political divide, “*There was concern that hostile judges might declare them unconstitutional or issue adverse decisions that would render the laws meaningless or unenforceable. These threats to compulsory education, however, rarely materialized and were always fleeting. The era of strictly voluntary education was over.*” [p9, Hutt 2012].

5.4 Endogenous Location Choices

The coefficients of interest $\hat{\beta}_j$ from (4) should not be interpreted as causal given migrants sort into locations, a process that might be driven directly by the presence of compulsory schooling laws, or indirectly through common factors that also impact the timing of compulsory schooling. Of course, our core finding implies that for such endogeneity to entirely drive the result, the underlying model of location choice would have to differ between European migrants from countries with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling at home. Nevertheless, it remains important to consider the issue and its implications for the interpretation of our findings.

Plausible instruments simply do not exist for the location choice of migrant groups that varies across countries of origin, US states, and years. Hence, the alternative approach we take is to establish whether the passage of compulsory schooling in state s by census year t , is associated with subsequent changes in the composition of the migrant population within the state (N_{st}^j). This sheds light on the narrower issue of whether any endogenous process by which migrants sort into states is significantly altered by the introduction of compulsory schooling law. We use two specifications to check for whether population trends shift in response to compulsory schooling:

$$N_{st}^j = \mu \mathbf{1}(CSL_{st} = 1) + \delta_s + \delta_t + \sum_t \theta_t (N_{s1850}^j \cdot \delta_t) + u_{st}, \quad (5)$$

$$N_{st}^j = \delta t + \kappa [(t - CSL_{st}) \mathbf{1}(CSL_{st} = 1)] + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{st}, \quad (6)$$

where N_{st}^j corresponds to measures of the state-year population, and $\mathbf{1}(CSL_{st} = 1)$ is a dummy for whether compulsory schooling law has been adopted in state s by census year t . Specification (5) allows for a complete set of state and year fixed effects (δ_s, δ_t), and also allows for there to be long run reversion to the mean in populations across states, as captured in the $N_{s1850}^j \cdot \delta_t$ term. Specification (6) is a standard trend break model, that allows for state fixed effects, but assumes population follows a linear time trend (δt) and then tests for a break in this linear trend in the years after compulsory schooling law has been adopted in state s .

Table A4 presents our results: Panel A shows estimates of μ from (5), and Panel B shows estimates of κ and δ from (6). In Columns 1 to 3 we focus on the partial correlation between the passage of compulsory schooling in a state on the subsequent total state population ($N_{st} = \sum_j N_{st}^j$). Examining Panel A, we see that unconditionally, states with compulsory schooling subsequently have significantly larger populations, but this result is not robust: including state fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the partial correlation by 90%, and allowing for reversion to the mean eliminates any significant partial correlation between the total population and the earlier passage of compulsory schooling. Columns 4 to 7 focus on the composition of the foreign-born population

in the state. We find no evidence that after compulsory schooling laws are passed, the foreign born population, European migrants from countries with a long history of compulsory schooling, European migrants from countries without a long history of compulsory schooling, or the ratio of the two groups of European migrant, are significantly different. These results go firmly against the idea that native or migrant population movements are endogenously driven by the earlier passage of compulsory schooling in a state. This conclusion is reinforced if we move to Panel B where (6) is estimated: we again find little evidence of native or migrant populations being responsive to the earlier passage of compulsory schooling ($\hat{\kappa} = 0$ in five out of six specifications).

Two other issues of internal migration are relevant for our study. The first is the widely documented Westward movement of white American-borns in the 19th century. This raises the concern that the passage of compulsory schooling was an instrument by which to attract American migrants (or Americans took ideas over compulsory schooling with them as they migrated across states), and that the location of the foreign-born groups we focus on in Table 2 is interlinked with the internal migration of white American-borns. If so, this generates a spurious correlation between the presence of these foreign-born groups and the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling. To check for this, we use data on the internal migration of Americans from the 1880 census to plot the cross-state variation in Americans born out-of-state (but in the US) and the foreign-born population group shares core to our analysis ($N_{s,1880}^j$). Figure A2 shows the result (and line of best fit): we find no significant relationship between the population share of out-of-state American-borns, with the population shares of Europeans with and without long exposure to compulsory schooling at home, or non-Europeans. This suggests our findings are not merely picking up the internal migration of white American-borns.

A second internal mass movement of individuals during our study period is the Great Migration of Blacks, from Southern to urban Northern states (hence more closely matching the spatial patterns in Figure 2). However, this is unlikely to be related to the passage of compulsion because: (i) the migration of blacks occurred mostly between 1916 and 1930, well after compulsory schooling laws began to be introduced: pre-1910 the net migration of blacks was only .5mm [Collins 1997]; (ii) there is nothing in multiple sources of qualitative evidence to suggest compulsory schooling was either targeting blacks, or related to the Great Migration. Indeed, many legislative caveats were included to ensure blacks did not benefit from compulsion, such as exemptions due to poverty or distance from the nearest public school [Black and Sokoloff 2006, Collins and Margo 2006].²⁴

²⁴Chay and Munshi [2013] review the literature suggesting an important pull factor for black migration to start in 1916 was the shutting down of European migration at the same time, that left labor supply shortages in Northern states. Prior to that date there is little evidence that European and black migration to states was interlinked.

5.5 Robustness

In the Appendix we detail the robustness of our core finding along four dimensions. First, we consider alternative samples by: (i) limiting attention to long established states observed in all census years from 1850 to 1930 and in which the desire to homogenize by natives might be stronger; (ii) estimating (4) dropping one census region at a time, to ensure our results are not driven by a small subset of states. The second dimension we consider robustness along is alternative classifications of European countries with and without compulsory schooling. We re-classify European countries using the lower and upper bound limits of when compulsory schooling might reasonably have been introduced in each country, shown in Table A2, as well as considering the impact of a rolling window of Europeans' exposure to compulsory schooling. Specifically, we examine whether the American median-voter is differentially sensitive to the presence of European migrants that have passed compulsory schooling at least 30 years ago, versus the presence of Europeans from countries that have either not passed compulsory schooling or passed it less than a generation ago. This highlights how American voters react differently over time to migrants from the same country, as that country becomes exposed to compulsory schooling at home.

The third set of robustness checks investigate alternative econometric models. We first impose more parametric structure on the underlying hazard using a log logistic model: this allows for unobserved heterogeneity across states to be accounted for. We then follow some of the existing literature and use linear regression models to understand the passage of compulsory schooling. Such regression models provide weak evidence that the presence of migrants in a state correlates to the passage of compulsory schooling, although they mask the key responsiveness of American voters to the key diversity in values held by different Europeans. The divergence between the survival and regression results can easily be reconciled: the linear probability model is essentially equivalent to the survival model assuming duration independence in the passage of legislation. This assumption is strongly rejected in the data: history does matter and the hazard of passing legislation, $h_0(t)$, varies over census years t .

The final set of robustness checks include two broad classes of additional controls in (4). First, we consider the passage of other pieces of legislation in US states, that might be complementary to, or pre-requisites for, the passage of compulsory schooling. For example, the passage of child labor laws and the establishment of a birth registration system have been argued to be interlinked with compulsory schooling [Lleras-Muney 2002, Goldin and Katz 2003]. We also check whether our result survives controlling for additional proxies for the states' progressivity, that might drive compulsory schooling directly, and also influence migrants' location choices. The second class of additional controls relate to legislation passed in European countries: in particular we examine how

the passage of compulsory schooling relates to the presence of European migrants from countries with child labor laws, to shed light on whether such policy preferences might be driving migrants to sort into locations with like-minded Americans, rather than compulsory schooling being introduced as a nation-building tool by American-borns. Finally, we explore an alternative source of variation in values among European migrants that might proxy for their civic values: whether they come from countries that had universal male suffrage in 1850.²⁵

6 Migrants' Demand for American Schooling

The extent to which nation-building efforts through compulsory schooling were required to ensure migrants were exposed to American public schools and their values homogenized, depends on migrant's underlying demand for American schooling. Only if their demand for common schooling was sufficiently low would compulsory schooling be required to change their values. The evidence in Table 2 previously indicated that differences in enrollment rates in any type of school do *not* drive the difference between how American-born median voters react to the presence of migrants from countries with and without compulsory schooling. In this Section we exploit detailed information on attendance and investments into American common schools in the cross-section of counties in 1890 to pin down the relative demands for American common schools of the different migrant groups, and to establish how these demands are affected by compulsory schooling laws.

6.1 Conceptual Framework

As migrants can form a significant share of county populations, we use a textbook probabilistic voting model [Persson and Tabellini 2000] to derive an empirical specification informative of the relative demands for common schools among migrant groups. Consider a jurisdiction comprising a continuum of citizens. An individual i belongs to group j , where groups are of size N^j , $\sum_j N^j = N$. Within a group, individuals have the same income, y^j . Individual preferences are quasi-linear,

$$u^j(g) = c^j + \alpha^j(.)H(g), \quad (7)$$

²⁵Motivated by the conceptual framework, we also examine heterogeneity across states in how migrant populations drive compulsory schooling. The framework highlights the likelihood compulsion is put into place depends partly on its fiscal costs, T . We examine this comparing the differential effects of migrant groups in relatively rich and poor states. The second comparative static we consider relates to the existence of voting restrictions on the foreign-born. These vary across state years, but when in place, the values of American-borns are more likely to be reflected, all else equal. These results are discussed in the Appendix.

where c^j is the private consumption of a member of group j , $H(g)$ is concave in the public good, g (common schools), and is assumed twice-differentiable with $H(0) = 0$. The group valuation for American common schools is $\alpha^j(\theta^j, 1(HCSL^j))$: θ^j captures factors that influence the group's demand for common schools (such as the share of young people in the group), and $1(HCSL^j)$ is an indicator for the historic entrenchment of compulsory schooling in the country of origin for those in migrant group j .

In line with our empirical setting, the local jurisdiction finances common schools by a local income tax rate τ so individuals face a budget constraint, $c^j = (1 - \tau)y^j$, and no group can be excluded. Given multiple groups reside in the jurisdiction, the probabilistic voting model specifies the following political process that produces a equilibrium level of common schooling: there are two political parties (A, B), whose only motivation is to hold office. The source of within group heterogeneity is a political bias parameter $\sigma^{ij} \sim U[-\frac{1}{2\phi^j}, \frac{1}{2\phi^j}]$: a positive value of σ^{ij} implies that voter i has a bias in favor of party B while voters with $\sigma^{ij} = 0$ are politically neutral. Hence ϕ^j measures the political homogeneity of a group j . Voter i in group j thus prefers candidate A if $w^j(g_A) > w^j(g_B) + \sigma^{ij}$.

The timing of events is as follows. First, parties A and B simultaneously and non-cooperatively announce electoral platforms: g_A, g_B . At this stage, they know the distribution from which σ^{ij} is drawn, but not realized values across voters. Second, elections are held where citizens vote sincerely for a single party. Voters and parties look no further than the next election. Third, the elected party implements her announced policy platform.

Proposition 2 *The political equilibrium is $g^* = g_A = g_B$ where g^* is implicitly defined as,*

$$H_g(g^*) = \frac{\theta \sum_j W^j y^j}{\bar{y} \sum_j W^j \alpha^j(\theta^j, 1(HCSL^j))}. \quad (8)$$

$W^j = N^j \phi^j$ is group j 's 'political weight', and $\theta = \frac{\sum_j \theta^j N^j}{N}$ is the share of young in the population.

The Proof is in the Appendix.

The group's political weight captures how influential the group is by virtue of its size and how many swing voters are in group j . A key feature of the probabilistic voting model is that all groups have some weight in the determination of commons schooling g^* . The key comparative static we consider is how the optimal provision of common schooling changes in group- j 's size:

$$\frac{\partial H_g(g^*)}{\partial N^j} = \frac{1}{\phi^j} \frac{\partial H_g(g^*)}{\partial W^j} = \frac{\theta y^j}{\phi^j \bar{y} \left(\sum_j W^j \alpha^j(\theta^j, 1(HCSL^j)) \right)^2} \left[\sum_{k \neq j} W^k y^k [\alpha^k - \alpha^j] \right] \quad (9)$$

Hence the larger is α^j relative to other group α^k 's, the more likely is it that $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial N^j} > 0$. The sign of $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial N^j}$ can then be informative of $sign(\alpha^j \text{ relative to } \alpha^k)$. We use this intuition to rank the relative demands for common schools across the j groups. This dovetails with the earlier analysis of what drove the cross-state adoption of compulsory schooling: our results there showed the American-born median voter was especially sensitive to European migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling. Hence they behaved as if,

$$\alpha^j(\theta^j, \mathbf{1}(HCSL^j) = 1) > \alpha^j(\theta^j, \mathbf{1}(HCSL^j) = 0), \quad (10)$$

so that absent compulsory schooling, this group would have demanded less common schooling. We now recover estimates of this relative ranking to understand whether these beliefs were justified.

6.2 Empirical Method

We estimate the model using cross-county data from the 1890 County Yearbook. This details investments into, and attendance at, common schools in over 2400 counties in 45 states. We proxy the equilibrium provision of common schooling, g^* , using the number of common school teachers in the county. These are locally financed and likely comprise the most significant investment into public schooling. As IPUMS 1890 census data is unavailable, we build control variables using 1880 values based on the 100% census sample. The groups considered replicate those in the earlier analysis: the American-born, European migrants from countries with compulsory schooling, European migrants from countries without compulsory schooling and non-European migrants. We then estimate the following OLS specification for county c in state s ,

$$\ln(teachers)_{cs} = \sum_j \alpha^j N_{cs}^j + \sum_j \gamma_j X_{cs}^j + \lambda X_c + \delta_s + u_{cs}, \quad (11)$$

where N_{cs}^j is the total population size of group j (again measured as an effect size), and X_{cs}^j includes other characteristics of group j (the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score).²⁶ X_c includes the (log) total population of the county aged below 15, and the county's occupational index score. δ_s is a state fixed effect so the coefficients of interest, α^j , are identified from variation in the composition of migrant populations across counties within the same state. Figure A4 illustrates the cross-

²⁶Three points are of note with regards to this specification. First, the County Yearbook provides information on public education for black and white populations separately. For our analysis, all schooling related variables (teachers and attending pupils) correspond to whites. Second, the model makes clear the need to control for these characteristics to remove the direct impacts on the demand for common schools, $\alpha^j(\theta^j, \cdot)$, arising from the age composition of population groups or their ability to finance local public goods. Third, there is an imperfect match between true school jurisdictions and counties, and this attenuates our coefficients of interest, α_j .

county variation in migrant group sizes for four states (one from each census region). Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive evidence on the shares of county populations from each group j and documents the considerable within state variation in these shares. Robust standard errors are reported, and we weight observations by 1880 county population so our coefficients of interest map to the average demand of an individual from group j . Mapping the model to the empirical specification makes clear the relative ranking of $\alpha^j(\cdot)$'s across groups (not their levels) can be identified from the ranking of $\hat{\alpha}^j$'s estimated from (11). As we do not control for the total county population, this allows us to control for the population size and characteristics for *all four* groups j and so measure demands relative to those of the American-born.

6.3 Results

Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 estimates (11) only controlling for the populations of each group j . At the foot of the table we report p-values on the equality of these coefficients to establish the ranking of relative demands for common schooling. The results highlight again that a key source of diversity within European migrants in their demand for common schools is whether they have historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home or not. More precisely: (i) a one standard deviation increase in the county population of European migrants with long exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin significantly increases the provision of common school teachers by 5.8%; (ii) a one standard deviation increase in the county population of European migrants without exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin significantly decreases the provision of common school teachers by 18%; (iii) these differential impacts across European migrant groups significantly differ from each other [p-value = .000]; (iii) the presence of non-European migrants is associated with significantly higher investments into common school teachers. This ranking of $\hat{\alpha}^j$'s is robust to including state fixed effects (Column 2), and group and county controls (X_{cs}^j , X_c) (Column 3).

Mapping the marginal impacts of each group from the full specification in Column 3 back to the probabilistic voting model then implies the following ranking of demands:

$$\alpha_{\mathbf{1}(HCSL^j)=1}^{Euro} = \alpha^{Am-born} > \alpha^{NonEuro} > \alpha_{\mathbf{1}(HCSL^j)=0}^{Euro}. \quad (12)$$

This links directly to the earlier analysis on how the composition of migrants drove the cross-state timing of compulsory schooling: there we found the American-born median voter was especially sensitive to the presence of migrants from European countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling. The implied ranking of $\hat{\alpha}^j$'s across European migrant groups closely matches up

across the two sets of analysis, despite the two sets of quantitative evidence using entirely different data sources, econometric methods and identification strategies. Fundamentally, it suggests that European migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling would have invested less in American common schools ($\alpha_{1(HCSL^j)=1}^{Euro} > \alpha_{1(HCSL^j)=0}^{Euro}$), a result entirely in line with the broader literature on the persistence of migrant preferences across locations. As such, the American-born median voter held correct beliefs in bringing forward in time the adoption of compulsory schooling in those states where such migrants were more numerous.²⁷

Given investments into common school are measured in the cross-section of counties in 1890, and that by then half of all states had passed compulsory schooling, we next estimate a modified version of (11) that allows for the demand for common schools to vary within the same migrant group depending on whether or not they reside in a state with compulsory schooling. This allows us to establish whether the compulsory schooling laws had the intended effect of increasing migrants' exposure to American values in American schools. Defining a dummy D_s equal to one if state s has passed compulsory schooling in 1890, we estimate the following specification:

$$\ln(teachers)_{cs} = \sum_j \alpha^{j0} N_{cs}^j + \sum_j \alpha^{j1} [D_s \times N_{cs}^j] + \sum_j \gamma_j X_{cs}^j + \delta_s + u_{cs}, \quad (13)$$

where $\hat{\alpha}^{j0}$ and $(\hat{\alpha}^{j0} + \hat{\alpha}^{j1})$ measure the relative demand for common schools pre and post-compulsory schooling respectively, for the same migrant group j . The corresponding estimates are shown graphically in Figure 4. We focus first on Panel A: the left hand side shows the $\hat{\alpha}^{j0}$'s for each group j (and their corresponding 95% confidence interval): the y-axis shows the magnitude of each estimate, but as only relative demands for common schools are identified from (13), we centre the point estimates on the value for American-borns. This shows that pre-compulsory schooling, a key source of diversity in values for common schools was between European migrants with and without historic exposure to compulsory schooling at home. Indeed, pre-compulsory schooling, European-born migrants from countries with compulsory schooling already in place by 1850 have significantly higher demands from common schooling than both other European migrants and the American-born.²⁸

²⁷We also note that one disconnect between the cross-state and cross-county evidence relates to non-Europeans. The way in which the American-born median voter responded to these groups at the state level differs from their underlying relative demand for common schools as measured here. This disconnect can stem from two sources: (i) the selection of non-European migrants into the US differs from that for European migrants; (ii) American-borns were less informed about the preferences of non-European migrants, that is plausible given the long history of anti-Chinese discrimination in the US, as discussed in Section 2.1, culminating in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, that banned all immigration of Chinese laborers.

²⁸It is well recognized that compulsory schooling laws necessitated no supply side response, so that the supply of teachers would not have been directly impacted [Margo and Finegan 1996]. The changes we pick up are those resulting from changes in demand arising from the various population groups j in the country, given teachers are locally financed by these groups.

The right hand side of Panel A in Figure 4 shows the change in demand for common schooling for the same groups j : these $\hat{\alpha}^{j1}$ estimates show there is a significant convergence in demands for common schooling with compulsory schooling. The change in demand for common schools is significantly greater among Europeans without historic exposure to compulsory schooling than among Europeans with such exposure to compulsory schooling. The evidence therefore suggests the introduction of compulsory schooling did indeed lead European migrants to be significantly more exposed to American public schooling system, as measured by this willingness to invest in common schools. Moreover, this was especially so for Europeans from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling and hence most in need of being taught the virtues of civic participation and homogenizing their values towards those of the American median voter.

Panel B confirms exactly the same pattern of demands in counties with and without compulsory schooling across groups if we change the outcome variable in (13) and so measure the demand for common schools using pupil attendance at the county level, rather than investments into teachers.

7 Discussion

Many great figures in political and economic history, such as Napoleon and Adam Smith, have emphasized the central role of the education system in nation-building [Mulligan *et al.* 2004, Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013]. In this paper we have documented how nation-building efforts were part of the policy response of American voters to the large and diverse waves of migrant inflows during the Age of Mass Migration. As such, our work adds to the broad literature emphasizing that the national origins of migrants matters [La Porta *et al.* 1998, Acemoglu *et al.* 2001]. We conclude by discussing the link between our work and the literature examining the impacts of compulsory schooling, and highlighting directions for future research.

The results discussed in Section 6.4 and summarized in Figure 4 highlight that pre-compulsory schooling, migrants from European countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling in their country of origin, had lower demand for American common schools. Compulsory schooling led to a significant degree of convergence in demands for American common schools between migrant groups and American-borns. These implied changes in demand for common schooling are very much in line with evidence on the impact of compulsory schooling on migrant enrolment rates. In particular, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer [2015] show how compulsory schooling laws had significant impacts on the enrolment rates of migrant children (increasing them by around 5% overall), with smaller impacts on native children. Moreover, Milligan *et al.* [2004] show using the NES and CPS data, that those exposed to compulsory schooling obtained significantly more years

of education, and later in life are significantly more likely to be registered to vote, to vote, to engage in political discussion with others, to follow political campaigns and attend political meetings, as well as having higher rates of participation in community affairs and trust in government. These are precisely the kinds of changes in values emphasized in Glaeser *et al.* [2007] as being inculcated through compulsory schooling. Indeed, these findings echo many of the original arguments of the common school reformers, who recurrently linked education with inculcating the civic virtues necessary for effective participation in a democracy.²⁹

We highlight two broad directions for future research. First, a wide set of public policies might have been impacted by large and diverse inflows during the Age of Mass Migration. While not all these policy responses would be driven by nation-building concerns, it would remain an important policy objective to ensure migrants contributed economically, as well as became socially assimilated. The most natural policy dimension to study would be cross-state variations in tax rates used to finance local public goods, but variations observed in the regulation and operation of financial and legal markets, say, might also originate from differences in patterns of mass migration into those states during the 19th century. It also remains important to understand the broader set of policies implemented during the study period and specifically targeted towards migrants. For example, during the early 20th century some states introduced citizenship requirements for foreigners to be able to vote. Such policies presumably held back migrant assimilation and sustained greater heterogeneity in values among the population. Hence there remains a need to understand the political economy trade-offs involved that led to the simultaneous use of both nation-building efforts towards foreigners as well as their political exclusion.

A second direction for future research is to extend the analysis to other countries. An avenue to explore is to combine this analysis with our earlier work that documented high rates of out-migration from the US by Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration [Bandiera *et al.* 2013]. This opens up an agenda examining whether returning Europeans drove institutional change in their home country after having been exposed to American institutions. Another possibility is to extend the analysis to consider the process of nation-building in the developing world post-independence. In particular, information on the colonial carve-up of Africa [Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013], opens up the possibility of studying nation-building efforts within countries as a function of the initial (and plausibly exogenous) levels of diversity by ethnicity and potentially values, built into those societies from the time of their independence from colonial rule.³⁰

²⁹However, recent evidence also highlights cases in which assimilation policies lead to a backlash among migrants: Fouka [2014] presents evidence showing that Germans that faced restrictions on the use of the German language in primary schools (introduced over the period 1917-23) are less likely to volunteer during the Second World War, more likely to marry within their ethnic group, and be more likely to give German sounding names to their children.

³⁰Such an analysis would provide quantitative evidence to back up the intriguing assertion made in other social

A Appendix

A.1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1: For any $i \leq i^m$ and for any $j \in \mathbb{R}$ where $j > i^m$ we can rewrite $d_{ij} = d_{ii^m} + d_{i^m j}$. Schooling shifts migrant values towards i^m by λ . So for $i \leq i^m$, as all migrants have values $j > i^m$ this distance becomes $d_{ij} = d_{ii^m} + (1 - \lambda)d_{i^m j}$. Introducing compulsory schooling then gives an American-born individual $i \leq i^m$ utility,

$$\begin{aligned} u_{i^m} &= c - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} f(j) d_{i^m j} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) [d_{ii^m} + (1 - \lambda) d_{i^m j}] dj - T \\ &= c - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} f(j) d_{i^m j} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) d_{ii^m} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) d_{i^m j} dj + \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) \lambda d_{i^m j} dj - T \\ &= c - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} f(j) d_{i^m j} dj - \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) [d_{ii^m} + d_{i^m j}] dj + \int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) \lambda d_{i^m j} dj - T \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Hence the American-born individual $i \leq i^m$ votes for compulsory schooling if $\int_{j \in \mathbb{R}} g(j) \lambda d_{i^m j} dj \geq T$, that can be re-written as (3). As this inequality is the same for all American-borns with values $i \leq i^m$, a majority of American-borns vote for compulsory schooling if (3) is satisfied and a majority vote against otherwise. ■

Proof of Proposition 2: The voter in group j indifferent between voting for party A or B is given by,

$$\sigma^{j*} = u^j(g_A) - u^j(g_B) \quad (15)$$

$$= (g_B - g_A) \frac{y^j \theta}{\bar{y}} + \alpha^j(\theta^j, \mathbf{1}(HCSL^j))(H(g_A) - H(g_B)). \quad (16)$$

All voters i in group j with $\sigma^{ij} \leq \sigma^{j*}$ prefer party A . Therefore, the share of the electorate that vote for party A is,

$$\pi_A = \sum_j W^j \phi^j \left(\sigma^{j*} + \frac{1}{2\phi^j} \right) \quad (17)$$

$$= \sum_j W^j \left((g_B - g_A) \frac{y^j \theta}{\bar{y}} + \alpha^j(\theta^j, \mathbf{1}(HCSL^j))(H(g_A) - H(g_B)) + \frac{1}{2\phi^j} \right), \quad (18)$$

where $W^j = N^j \phi^j$ is group j 's political weight. Party A wins the election if $\pi_A > 1/2$. As both parties facing the same optimization problem, in equilibrium they announce the same policy. The equilibrium amount of common schooling is then derived by taking the first order condition of π_A

sciences that, "Post-independence authorities in Africa expanded education with a goal of promoting national identity and integration, as it had earlier been used in Europe", [p3, Weber 1976].

with respect to g_A and using the fact that $g_A = g_B = g^*$. Solving gives (8).■

A.2 Coding Compulsory Schooling Laws

A.2.1 US States

The data on the year of enactment of compulsory schooling laws (CSL) across US states was extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972], whose original source was Steinhilber and Sokolowski [1966]. The Landes and Solomon [1972] data has been compared to alternative sources including Katz [1976], Leddon [2010], and the Workers’ Compensation Project of Fishback [2000]. Katz [1976] mentions the dates of CSL enactment for a number of states: they are all in accordance with the Landes and Solomon data. Leddon [2010] provides a table with the enactment years of CSL, which correspond exactly to those in Landes and Solomon [1972]. Finally, the Workers Compensation Project Data does not include Alaska and Hawaii, but coincides with Landes and Solomon [1972] for all other available states.

A.2.2 European Countries

Our coding of the introduction of compulsory schooling laws across European countries relies on primary sources (original laws were consulted whenever possible) and secondary sources of a scientific and official nature (monographs and papers, mostly written by historians, and information provided by governments or the European Union). We focus on the first establishment of general compulsory education in the respective territory of interest. We do not explicitly differentiate between compulsory school attendance and compulsory education, as some countries allow for home schooling. It should be noted that sources on the history of compulsory education in different countries sometimes contradict each other: this is a particular concern for countries with federal systems (such as Switzerland) and for territories which belonged to different national entities over the 19th and 20th century (such as today’s Poland and Germany).

Albania Compulsory schooling was introduced when the country became a monarchy in 1928. Article 206 of the Royal Constitution, adopted in 1928, states, “The primary education of all Albanian subjects is obligatory, and the State schools are free” [Hörner *et al.* 2007, Sefa and Lushnje 2012].

Armenia Compulsory primary schooling was introduced in 1932 [EFA 2000, Hörner *et al.* 2007].

Austria-Hungary As part of a comprehensive schooling reform, Maria Theresia signed the General School Ordinance (Allgemeine Schulordnung) in 1774, which made schooling compulsory for children of both genders between 6 and 12 throughout most of the Austro-Hungarian territory. Article 12 of the ordinance states, “children of both sexes whose parents or guardians do not have the will or the means to support a tutor should go to school without exception (...) as soon as they have entered their 6th year”. In order to be allowed to leave school before the age of 12, children needed to “prove in public exams, and provide a written certificate by the superintendent, that they had learnt all the necessary”.³¹ The ordinance further stipulates that municipal authorities in the city and teachers in the country should keep a list of children who have to attend school and admonish parents to send their children to school. This regulation did not apply to Hungary, where schooling was however made compulsory in 1777 with the Ratio Educationis [Melton 1988]. The 1774 law could not be fully enforced, such that analphabetism remained a widespread phenomenon in Austria in the 19th century. To increase school attendance, Maria Theresia’s son and successor Joseph II established punishments for non-compliance in 1781. In 1869, a comprehensive new schooling law (the Reichsvolksschulgesetz) was enacted. It restated the compulsory character of schooling (Art. II.20) and increased years of compulsory attendance from 6 to 8 (Art II.21) [Slaje 2009, Donnermair 2010].^{32,33} According to Schneider [1982], the 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz achieved compulsory schooling even in rural areas.

Belgium Primary schooling was made compulsory in 1914 with the Loi Pouillet [Flora *et al.* 1983, Wielemans 1991, Colle-Michel 2007, Gathmann *et al.* 2012].

Denmark Education was first made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to prepare children for confirmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the basics of religion and the reading of familiar texts. In Denmark, writing was added to the curriculum with the 1814 Education Act, when compulsory primary schools were established [Schneider 1982, Flora *et al.*

³¹ “Kinder, beiderlei Geschlechts, deren Ueltern, oder Vormünder in Städten eigene Hauslehrer zu unterhalten nicht den Willen, oder nicht das Vermögen haben, gehören ohne Ausnahme in die Schule, und zwar sobald sie das 6te Jahr angetreten haben, von welchem an sie bis zu vollständiger Erlernung der für ihren künftigen Stand, und Lebensart erforderlichen Gegenstände die deutschen Schulen besuchen müssen; welches sie wohl schwerlich vor dem 12ten Jahr ihres Lebens, wenn sie im 6ten, oder nach dem 6ten angefangen haben, gründlich werden vollbringen können; daher es denn gerne gesehen wird, daß Ueltern ihre Kinder wenigstens durch 6 oder 7 Jahre in den deutschen Schulen liessen (...) Wenn aber einige vor dem 12ten Jahre zu dem Studiren übergehen, oder aus der Schule entlassen sein wollen; so müssen sie in den öffentlichen Prüfungen beweisen, und von dem Schulaufseher ein schriftliches Zeugnis erhalten, daß sie alles Nöthige wohl erlernt haben”.

³² “Die Eltern oder deren Stellvertreter dürfen ihre Kinder oder Pflegebefohlenen nicht ohne den Unterricht lassen, welcher für die öffentlichen Volksschulen vorgeschrieben ist.”

³³ “Die Schulpflichtigkeit beginnt mit dem vollendeten sechsten, und dauert bis zum vollendeten vierzehnten Lebensjahre.”

1983, Simola 2002, Bandle *et al.* 2005, Gathmann *et al.* 2012].

Finland Primary schools were established in 1866 and became compulsory in 1921 with the Compulsory School Attendance Act. However, universal primary school attendance was only achieved at the time of the Second World War [Flora *et al.* 1983, Simola 2002].

France In France, law no. 11 696 of March 28, 1882 (Loi Jules Ferry), made primary education compulsory for children of both sexes aged 6-13 years [Cubberley 1920, Schneider 1982, Flora *et al.* 1983, Schriewer 1985]. Its Article 4 states, “primary instruction is compulsory for children of both sexes from 6 to 13 years of age”.³⁴ Children were allowed to leave school at age 11 if they passed the public examination for the “certificate of primary studies”. A municipal commission was set up to monitor and encourage school attendance by keeping lists of school-aged children and taking different types of measures in case of non-compliance.

Germany Education was made compulsory in Prussia in 1717 with the School Edict (Schuledikt) enacted by Frederick William I, who “made attendance at village schools compulsory for all children not otherwise provided with instruction” [p4, Ramirez and Boli 1987]. According to Stolze, this was the first time Frederick William proclaimed schooling to be compulsory in all Prussian provinces [Stolze 1911]. This regulation was reiterated by his son Frederick II in his 1763 “General Regulations for Village Schools” (General-Landschul-Reglement), which decreed compulsory schooling for the entire Prussian monarchy. Article 1 of the general regulations stipulates that “all subjects sent both their own children and children entrusted to them, boys or girls, from their fifth year of age on, to school”.³⁵ The regulation stated the school fees to be paid. For those too poor to afford them, they should be financed through donations collected in the church or village. The responsibility to enforce attendance lay with the local preacher and court authorities, who were able to sanction fines for non-compliance. The General-Landschul-Reglement did not apply to Catholics and urban residents. However, a separate edict was promulgated in 1765 for Silesian Catholic schools. Given widespread opposition, compulsory schooling only became effective over a long period [Ramirez and Boli 1987, Melton 1988]. In the German Empire, education became

³⁴“L’instruction primaire est obligatoire pour les enfants des deux sexes âgés des six ans révolus à treize ans révolus.”

³⁵“Zuvörderst wollen Wir, daß alle Unsere Unterthanen, es mögen denn Eltern, Vormünder oder Herrschaften, denen die Erziehung der Jugend obliegt, ihre eigene sowol als ihrer Pflege anvertraute Kinder, Knaben oder Mädchen, wo nicht eher doch höchstens vom Fünften Jahre ihres Alters in die Schule schicken, auch damit ordentlich bis ins Dreyzehnte und Vierzehnte Jahr continuiren und sie so lange zur Schule halten sollen, bis sie nicht nur das Nöthigste vom Christenthum gefasset haben und fertig lesen und schreiben, sondern auch von demjenigen Red und Antwort geben können, was ihnen nach den von Unsern Confistoriis verordneten und approbirten Lehrbüchern beygebracht werden soll.”

compulsory upon unification in 1871, but precise regulations differed between states (in Bavaria and Wurtemberg, school was compulsory for children between 7 and 14, whereas in the rest of the Empire, it was for those aged between 6 and 14) [Flora *et al.* 1983]. Not only Prussia, but also most of the other German territories had already introduced compulsory schooling before unification. The first state to do so was Palatinate-Zweibrücken in 1592 [Oelkers 2009]. The state of Weimar introduced compulsory education in 1619 according to Ramirez and Boli [1987], and the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1802 according to De Maeyer [2005], a date which is, however, contradicted by other sources.

Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland) In England and Wales, the 1870 Elementary Education Act (Forster’s Education Act) established state responsibility for primary education. Schooling was made compulsory for children aged between 5 and 13 ten years later, in the Education Act of 1880 [Flora *et al.* 1983, Ritter 1986]. In Scotland, education became compulsory for all children between 5 and 13 in 1872 with the Education (Scotland) Act [Flora *et al.* 1983, Anderson 1995].

Greece Education was made compulsory in a 1834 decree on elementary education, which was part of the so-called “Bavarian Plan”, an educational reform which took place under the reign of King Otto, a Prince of Bavaria. [Gkolia and Brundrett 2008, Cowen and Kazamias 2009].

Ireland Schooling was made compulsory in 1892 by the Irish Education Act [Akenson 1970, Schneider 1982, Flora *et al.* 1983]. Children were excused from compulsory attendance during harvest and other seasons during which their labor was needed. Furthermore, children aged between 11 and 14 could obtain a work permit if they had a “certificate of proficiency in reading, writing and arithmetic”. School attendance committees were in charge of enforcing the legislation, and courts could impose modest fines on parents who refused to comply. Nonetheless, the law appeared to have little impact on school attendance during the 19th century [Akenson 1970].

Italy Compulsory schooling in Italy is based on the Legge Casati, enacted in 1859 in the Kingdom of Sardinia. This law defined elementary schooling to consist of two grades, inferior and superior, each of which takes two years. Article 326 states that “[p]arents, and those who act as their substitutes, are obliged to procure, in the way they believe most convenient, to their children of both sexes in the age of attending public elementary school of the inferior grade, the instruction

which is given in those”.³⁶ Elementary education was provided free of charge. The law became effective in 1860, and was extended to all Italian provinces upon unification. The legal framework was completed in 1877 with the Legge Coppino, which reiterates the compulsory character of education in its first article: “Boys and girls who have completed the age of six years, and to those parents or those acting as their substitutes have not procured the necessary instruction (...) have to be sent to the local public school”.³⁷ However, it did not result in universal school attendance everywhere. Additional laws were hence enacted in 1904 and 1911, which made more stringent provisions for school attendance and increased state aid for elementary schools [Cubberley 1920, Schneider 1982, Ramirez and Boli 1987].

Luxembourg Compulsory schooling was introduced in Luxembourg through the 1881 law on the organisation of primary education [European Commission 2010]. Article 5 of this law states that “every child of either sex, having completed six years of age at the beginning of the school year, has to receive during six consecutive years instruction in the subjects listed...”.³⁸ However, the compulsory character of schooling is reflected in earlier laws as well. Article 23 of the 1843 law on primary instruction (which is bilingual) defines “children of school-age” (“schulpflichtige Kinder” in its German, “enfants susceptibles de fréquenter l’école” in its French version) as those between 6 and 12 years of age.³⁹ While the French wording is less explicit, the German wording “Schulpflicht” clearly implies an obligation to attend school. Article 56 of the same law even specifies sanctions for non-compliance. For example, “indigent parents who habitually neglect sending their children to school, can be prived from public support.”^{40,41}

³⁶ “I padri, e coloro che ne fanno le veci, hanno obbligo di procacciare, nel modo che crederanno più conveniente, ai loro figli dei du sessi in età di frequentare le scuole pubbliche elementari del grado inferiore, l’istruzione che vien data nelle medesime.”

³⁷ “I fanciulli e le fanciulle che abbiano compiuta l’età di sei anni, e ai quali i genitori o quelli che ne tengono il luogo non procaccino la necessaria istruzione (...) dovranno essere inviati alla scuola elementare del comune.”

³⁸ “Tout enfant de l’un ou de l’autre sexe, âgé de six ans révolus au commencement de l’année scolaire, doit recevoir pendant six années consécutives l’instruction dans les matières énumérées (...)” / “Jedes Kind beiderlei Geschlechts, welches bei Beginn des Schuljahres das sechste Lebensjahr zurückgelegt hat, muß während sechs aufeinander folgender Jahre in den (...) angegebenen Lehrgegenständen unterrichtet werden.”

³⁹ “Sont considérés comme tels, les enfans qui, á partir du premier octobre de chaque année, ont six ans révolus et moins de douze ans accomplis (...)” / “Als solche werden diejenigen Kinder betrachtet, welche vom 1. October jedes Jahres an sechs Jahre zurückgelegt haben und noch nicht volle 12 Jahre alt sind (...)”.

⁴⁰ “Les parens indigens qui négligeront habituellement ’envoyer leurs enfans aux écoles, pourront être privés des secours publics.” / “Die dürftigen Eltern, die gewöhnlich unterlassen, ihre Kinder in die Schule zu schicken, können von den öffentlichen Unterstützungen ausgeschlossen werden.”

⁴¹ Earlier administrative documents, in particular a circular from 1842 and an ordinance from 1840, refer to a school regulation from 1828. The original text of the 1828 regulation could not be accessed, which is why we could not determine whether schooling was made first made compulsory in 1828 or in 1843.

Netherlands Compulsory education was introduced in 1900, with “De Leerplichtwet” [Schneider 1982, Flora *et al.* 1983, Gathmann *et al.* 2012].

Norway Education was first made compulsory in Denmark-Norway in 1739, to prepare children for confirmation. Under those provisions, education consisted of the basics of religion and the reading of familiar texts. In Norway, writing was added to the curriculum in 1827 with a new primary school law, but children were typically unable to write more than their name and the letters of the alphabet. Several authors regard the 1827 Primary School Act as the first compulsory schooling law of Norway [Hove 1967, Einhorn 2005]. Still in 1857, 80% of rural children only had access to ambulant schooling, as there were no schools in their parishes. This changed after the 1860 School Law, which provided for permanent schools instead [Rust 1990]. In 1889, a stricter compulsory schooling law was enacted, requiring “a more demanding mother tongue subject” and 7 years of primary school attendance [Hove 1967, Bandle *et al.* 2005].

Poland During the 19th century Poland was partitioned between Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary on three occasions. Education in Poland was, on the one hand, largely determined by the respective occupier, but reflected, on the other hand, the efforts of the Polish to uphold their cultural heritage [Slaje 2009]. In the Prussian part of Poland, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1825 [Biskup 1983]. Sources are contradictory on whether there was corresponding legislation in the Austrian and Russian parts during the partition. Shortly after re-obtaining its independence in 1918, Poland enacted a decree “On Compulsory Schooling” (O obowiazku szkolnym) which made school attendance compulsory for children between 7 and 14 in 1919 [Slaje 2009].

Portugal Compulsory schooling was first introduced in Portugal in 1835, with the Regulamento Geral da Instrução Primaria. In Title VII, Article 1, it states that “To the obligation imposed, by the constitution, on the government to provide all citizens with primary education, corresponds the obligation of parents to send their children to public schools, as soon as the pass 7 years (...) if they don’t have the means to educate them otherwise”.⁴² The responsibility for enforcement rested on municipal authorities and priests.⁴³

Russia Compulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of age was introduced shortly after the success of the October Revolution, with the Dekret ot “ob Edinoy Trudovoy Shkole

⁴² “A obrigação imposta, pela Carta Constitucional, ao Governo de proporcionar a todos os Cidadãos a Instrução Primaria, corresponde a obrigação dos Pais de familia de enviar seus filhos às Escôlas Publicas, logo de passem de 7 annos, (...), se meios não tiverem de o fazer construir de outro modo.”

⁴³ “A’s Camaras Municipaes, e aos Parochos incumbe o procurar mover por todos os meios de que poderem usar, os Pais de familia a cumprir com esta importante obrigação...”

Rossiyskoy Sozialisticheskoy Federativnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki (Polojenie)” (Decree on the Unified Labour School of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) of October 16, 1918 [Presidential Library 2013].

Spain The first law to regulate education in Spain was the 1838 Law of Primary Instruction (Ley de Instrucción Primaria). It was accompanied by a Plan of Primary Instruction (Plan de Instrucción Primaria), which stipulates the obligation of villages and cities to provide primary schools (Art. 7-10). Furthermore, its Article 26 states that “[a]s it is an obligation of parents to procure for their children, and for guardians to procure for the persons under their responsibility, the amount of instruction which can make them useful for society and for themselves, the local commissions will assure by the means their prudence dictates them to stimulate parents and guardians to comply with this important duty, applying at the same time all their enlightenment and zeal to the removal of obstacles which would impede it,”, remaining thus highly vague with respect to the content and form of such an instruction.⁴⁴

Compulsory education was introduced with the Law of Public Instruction of September 9, 1857 [De Maeyer 2005, Gathmann *et al.* 2012]. Article 7 states that “Elementary primary education is compulsory for all Spanish. The parents and guardians must send their children and wards to public schools from the age of six to nine years; unless they provide them sufficiently with this type of instruction in their homes or in private establishments”.⁴⁵

Sweden Compulsory education was introduced in 1842 with the Folkskolestadgan [Schneider 1982, Soysal and Strang 1989, Simola 2002].

Switzerland With the adoption of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung) of 1874, primary schooling became mandatory in all Swiss cantons [Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 1874, Muller 2007]. Article 27.2 states that “Cantons provide sufficient primary education, which shall be exclusively under the control of the state. It is compulsory and, in public schools, free of charge.”⁴⁶ However, compulsory schooling had been introduced previously by different cantons at

⁴⁴Siendo una obligacion de los padres procurar á sus hijos, y lo mismo los tutores y curadores á las personas confiadas á su cuidado, aquel grado de instruccion que pueda hacerlos útiles á la sociedad y á si mismos, las Comisiones locales procurarán por cuantos medios les dicte su prudencia estimular á los padres y tutores al cumplimiento de este deber importante, aplicando al propio tiempo toda su ilustracion y su celo á la remocion de los obstáculos que lo impidan.”

⁴⁵“La primera enseñanza elemental es obligatoria para todos los españoles. Los padres y tutores o encargados enviarán a las Escuelas públicas a sus hijos y pupilos desde la edad de seis años hasta la de nueve; a no ser que les proporcionen suficientemente esta clase de instrucción en sus casas o en establecimiento particular”.

⁴⁶“Die Kantone sorgen für genügenden Primarunterricht, welcher ausschliesslich unter staatlicher Leitung stehen soll. Derselbe ist obligatorisch und in den öffentlichen Schulen unentgeltlich.”

different points in time. Sources contradict each other in terms of the dates of introduction. For example, Forster [2008] dates the introduction of compulsory schooling in Geneva in 1536, whereas Muller [2007] sets it at 1872.

A.3 Robustness Checks

We examine the robustness of our core result along four dimensions: (i) using alternative samples; (ii) using other classifications of European countries with and without compulsory schooling; (iii) employing alternative econometric models; (iv) including additional controls.

On alternative samples, we first limit attention to states that are observed in all IPUMS census years from 1850 to 1930. These comprise well established state jurisdictions in which the desire to nation-build might be stronger than in states that joined the union more recently. The result, in Column 1 of Table A5, qualitatively mirrors the patterns of significance found in the baseline specification. The point estimates suggest that in long established states, American-born voters are slightly *more* sensitive to the presence of European migrants from countries without a history of compulsory schooling (the hazard rises to 3.16 from 2.15 in the baseline specification exploiting all states).

We next restrict the sample to three of four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, West, South) to assess whether our results are driven by a small subset of states. This might be a concern given the spatial pattern of adoption shown in Figure 2. We thus estimate (4) and obtain parameter estimates for how population group j impacts the hazard in states excluding region r , $\hat{\beta}_j^r$. Figure A3 plots all twelve $\hat{\beta}_j^r$ estimates, collating estimates for each migrant group j across the four subsamples in the same histogram. Each figure also shows the baseline estimate $\hat{\beta}_j$ when the full sample of states is used.⁴⁷ In 11 out of 12 cases, the hazard rate remains of similar magnitude than in the baseline specification (and in no case does the estimated hazard rate switch to above/below one). The one exception is that when Western states are dropped, American-born median voters are even *more* sensitive to the presence of European migrants from countries without historic exposure to compulsory schooling. Overall then, the results in Figure A3 suggest our baseline finding is not driven by one particular geographic region.

The next set of checks consider alternative ways to group European countries by their exposure to compulsory schooling. We first regroup European countries using the lower and upper bound definitions of the introduction of compulsory schooling (shown in Table A2). The results are in Columns 2 and 3 of Table A5: our baseline result is robust to using the lower bound definition

⁴⁷We calculate effect sizes for each migrant group's population share using data from the relevant subsample of states (excluding region r) in pre-adoption census years.

and so narrowing down the focus on those European countries that have the longest exposure to compulsory schooling at home. Using the upper bound definitions, the results suggest compulsory schooling is significantly less likely to be passed in the presence of European migrants with exposure to compulsory schooling at home, and the hazard of compulsory schooling being passed across US states remains significantly differently related to the two groups of European migrant, with and without compulsory schooling at home [p-value= .005].

Another way to examine the responsiveness of American-born voters to European migrants' exposure to compulsory schooling is to define Europeans from countries that have passed compulsory schooling laws in the past 30 years. This approach lies between the two extremes of using upper and lower bound definitions. Figure 2 makes clear that using a rolling window for Europeans' exposure to compulsory schooling adds in a number of significant countries that pass compulsory schooling between 1850 and 1880 (Spain, Switzerland, Italy and Britain) and so might impact the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling in the US from 1910 onwards. Column 4 shows that with this definition the sharp contrast between how American-borns react to different types of European migrant becomes even more pronounced: a one standard deviation increase in the population share of European migrants from countries that do *not* have more than a generation of exposure to compulsory schooling at home significantly increases the hazard by 2.31. In contrast, the presence of Europeans with compulsory schooling at home for at least one generation significantly reduces the hazard rate below one. These sharper results highlight how American-born voters appear to react differentially over time to the *same* country of origin as that country's population accumulates experience of compulsory schooling.

Another way to examine differential responses over time of American voters to individuals with the same country of origin is to focus in on second generation migrants. They are American-born and coded as such, but the next specification splits American-borns between those with American-born parents and those with at least one foreign-born parent. This latter group of individuals form an additional group j that can then be controlled for in addition to the migrant groups considered so far (we then also control for the group characteristics of second generation immigrants in X_s^j). Column 5 shows the result: the passage of compulsory schooling is not significantly impacted by the presence of second generation migrants, rather it is the composition of more *recent* foreign-born migrants that drives the policy response of US states.⁴⁸

The third set of robustness checks relate to using alternative econometric specifications. We first impose more parametric structure on the underlying hazard, $h_0(t)$, using a log logistic model.

⁴⁸Abramitzky and Boustan [2014] show that during the study period, first generation migrants display a strong tendency towards endogamy but that this weakens by the second generation.

When estimating this model, time ratios are reported.⁴⁹ A time ratio *less* than one has the same interpretation as a hazard greater than one, indicating the covariate is associated with the passage of compulsory schooling *earlier* in time. Column 6 shows that imposing this parametric structure leaves our core findings unchanged: (i) the passage of compulsory schooling occurs significantly earlier in time when a greater share of the population comprises European migrants without historic exposure to compulsory schooling; (ii) the time ratio on Europeans with historic exposure to compulsory schooling is above one and these time ratios are significantly different between the European migrant groups; (iii) compulsory schooling is passed significantly earlier in time when a greater share of the population is non-European born. All these findings to continue to hold when we allow for there to be cross-state heterogeneity in hazard rates as captured by a frailty parameter (Column 7).

In Column 8 we move away from survival models and use a linear probability regression, following some of the earlier literature examining the passage of compulsory schooling. Such models use *all* state-years (not just those pre-adoption) to essentially estimate the probability that state s has compulsory schooling in place, and are equivalent to a survival model assuming duration *independence* in the passage of legislation. Column 8 shows the result: using a regression model we find no significant partial correlation between the population shares of either European migrant grouping and the likelihood compulsory schooling is passed, although an increase in the population share of non-Europeans does have a positive and significant impact, consistent with earlier work [Landes and Solomon 1972, Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]. The reason why the OLS and survival results differ is that the assumption of duration *independence* in the passage of compulsory schooling is strongly rejected in our data: history does matter and so the hazard of passing legislation, $h_0(t)$, varies over census years t , a result that is demonstrated both in the unparameterized Cox proportional hazard model, and the parametric log logistic specification. Both indicate positive duration dependence in the passage of compulsory schooling laws.

The final set of robustness checks include additional controls in (4). We use two broad classes of additional control. First, we consider the passage of *other* pieces of state legislation, that might be complementary to, or pre-requisites for, the passage of compulsory schooling. For example, the passage of child labor laws and the establishment of a birth registration system have been argued to be interlinked with compulsory schooling [Lleras-Muney 2002, Goldin and Katz 2003]. Column 1 of Table A6 shows the baseline results to be unchanged if we additionally control for whether a state has child labor laws or a system of birth registration. Given the stability of our coefficients

⁴⁹In the log logistic model the hazard rate is characterized as $h(t, X) = \frac{\lambda^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}-1}}{\gamma[1+(\lambda t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}]}$, where $\lambda = \exp -(X\beta)$. This has two parameters: λ is the location parameter and γ is the shape parameter, allowing for non-monotonic hazards.

of interest, this finding further implies migrant groups were not differentially attracted to states based on these legislative and regulatory characteristics.

A related concern is that some states might be more progressive than others, in that they are more likely to pass compulsory schooling, but also be more likely to universal suffrage or to allow women property rights and over their own earnings. If migrants from European countries are differentially likely to locate to such progressive states (as a function of their country of origin's own legislative history), our earlier result would be spurious. To check for this we then additionally control for both state characteristics. Column 2 shows that neither having universal suffrage nor property rights for women have significant impacts on the passage of compulsory schooling in the state (neither hazard significantly differs from one). Moreover, the impacts of the presence of different migrant groups replicate the baseline findings.

The remaining Columns of Table 6 consider additional controls related to the presence of European migrants from *countries* that have passed other pieces of legislation, apart from compulsory schooling, that might relate to migrant values. For example, we consider whether the American-born median voter responds to the presence of Europeans from countries with child labor laws in place since 1850. Column 3 shows there is no impact of having migrants in the state from European countries with a long history of child labor laws, that might otherwise have reflected the passage of compulsory schooling as being driven by the child-related preferences of migrants (and natives), rather than compulsory schooling being driven by the desire of the American-born median voter to homogenize certain incoming migrants.

Many of the results point to the use of compulsory schooling to nation-build because schooling encourages civic participation (and that such values are transportable across countries). The final Column explores an alternative source of variation in values among European migrants that might proxy for this: whether migrants originate from countries that already have universal male suffrage in 1850. The result in Column 4 shows there is a significant reduction in the hazard of passing compulsory schooling in state when more European migrants come from such democratic countries, albeit there are only a few European countries classified as such. The other coefficients of interest remain unchanged, so that both sets of findings are in line with nation-building efforts of US states being responsive to variation in values held by European migrants.

A.4 State Heterogeneity

The conceptual framework makes precise sources of heterogeneity across states that can lead to differences in the likelihood compulsory schooling is adopted, for a *given* composition of the population between migrants and natives. We now examine some of these predictions in more

detail with the results summarized in Table A7.

To begin with, equation (3) highlights the likelihood compulsory schooling is introduced depends partly on its fiscal costs, T . We therefore compare the differential effects of migrant groups across states using two proxies for the state’s ability to bear such fiscal costs: (i) state occupational index scores; (ii) state GDP per capita taken from Caselli and Coleman [2001]. For each proxy, we estimate (4) allowing the effects of each migrant population share, N_s^j , to vary with whether the state is above/below the median state in the measure of fiscal capability (measured in pre-adoption years). The results, in Columns 1a to 2b, do show suggestive evidence that the documented baseline impacts of the composition of migrant groups on the cross-state passage of compulsory schooling are more pronounced and economically significant in richer states (using either proxy for the fiscal capability of the state). Indeed, only among high income states are there significantly differential responses to European migrants from countries with and without histories of compulsory schooling.

A second comparative static to consider relates to the imposition of voting restrictions on the foreign-born [Naidu 2012]. These vary across state years (being switched on and then switched off during our study period). When such voting restrictions are in place, the values of American-borns are more likely to be reflected, all else equal. The result, shown in Columns 3a and 3b of Table A7, suggests the link between the composition of migrants in the state and the passage of legislation is slightly more precisely estimated when voting restrictions are in place, but the point estimates for each hazard remain relatively unaffected. To reiterate the reason why there are only weak differences in the estimates with and without voting restrictions on foreigners, we again highlight that, as Figure A1 shows, in nearly all states the majority of the population are American-born and this remains the case if we focus in on those subsamples that better reflect those eligible to vote at the time. Given the dominance of the American-born population at the state level, we cannot much exploit changes in voting rights of the foreign-born. Indeed, in state-years with *and* without citizenship voting requirements, we find significantly differential responses to the presence of European migrants from countries with and without histories of compulsory schooling.

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Table 1: Characteristics of American-Borns and Immigrant Groups**Sample period for State Descriptives: Census years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law****Sample period for County Descriptives: 1880 (based on 100% census sample)****Columns 1 to 4: Mean, overall standard deviation (SD) in parentheses, between SD in brackets, within SD in braces****In Columns 5 and 6, p-values on t-tests are reported in brackets**

	(1) American Born	(2) European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	(3) European Born from Countries that had CSL in 1850	(4) Non-European Foreign Born	(5) Test of Equality [Col 2 = Col 3]	(6) Within State Test of Equality [Col 2 = Col 3]
<u>A. State Level</u>						
Population (10,000s)	76.5 (81.8)	4.60 (9.91)	3.14 (5.89)	.862 (1.75)	[.300]	[.333]
SD Between States	[70.3]	[10.4]	[5.36]	[1.38]		
SD Within State (over census years)	{45.1}	{2.51}	{2.79}	{1.08}		
Share of Adults (aged 15+) that are Illiterate	.204 (.350)	.102 (.074)	.046 (.096)	.166 (.225)	[.008]	[.011]
Enrolment Rate (8-14 year olds)	.570 (.245)	.297 (.326)	.441 (.328)	.331 (.368)	[.011]	[.016]
Share Aged 0-15	.445 (.097)	.081 (.066)	.065 (.078)	.156 (.162)	[.160]	[.188]
Share in Labor Force	.305 (.108)	.585 (.156)	.609 (.200)	.486 (.252)	[.345]	[.378]
Share Residing on a Farm	.501 (.189)	.225 (.180)	.243 (.238)	.261 (.274)	[.215]	[.246]
Mean Occupational Score	18.2 (2.94)	21.1 (3.90)	22.2 (7.14)	19.4 (7.36)	[.153]	[.180]
<u>B. County Level</u>						
Share of County Population	.894 (.136)	.041 (.057)	.040 (.066)	.025 (.072)	[.822]	[.335]
SD Between States	[.121]	[.051]	[.049]	[.048]		
SD Within State (over counties)	{.085}	{.041}	{.043}	{.061}		

Notes: In Panel A, the unit of observation is the state-census year. All variables are constructed from the IPUMS-USA census data using individual weights. For each state, the sample period starts from 1850 and covers all census years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling laws. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In Panel B, the unit of observation is the county in 1880. All variables are constructed from the IPUMS-USA 100% 1880 census sample. County populations are measured in shares. For both Panels, in Column 1, the American born are those whose recorded nativity is native born. In Column 2, the European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. All other European countries are included in Column 3. In the first row, populations are measured in 10,000s. Adults are defined to be aged 15 and above when defining the share of adults that are illiterate, and enrolment rates for 8-14 year olds are the share of this group that report being in school. The occupational score is a constructed variable from IPUMS-USA that assigns each occupation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of 1950 dollars) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950. The occupational score thus provides a continuous measure of occupations, according to the economic rewards enjoyed by people working at them in 1950. Column 5 reports the p-value on a test of the null hypothesis that the values in Columns 2 and 3 are equal – this is derived from an OLS regression allowing standard errors to be clustered by region. Column 6 reports the p-value on the same test where we additionally control for state fixed effects.

Table 2: Immigrant Groups and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws

Non parametric Cox proportional hazard model estimates, hazard rates reported

Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares and enrolment rates measured in effect sizes

	(1) Foreign	(2) European	(3) Historic Exposure to Compulsory Schooling	(4) Enrolment Rates	(5) Enrolment Rates
Share of the State Population that is:					
Foreign Born	1.24*				
	(.142)				
European Born		1.43**			
		(.226)			
From European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850			1.64***	2.00***	2.15***
			(.225)	(.482)	(.509)
From European Countries that had CSL in 1850			.988	.794	.780
			(.122)	(.146)	(.161)
Non-European Born		.998	.995	1.67**	1.80***
		(.041)	(.035)	(.344)	(.409)
Enrolment Rate of American-Borns				2.39*	2.82**
				(1.12)	(1.39)
Enrolment Rate of Foreign-Borns				1.09	
				(.155)	
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850					.815*
					(.094)
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Countries that had CSL in 1850					1.03
					(.153)
Enrolment Rate of Europeans From Non-European Countries					1.18
					(.235)
Group Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
European Groups Equal [p-value]			[.005]	[.005]	[.004]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value]			[.001]	[.508]	[.505]
Observations (state-census year)	230	230	230	230	230

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is equal to one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Standard errors are clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In Column 4 onwards we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. We also control for the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds among American and foreign-borns (in effect sizes). In Column 5, we replace the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds (in effect sizes) for foreign borns with group specific enrolment rates for all European and non-European groups (all foreign borns) in the state (in effect size). At the foot of Column 3 onwards we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.

Table 3: Other Sources of Diversity in Values Within European Migrants

Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported

Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares measured in effect sizes

	(1) Language	(2) European Region	(3) Religion
Share of the State Population that is From:			
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, English Speaking	1.66* (.494)		
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Non English Speaking	1.25 (.311)		
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850 (all Non English Speaking)	.776 (.127)		
Non-Euro Born	1.83*** (.227)	2.08** (.639)	2.29*** (.609)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian		1.89 (.837)	
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern		1.16* (.099)	
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Northern/Scandinavian		.698 (.162)	
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Southern/Eastern		.883*** (.038)	
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Protestant			1.22 (.234)
Euro Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other			2.39*** (.596)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Protestant			.598* (.176)
Euro Countries that had CSL in 1850, Catholic/Other			.840*** (.044)
Group and State Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
With CSL (All Non English) = Without CSL, Non English	[.057]		
With CSL = Without CSL, Northern European		[.066]	
With CSL = Without CSL, Southern/Eastern European		[.003]	
With CSL = Without CSL, Protestant			[.052]
With CSL = Without CSL, Catholic/Other			[.000]
Observations (state-census year)	230	230	230

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling is passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Standard errors are clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In Column 1, English speaking European countries are Britain and Ireland (both without compulsory schooling in 1850). In Column 2, Northern Europe/Scandinavian countries are defined to be Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In Column 3, we use the Barro and McCleary [2005] data to define country religion. The following European countries are then defined to be Protestant: Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Holland, Norway and Switzerland. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same between various European groups with and without compulsory schooling in 1850.

Table 4: Alternative Mechanisms Driving the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws

Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported

Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares measured in effect sizes

	(1) Redistribution	(2) Industrialization	(3) Land Inequality	(4) Republicans	(5) Democrats
Share of the State Population that is From:					
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	2.14*** (.470)	2.38*** (.520)	1.84** (.461)	2.62*** (.858)	3.00*** (1.04)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850	.831 (.160)	.819 (.148)	.901 (.196)	.915 (.180)	1.02 (.170)
Non-European Countries	1.82*** (.389)	2.01** (.554)	2.14*** (.518)	1.77** (.455)	1.62* (.459)
SD of Occupational Income Score	1.38 (.423)				
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Professional Occupations		1.00 (.000)			
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Craft Occupations		2.51* (1.32)			
Share of Labor Force Engaged in Operative Occupations		.550 (.296)			
Land Share of Top 20% of Holdings [Galor et al. 2009]			.815 (.171)		
Republican Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections				1.68* (.455)	
Democratic Party Vote Share in Congressional Elections					.558*** (.105)
Group and State Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value]	[.003]	[.000]	[.025]	[.002]	[.003]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value]	[.513]	[.549]	[.591]	[.331]	[.135]
Observations (state-census year)	230	230	216	148	148

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Standard errors are clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. Column 1 controls for the state-year standard deviation in the occupational index score. Column 2 controls for the share of the population defined to be working in craft occupations, and operative occupations (where professional occupations are the omitted category). Column 3 controls for the land share of the largest 20% of farm land holdings, from [Galor et al. 2009], to proxy inequality of land holdings. This is available for 1880, 1900 and 1920: we linearly interpolate it for other state-census years. Column 4 (5) controls for the vote share of the Republican (Democratic) party in congressional elections: these are available only in census years from 1860 onwards for a subset of states. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups.

Table 5: Migrants and County Investments in Common Schools

OLS estimates, robust standard errors

Dependent variable: Log common school teachers in county


County populations measured in effect sizes

	(1) Immigrant Groups	(2) State FE	(3) Controls
County Population that is:			
American Born	.298*** (.060)	.239*** (.042)	.029** (.011)
European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	-.180*** (.032)	-.176*** (.024)	-.040*** (.011)
European Born from Countries that had CSL in 1850	.058* (.034)	.076*** (.025)	.036*** (.007)
Non-European Born	.120*** (.018)	.078*** (.012)	.017*** (.005)
Mean of Dependent Variable (in levels)		133	
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes
Group and County Controls	No	No	Yes
American = European Born without CSL [p-value]	[.000]	[.000]	[.002]
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value]	[.000]	[.000]	[.000]
Observations (county)	2472	2472	2472

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a county, and the sample covers counties from 45 states. The dependent variable is the log of the number of white teachers in the county. All outcomes are measured in 1890. All right hand side controls are measured in 1880, and derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA census sample. OLS regression estimates are shown, where robust standard errors are estimated, and observations are weighted by the county population. In all Columns population groupings are all defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated from population numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Column 2 onwards includes state fixed effects. In Column 3 we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for various pairs of groups.


Figure 1: The Educated American

Enrolment Rates (5-14 year olds)




Notes: Enrollment rates represent students enrolled in public and/or private schools for children aged 5-14. The enrollment rates are extracted from: (i) Lindert [2004] for Austria (1830-1870); Belgium (1830,1840,1860); France (1830,1840); Greece (1860); Ireland (1860); Italy (1830,1850,1860); Japan (1860); the Netherlands (1850, 1860); Norway (1830-1860,1890); Portugal (1850,1880); Spain (1850,1860,1890); the US (1830,1840) (ii) Flora et al. [1983] for Austria-Hungary (1891); Belgium (1850,1869,1881); Ireland (1890); Italy (1890); Norway (1870,1880); the UK (1850,1870-1890); Prussia (1871,1882,1891) (iii) Benavot and Riddle [1988] for Austria (1880); France (1870,1890); Greece (1870,1880); Ireland (1870,1880); Italy (1870,1880); Japan (1870-1890); the Netherlands (1870-1890); Spain (1870); the US (1870-1890). All other rates were calculated using enrollments from Banks and Wilson [2011] and the total population between 5-14 years old from Mitchell [2007a, 2007b] for France (1851,1861,1881); Greece (1889); Portugal (1864,1875,1890); Spain (1877,1887); the UK (1861); the US (1850,1860).

Figure 2: Timeline for Passage of Compulsory Schooling, by US State and European Country




RED = Northeast, GREEN = Midwest, YELLOW = West, BLUE = South

Figure 3: Migrant Groups Population Shares before Compulsory Schooling, by State



Notes: The bars represent the mean population share of immigrants by group for each US state prior to the passage of compulsory schooling laws in the state. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws are extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.

Figure 4: Demand for Common Schooling in 1890, by Population Groups and Compulsory Schooling Law



Notes: The Panels show coefficient estimates and robust standard errors from an OLS regression in which the unit of observation is a county, and the sample covers counties from 45 states. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log of the number of white teachers in the county. The dependent variable in Panel B is the log of the number of enrolled white pupils in the county. All outcomes are measured in 1890. All controls in the regressions are measured in 1880, and derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA census sample. Observations are weighted by the county population. In all Panels, the four population groups are controlled for, as well as an interaction between each group and whether compulsory schooling laws are in place in the state prior to and including 1890 (the other controls in each regression are state fixed effects, the average occupational score of the county population, the log of the county population aged 0 to 15, and the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the labor force participation rate, the share residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score). Population groupings are all defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated from population numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In each Panel, the left hand side figure shows the coefficient on the population grouping in the pre-compulsion period. The right hand side figure shows the coefficient on the interaction between the population grouping and the compulsory schooling law dummy.

Table A1: Year of Passage of Laws, by US State*

State	Territory Joined the Union ¹	State Joined the Union ²	Introduction of Compulsory Schooling ³	Age Groups Compulsory Schooling Laws Applied to ⁴	Introduction of Child Labor Laws ⁵	Introduction of Birth Registration Proof ⁶
Alabama	1817	1819	1915	8 - 14	1910	1908
Alaska		1959	1929			
Arizona	1863	1912	1899	8 - 14	after 1910	1909
Arkansas	1819	1836	1909	8 - 14	1910	1914
California		1850	1874	8 - 14	1890	1905
Colorado	1861	1876	1889	8 - 14	1890	1907
Connecticut		1788	1872	7 - 14	1890	1897
Delaware		1787	1907	7 - 14	after 1910	1881
Florida	1822	1845	1915	8 - 12	1910	1899
Georgia		1788	1916	8 - 12	1910	1919
Hawaii		1959	1896			
Idaho	1863	1890	1887	8 - 14	1910	1911
Illinois	1809	1818	1883	7 - 14	1900	1916
Indiana	1800	1816	1897	7 - 14	1890	1908
Iowa	1838	1846	1902	7 - 14	1910	1880
Kansas	1854	1861	1874	8 - 14	1910	1911
Kentucky		1792	1896	7 - 14	1910	1911
Louisiana	1804	1812	1910	- 14	1890	1918
Maine		1820	1875	7 - 14	1890	1892
Maryland		1788	1902	8 - 12	1900	1898
Massachusetts		1788	1852	7 - 14	before 1880	1841
Michigan	1805	1837	1871	7 - 14	1890	1906
Minnesota		1858	1885	8 - 14	1900	1872
Mississippi	1798	1817	1918	7 - 12	1910	1912
Missouri		1821	1905	8 - 14	1900	1910
Montana	1864	1889	1883	8 - 14	1910	1907
Nebraska		1867	1887	7 - 14	1890	1904
Nevada	1861	1864	1873	8 - 14	after 1910	1911
New Hampshire		1788	1871	8 - 14	before 1880	1883
New Jersey		1787	1875	7 - 14	before 1880	1878
New Mexico	1850	1912	1891	7 -	after 1910	1920
New York		1788	1874	7 - 14	1890	1880
North Carolina		1789	1907	8 - 12	1910	1914
North Dakota	1861	1889	1883	8 - 14	1900	1907
Ohio		1803	1877	8 - 14	1890	1909
Oklahoma	1890	1907	1907	8 - 14	1910	1917
Oregon	1848	1859	1889	9 - 14	1910	1903
Pennsylvania		1787	1895	8 - 14	before 1880	1906
Rhode Island		1790	1883	7 - 14	before 1880	1896
South Carolina		1788	1915	8 - 14	1910	1915
South Dakota	1861	1889	1883	8 - 14	1910	1905
Tennessee	1790	1796	1905	8 - 14	1900	1914
Texas		1845	1915	8 - 12	1910	1903
Utah	1850	1896	1890	8 -	after 1910	1905
Vermont		1791	1867	8 - 12	before 1880	
Virginia		1788	1908	8 - 12	1910	1912
Washington	1853	1889	1871	8 - 14	1910	1907
West Virginia		1863	1897	8 - 12	1900	1925
Wisconsin	1836	1848	1879	7 - 12	before 1880	1908
Wyoming	1868	1890	1876	7 -	after 1910	1909

Notes and Sources:

* The District of Columbia is not included as it is a federal district.

¹ Year when the territory joined the Union [extracted from Braun and Kvasnicka 2013]

² Year when the state joined the Union [extracted from US Census Office]

³ Year of introduction of compulsory school attendance laws [extracted from Landes and Solomon 1972]

⁴ Year of introduction of child labor laws for manufacturing employment [extracted from Moehling 1999]

⁵ Age groups that compulsory schooling laws applied to when the laws were introduced (i.e., the closest year available) [extracted from Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015]

⁶ Year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age [extracted from Fagernäs 2014]

Table A2A: Compulsory Schooling Laws, by Country

Country	Introduction of CSL: Preferred Year	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Sources	Legislation Introducing Compulsory Schooling	Notes
Albania	1928	1928	1928	Hörner et al. (2007), Sefa and Lushnje (2012)	Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom of Albania (Constitution)	
Armenia	1932	1932	1932	Hörner et al. (2007), EFA (2000)		
Austria-Hungary	1774	1774	1869	Melton (1988), Staje (2009), Schneider (1982), Donnermair (2010), Fort (2006), Ramirez and Boli (1987), Flora et al. (1983), Cohen (1996)		In Austria, the principle of compulsory education was introduced in 1774 by Joseph II but met with opposition (Flora et al. (1983), p.555). Six years of compulsory schooling were introduced in 1774 together with state-controlled public schools (Fort (2006), p.20). Maria Theresa and Joseph II reformed the education the education system in pursuit of pragmatic goals for the state. In 1781 Joseph II established the principle of mandatory primary education for all children aged 6-12, although in practice it took decades to realize this in many crown lands (Cohen (1996), p.15). As attendance was still not satisfactory a century later, the law was re-iterated with the 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Complete separation of schools from the Church was achieved in 1868 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.5). In Hungary, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1777 with the "Ratio Educationis". The 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz (the upper bound) applied to all the countries of the Empire
Belgium	1914	1914	1914	Wielemans (1991), Gathmann et al. (2012), Flora et al. (1983), Colle-Michel (2007), Ramirez and Boli (1987)	Loi Pouillet (Loi du 19 mai 1914)	Compulsory education was introduced in 1914 but implemented only after World War I (Flora et al. (1983), p.561)
Britain	1880	1872	1880	Soysal and Strang (1989), Flora et al. (1983), Ritter (1986), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), Anderson (1995)		Compulsory education of eight years was introduced with exceptions in England and Wales in 1880 (Flora et al. (1983), p.623). School became compulsory in 1881 and free in 1891. However, the legislation was not implemented in the same way in every community. That is, some communities continued to depend on voluntary schooling or under the control of religious groups (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.108). In Scotland, compulsory schooling was already introduced in 1872 (lower bound) with the "Education (Scotland) Act"
Canada	1871	1871	1943	Oreopoulos (2005)		In the case of Canada, schooling was made compulsory at different points in time in different Canadian states. The first state to introduce a CSL was Ontario (1871), the last one was Quebec (1943) (Oreopoulos 2005). The first date (1871) was chosen as the CSL enactment date for Canada
Denmark	1814	1739	1814	Bandle et al. (2005), Gathmann et al. (2012), Simola (2002), Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1983)	Education Act	Compulsory education was first enacted in 1739, but consisted only of religious education and the reading of certain familiar texts. In 1814, writing was added to the curriculum. Compulsory education covered only three days a week. Starting from 1869 compulsory education was extended to cover six days a week (Flora et al. (1983), p.567)
Finland	1921	1921	1921	Hörner et al. (2007), Simola (2002), Flora et al. (1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	Compulsory School Attendance Act	Finland became an independent state in 1917; the primary school institution was established in 1866, but only became compulsory in 1921 (Simola 2002, p.212) with the introduction of eight years of compulsory schooling (Flora et al. (1983), p.572). The Parliament passed the law on compulsory education in 1921. The law entitled everyone to receive education free of charge, regardless of sex, language, or class. [...] Towns were given five years to enforce the law and rural municipalities fifteen. In other words, the elementary schools were not functioning properly until the late 1930s (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.136)
France	1882	1882	1882	Soysal and Strang (1989), Cubberley (1920), Schriewer (1985), Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	Lois Jules Ferry (Loi n° 11 696 du 28 Mars 1882 (Article 4))	The Jules Ferry Laws established free education (1881) and laic and compulsory education (1882) (Garnier et al. 1989, p.291)
Germany	1717	1592	1871	Ramirez and Boli (1987), Stolze (1911), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), Flora et al. (1983), Oelkers (2009)		The first German state to introduce compulsory schooling was Palatinate-Zweibrücken in 1592. In Prussia, compulsory schooling was introduced by Frederick William in 1717, and reiterated by Frederick II in 1763. The general law of the land (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 makes instruction - as opposed to attendance - mandatory, a fact that had consequences for school attendance and organization. In this system the state only regulates the minimum for those parents who cannot provide for their children's attendance. [...] Elementarschulen became unavoidable but actually only for the poorer classes of the population, who could not afford a better form of education (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), pp.179-180). Upon unification of the German Empire in 1871, compulsory schooling (which existed in Prussia) was extended to all states. Eight years of compulsory education were introduced in the German Empire with the exception of Württemberg and Bavaria where only seven years were introduced (Flora et al. (1983), p.584). Most states already had compulsory schooling before 1871 (detailed information on all states was not available). As Prussia was the largest and dominant state at the time of unification, we use the date of its first CSL enactment (1717) as the reference date for Germany
Greece	1834	1834	1834	Gkolia and Brundrett (2008), Cowen and Kazamias (2009), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	Bavarian Plan (Decree of 1834)	With the arrival of the Bavarians [i.e., 1833], the formal education in Greece included three levels: the primary, the secondary, and the higher education. The compulsory schooling was seven years. This educational system was established by laws relating to the primary schools in 1834 (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.232)
Ireland	1892	1892	1898	Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1983), O Buachalla (1988)	Irish Education Act	The 1892 Irish Education Act introduced free primary compulsory schooling (O Buachalla 1988, p.21). Compulsory education was introduced only in towns in 1892 (with the requirement of minimum attendance of 75 days per year), and extended to rural areas in 1898 (Flora et al. (1983), p.593)

Italy	1877	1859	1877	Cubberley (1920), Schneider (1982), Ramirez and Boli (1987)		In the Kingdom of Sardinia, compulsory education was introduced in 1859 (2 years in all communes, 4 years in communes over 4,000 population) (Flora et al. (1983), p.598). Upon unification, compulsory school attendance was extended to all Italian provinces. This process was completed in 1877. The education system was quite effective in some of the Northern regions by 1880 and in Southern regions by 1900 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.7)
Japan	1872	1872	1872	Duke (2009), Loomis (1962), Burnett and Wada (2007), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	Gakusei (Fundamental Code of Education)	The Fundamental Code of Education - the Gakusei - was announced in 1872. [...] They declared their intention to spread education and mentioned that educational opportunity should be available for all people [...] they emphasized parents' responsibility for education, every guardian shall bring up his children with tender care, never failing to have them attend school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.275)
Luxembourg	1912	1912	1912	Soysal and Strang (1989), UNESCO (2007), European Commission (2010)	Loi du 10 août 1912 sur l'organisation de l'enseignement primaire	
Netherlands	1900	1900	1900	Soysal and Strang (1989), Gathmann et al. (2012), Schneider (1982), Flora et al. (1986), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	De Leerplichtwet (July 7, 1900, Staatsblad No. 111)	Introduction of six years of compulsory education (Flora et al. (1983), p.603). When compulsory education was introduced in 1900, about 90% of children was already attending a primary school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.315)
Norway	1827	1739	1860	Soysal and Strang (1989), Bandle et al. (2005), Hove (1967), Einhorn (2005), Rust (1990)	Primary School Act	
Poland	1919	1825	1919	Karsten and Majoor (1994), Slaje (2009), Biskup (1983), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000)	Decree On Compulsory Schooling (O obowiazku szkolnym) (February 7, 1919)	In the Prussian part of partitioned Poland, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1825. Shortly after the reunification, compulsory schooling was extended to the entire country in 1919. School systems inherited from Russia, Prussia and Austria were different and school traditions varied [...] the young country's most important task in the field of education policy was to adopt a uniform school system (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.340) [...] The Constitution of 1921 failed to provide the rural population with guarantees of any rights to education of the same quality as that provided to urban areas (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.341)
Portugal	1835	1835	1835	Ministro dos Negocios do Reino (1835)	Regulamento Geral Da Instrução Primaria	
Russia	1918	1918	1918	Decree of October 16, 1918, on the Comprehensive Labor School of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic	Decree of October 16, 1918, on the Comprehensive Labor School of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic	
Spain	1857	1857	1857	Gathmann et al. (2012), De Maeyer et al. (2005), Ministerio de Fomento (1857)	Ley Moyano de Instrucción Pública de 1857	
Sweden	1842	1842	1842	Soysal and Strang (1989), Simola (2002), Schneider (1982)	Folkskolestadgan (SFS 1842:19)	The 1842 law was followed in later decades by other bills that made the system entirely universal (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.6)
Switzerland	1874	1874	1874	Bundesverfassung (Federal Constitution)	Bundesverfassung (Federal Constitution)	Sources contradict each other with respect to introduction of compulsory schooling in different cantons. After the constitutional change of 1874, age of entry still varied according to cantonal law which also governed the duration of the primary school course (Flora et al. (1983), p.618). It was the radical new arrangement of society that made first attempt in 1798, but in a permanent manner only in the 19th century led to the establishment of the compulsory state school (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.433)

Table A2B: Compulsory Schooling Laws, for European Countries With Potential for Within-Country Regional Variation

Country	Region	Year of Introduction of Compulsory Schooling	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Sources	Legislation Introducing Compulsory Schooling	Notes
Austria-Hungary	Austria	1774	1774	1869	Melton (1988), Staje (2009), Schneider (1982), Donnermair (2010), Fort (2006), Ramirez and Boli (1987), Flora et al. (1983), Cohen (1996)	Allgemeine Schulordnung für die deutschen Normal-, Haupt- und Trivialschulen in sämtlichen Kaiserlich-Königlichen Erbländern (General School Ordinance)	In Austria, the principle of compulsory education was introduced in 1774 by Joseph II but met with opposition (Flora et al. (1983), p.555). Six years of compulsory schooling were introduced in 1774 together with state-controlled public schools (Fort (2006), p.20). Maria Theresa and Joseph II reformed the education the education system in pursuit of pragmatic goals for the state. In 1781 Joseph II established the principle of mandatory primary education for all children aged 6-12, although in practice it took decades to realize this in many crown lands (Cohen (1996), p.15). As attendance was still not satisfactory a century later, the law was re-iterated with the 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Complete separation of schools from the Church was achieved in 1868 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.5). In Hungary, compulsory schooling was introduced in 1777 with the "Ratio Educationis". The 1869 Reichsvolksschulgesetz (the upper bound) applied to all the countries of the Empire.
	Hungary	1777	1777	1869		Ratio Educationis	
Britain	England	1880	1880	1880	Soysal and Strang (1989), Flora et al. (1983), Ritter (1986), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), Anderson (1995)	Elementary Education Act 1870	Compulsory education of eight years was introduced with exceptions in England and Wales in 1880 (Flora et al. (1983), p.623). School became compulsory in 1881 and free in 1891. However, the legislation was not implemented in the same way in every community. That is, some communities continued to depend on voluntary schooling or under the control of religious groups (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), p.108). In Scotland, compulsory schooling was already introduced in 1872 (lower bound) with the "Education (Scotland) Act".
	Scotland	1872	1872	1872		Education (Scotland) Act	
	Wales	1880	1880	1880		Elementary Education Act 1870	
Germany*	Prussia	1717	1717	1763	Ramirez and Boli (1987), Stolze (1911), Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), Flora et al. (1983), Oelkers (2009)	Schuledikt (Schools Edict, September 28, 1717)	The first German state to introduce compulsory schooling was Palatinate-Zweibrücken in 1592. In Prussia, compulsory schooling was introduced by Frederick William in 1717, and reiterated by Frederick II in 1763. The general law of the land (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 makes instruction - as opposed to attendance - mandatory, a fact that had consequences for school attendance and organization. In this system the state only regulates the minimum for those parents who cannot provide for their children's attendance. [...] Elementarschulen became unavoidable but actually only for the poorer classes of the population, who could not afford a better form of education (Salimova and Dodde (eds.) (2000), pp.179-180). Upon unification of the German Empire in 1871, compulsory schooling (which existed in Prussia) was extended to all states. Eight years of compulsory education were introduced in the German Empire with the exception of Wurtemberg and Bavaria where only seven years were introduced (Flora et al. (1983), p.584). Most states already had compulsory schooling before 1871 (detailed information on all states was not available)
	Palatinate-Zweibrücken	1592	1592	1592			
	German Empire	1871	1871	1871			
Italy	Kingdom of Sardinia	1859	1859	1859	Cubberley (1920), Schneider (1982), Ramirez and Boli (1987)	Legge Casati	In the Kingdom of Sardinia, compulsory education was introduced in 1859 (2 years in all communes, 4 years in communes over 4,000 population) (Flora et al. (1983), p.598). Upon unification, compulsory school attendance was extended to all Italian provinces. This process was completed in 1877. The education system was quite effective in some of the Northern regions by 1880 and in Southern regions by 1900 (Ramirez and Boli 1987, p.7)
	Kingdom of Italy	1877	1877	1877		Legge Coppino	

Notes: ** The data for Germany is not exhaustive as we were unable to locate information for all regions. Only Prussia (the largest state) and Palatinate-Zweibrücken (the earliest state to enact compulsory schooling) are included here.

Table A3: Compulsory Schooling Laws and European Enrolment Rates

Source, Enrolment Measure	CSL pre-1850	No CSL pre-1850	Difference (t-test)	Sample	Notes
Lindert [2004]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds					
Public+private	60.71	57.28	3.43	Austria, Belgium, England and Wales, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Scotland.	The data from Lindert (2004) available at lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu . The main data sources used for Europe are Flora et al. (1983) and Mitchell (2007). He discusses problems with these data provides an alternative estimate based on educational censuses, inspections data and school attendance rates. The exact measure of enrolment in Lindert's data differs between countries. For some countries, he provides public plus private enrollments, for others, only public enrollments; and for others, the exact measure is not specified. For some countries, more than one measure is provided. Therefore, comparisons cannot be made between all countries, but only between those for which a common measure is available. Our initial dataset compiled from Lindert 250 observations from 20 countries. Out of these, 84 from 10 countries are used in the public plus private comparison, 111 from 14 countries in the public comparison, and 30 from 50 countries in the not specified comparison.
Public	57.46	55.9	1.56	Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland.	
Not specified	51.42	43.31	8.11	Denmark, Greece, Japan, Russia, Spain.	
Mitchell [2007]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds					
Primary	65.24	56.7	8.54**	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.	Mitchell (2007) compiles data from a large number of sources, mainly the official publications of European governments. He provides yearly data on the number of pupils in primary and secondary school and the size of certain age groups in the population. Age groups provided are however not uniform across countries, and population data only exists for few years (while enrollment numbers are very complete). The data exhibits a number of breaks, at which enrollment "jumps" due to changes in measurement or the school system. These are, however, well-documented. As highlighted by Morrisson and Murtin [2009], the definition of primary and secondary schooling in adopted in Mitchell (2007) is unknown, and information on the school systems of the countries in the sample "can hardly be recovered from other sources" (p. 9). Our initial dataset compiled from Mitchell contains 1274 observations from 19 countries (20 after the partition of Northern and Southern Ireland in 1921). Out of these, 98 from 17 countries could be u84). Most states already had compulsory schooling before 1871 (detailed information on all states was not available)hare residing on a farm, and the average occupational income score). Population groupings are all defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated from population numbers in the cross section of co
Banks and Wilson [2012], CNTS: Number of 5-14 year olds enrolled divided by total population					
Primary	11.66	9.73	1.94***	Albania, Austria (Austria-Hungary until 1913), Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Prussia until 1866), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, USSR (Russia until 1913), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.	The data from Banks and Wilson [2012] is available on the CNTS website (http://www.databanksinternational.com/71.html). They adopt the UNESCO definitions of primary and secondary schooling: "First level: Education whose main function is to provide basic instruction in the tools of learning (e.g., at elementary school, primary school). Its length may vary from 4 to 9 years, depending on the organization of the school system in each country; Second level: Education based upon at least four years of previous instruction at the first level, and providing general or specialized instruction, or both (e.g., at middle school, secondary school, high school...)". Furthermore, they aim to omit "data on preprimary, vocational or technical, part-time, and adult education students". Their main data sources are The Statesman's Yearbook and a dataset compiled by Zapf and Flora [1973]. In addition, they use a number of official national government sources and own estimates. Enrolment rates are not measured in terms of a particular age group, but in terms of the entire population. Our initial dataset compiled from CNTS et al. contains 2061 observations from 22 countries. Out of these, 1522 are used in the primary, 1456 in the secondary, and 1455 in the primary plus secondary comparison test.
Secondary	0.76	0.61	0.15***		
Primary + secondary	12.18	10.41	1.77***		
Flora et al. [1983]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds					
Primary	67.5	62.3	5.2***	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Prussia, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland.	Flora et al. (1983) use data from the Western European Data Archive to compile their dataset on education, which contains yearly data on primary and secondary school enrollment. It is an unbalanced panel, in which the most common distance between two observations is 5 years, with a mean distance of 4.4. The data is characterized by a large number of missing values. For primary school enrollment, data on the total number of pupils and on their percentage in the 5-14 age group is provided, both for public plus private enrollment and for public enrollment only. Percentages are often missing, as data for the population distribution is not available. As noted by Benavot and Riddle (1988), "it is not always clear whether counts of pupils refer to total enrollments, average yearly enrollments, average yearly enrollments, average daily attendance, or attendance on inspection or examination days" (p. 196). For secondary school enrollment, the data is more complex, reflecting the diversity of schooling systems across cular age group, but in terms of the entire population. Our initial dataset compiled from CNTS et al. contains 2061 observations from 22 countries. Out of these, 1522 are used in the primary, 1456 in the secondary, and 1455 in the primary plus secondary comparison test.population numbers in the cross section of counties in 1890. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In each Panel, the left hand side figure shows the coefficient on the population grouping in the pre-compulsion period. The right hand side figure shows the coefficient on the interaction between the population grouping and the compulsory schooling law dummy.nd holdings, from [Galor et al.
Benavot and Riddle [1988]: Primary enrolment rate, 5-14 year olds, by decade					
Primary	56.15	58.92	-2.77	Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.	Benavot and Riddle [1988] provide primary enrollment rates for age groups 5-14 for a large number of countries. The data is per decade and spans from 1870 to 1940. It is compiled from several sources; the main source for Western Europe being Flora et al. [1983]. When data gaps were small, they base estimates for the proportion of 5-14 year olds in a country's population on observations from adjacent years. When data gaps are large, estimates are based on a country's level of development. The percentage of estimated values among all values for a decade ranges between 47% and 67%. A particular drawback of this dataset is that it is relatively coarse and provides only few data points for estimations, as it is measured by decade. Our initial dataset compiled from Benavot and Riddle contains 176 observations from 21 countries. In the comparison table, 154 observations are used and no country has to be dropped entirely.

Table A4: Population and the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws by US State

OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by region

	Log (State Population)			Foreign Born Population			
	(1) Unconditional	(2) Fixed Effects	(3) Mean Reversion	(4) Foreign Born Population	(5) European Born from Countries that had CSL in 1850	(6) European Born from Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	(7) Ratio of Europeans from Countries without CSL in 1850 to Those that had CSL in 1850
A. Mean Reversion Model							
CSL Passed [yes=1]	1.04*** (.174)	-.112* (.056)	-.074 (.062)	.113 (.078)	.098 (.106)	.063 (.103)	-2.96 (2.43)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census Year x 1850 Population Interactions	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census Year x 1850 Occ Score Interactions	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations (state-census year)	288	288	288	288	286	288	286
B. Trend Break Model							
Post CSL Passage Trend Break	-.003 (.009)	-.013* (.016)	- -	-.001 (.005)	.008 (.005)	.001 (.004)	-.251 (.216)
1850-1930 Trend	.025*** (.004)	.030*** (.004)	- -	.020*** (.005)	.017*** (.003)	.018*** (.003)	-.032 (.040)
State Fixed Effects	No	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (state-census year)	288	288	-	288	286	288	286

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a state-census year from 1850 to 1930. The dependent variable varies across columns: in Columns 1 to 3 it is the log of the total state population, and in Columns 4 to 7 it relates to various migrant populations. All variables are derived from the IPUMS-USA census samples. OLS regression estimates are shown with standard errors clustered by census region. In Panel A, a mean reversion model is estimated (allowing for state and year effects, as well as a linear time effect of the outcome in 1850) and in Panel B a trend break model is estimated (including state fixed effects and a linear time trend). The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.

Table A5: Robustness Checks on the Passage of Compulsory Schooling Laws by US State

Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares measured in effect sizes

Estimation Method: Coefficients Reported:	Non Parametric: Cox Proportional Hazard Rate					Parametric: Log Logistic Time Ratio		OLS LPM
	(1) Main States	(2) Lower Bound Definition of CSL	(3) Upper Bound Definition of CSL	(4) Rolling Window	(5) Americans	(6) Log Logistic Time Ratio	(7) Log Logistic Time Ratio and Frailty Parameter	(8) OLS
Share of the State Population that is From:								
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	3.16** (1.64)	1.59** (.343)	1.20 (.257)		1.62* (.447)	.940*** (.020)	.944** (.021)	.019 (.036)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850	1.52 (.506)	.821 (.151)	.759*** (.076)		1.07 (.244)	1.02 (.026)	1.01 (.015)	.017 (.042)
Non-European Born Country	1.73*** (.302)	2.08*** (.478)	1.73** (.433)	1.08 (.262)	1.56** (.304)	.953*** (.017)	.970* (.016)	.050* (.030)
European Countries that did NOT have CSL introduced in the past 30 years				2.31* (.995)				
European Countries that had CSL introduced sometime in the past 30 years				.628* (.170)				
American-Born, Second Generation					.777 (.213)			
State and Group Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes + State and Year FE
European Groups Equal [p-value]	[.094]	[.004]	[.005]	[.049]	[.241]	[.012]	[.006]	[.967]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value]	[.201]	[.332]	[.251]	[.218]	[.894]	[.520]	[.078]	[.543]
Gamma Parameter						.025*** (.004)	.016*** (.005)	
Theta Parameter							.324 (.270)	
Observations (state-census year)	187	230	230	230	230	230	230	371

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 5 a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. In Column 1 the 36 states that are observed in all 8 IPUMS census waves from 1850 to 1930 are included in the sample. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In Columns 6 and 7 a parametric hazard model is estimated, where the baseline hazard is assumed to follow a log logistic distribution: the time to failure is then reported, and in Column 7 we also allow for a frailty parameter to be estimated. At the foot of Columns 6 and 7, the relevant parameters from the parametric hazard and frailty parameters are reported. In Columns 1 to 7, tests for coefficient significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. In Column 8 an OLS panel data model is estimated (controlling for state and year fixed effects) where the dependent variable is equal to one if compulsory schooling laws are in place. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law (in Column 1 this is calculated within the sample of large states). Standard errors are clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns (except Column 5) we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In Column 5 we split the American-born population into those with and without foreign-born parents. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population.

Table A6: The Passage of CSL and Other Forms of Legal Development in US States and European Countries

Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported

Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares measured in effect sizes

	US State Laws		European Country Laws	
	(1) Child Labor and Birth Registration Laws in Place	(2) Universal Suffrage and Women's Property Rights	(3) European Child Labor Laws	(4) European Male Suffrage
Share of the State Population that is From:				
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	2.22*** (.533)	2.20*** (.528)	2.58*** (.851)	2.72*** (.719)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850	.836 (.195)	.819 (.198)	.856 (.161)	.830 (.157)
Non-European Countries	1.77*** (.377)	1.76*** (.386)	1.85*** (.434)	2.14*** (.556)
Child Labor Laws in Place	1.19 (.366)	1.19 (.360)		
Birth Registration Law in Place	.707 (.283)	.716 (.293)		
Universal Suffrage for Men and Women		.904 (.199)		
Women Have Right to Property and their Own Earnings		1.15 (.356)		
Share of the State Population that is From:				
European Countries that had Child Labor Law in 1850			.693 (.317)	
European Countries that had Male Suffrage in 1850				.414** (.143)
Group and State Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value]	[.005]	[.004]	[.004]	[.000]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value]	[.386]	[.382]	[.316]	[.329]
Observations (state-census year)	230	230	230	230

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Standard errors are clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In Column 1, the child labor laws are derived from Moehling [1999], and the year of introduction of birth certificate as official proof of a child's age is extracted from Fagermäs [2014]. In Column 2 the coding for whether the US state has universal suffrage for men is derived from multiple sources, and the state coding for whether women have the right to property and their own earnings is extracted from Geddes et al. [2012]. In Column 3 the following European countries are defined to have child labor laws in place in 1850: Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland. In Column 4 the following European countries are defined to have universal suffrage for men: Denmark, France, Switzerland and Spain. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have CSL in place in 1850.

Table A7: State Heterogeneity in Adoption of Compulsory Schooling Laws

Non parametric Cox proportional model, hazard rates reported


Standard errors clustered by state; Populations shares measured in effect sizes

	(1) Occupational Income Score		(2) Real Income per Capita		(3) Citizenship Requirement to Vote	
	Below Median	Above Median	Below Median	Above Median	No Requirement	Requirement in Place
Share of the State Population that is From:						
European Countries that did NOT have CSL in 1850	1.60 (.764)	2.26** (.562)	.662 (.244)	2.55** (.755)	2.22 (.874)	2.47** (.617)
European Countries that had CSL in 1850	.693 (.260)	.850 (.124)	.824 (.132)	.739 (.168)	.863 (.185)	.847 (.192)
Non-European Countries	1.70 (.619)	1.85* (.072)	1.17 (.496)	1.80* (.449)	1.76* (.462)	3.03* (1.05)
Above Median State Occupational Income Score		.429* (.302)				
Above Median Real Income per Capita [Caselli and Coleman 2001]				.196*** (.089)		
Citizenship Requirement to Vote in Place						.259*** (.113)
Group and State Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
European Groups Equal (with and without CSL) [p-value]	[.238]	[.019]	[.614]	[.033]	[.055]	[.022]
Euro Without CSL = Non-Euro [p-value]	[.908]	[.517]	[.365]	[.308]	[.535]	[.633]
Observations (state-census year)	230		230		230	


Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. A non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. Hence tests for significance relate to the null that the coefficient is one. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. In all Columns population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares in census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. Standard errors clustered by state. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. In all Columns we control for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850, as well as the one additional group defined in each column): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds and the share residing on a farm. In all Columns we control for the following state characteristics: the total population, and the average occupational score of the population. In Column 1 we interact each population grouping with a dummy for whether the state is above/below the median state average pre-compulsion period in terms of the occupational income score of the entire population in the state. In Column 3 we interact each population grouping with a dummy for whether the state has citizenship requirements to be eligible to vote. These are coded from Keyssar [2000]. At the foot of each Column we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the hazard coefficients are the same for the two European groups, and the p-value that the hazard coefficients are the same for the non-European immigrant groups and European borns from countries that did not have compulsory schooling in place in 1850.

Figure A1: Foreign Population by US State, 1880


A. Share of **Total Population that is Foreign Born**




B. Share of **Male Population that is Foreign Born**



C. Share of **Labor Force that is Foreign Born**




D. Share of **Urban Population that is Foreign Born**




Notes: All variables are derived from the 100% IPUMS-USA 1880 census sample. In Figure D, there are some states in which none of the foreign-born population resides in urban areas. The solid line shows the mean of each variable in all state-census years prior to the adoption of compulsory schooling laws. The dashed line shows the .5 population share.

Figure A2: Internal Migration by American-Borns and Immigrant Groups



Notes: Each graph shows a scatter plot, by state, of the population share of various immigrant groups against the share of American-borns resident in the state that were born outside of the state (and in another US state). The data on American-born internal migration is obtained from the 1880 census. On each scatter plot we superimpose the line of best fit and a confidence interval of the prediction.

Figure A3: Hazard Rates by Population Group, Excluding One Region



Notes: The graph shows the hazard rates on various population groups from a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is estimated, where hazard rates are reported. The unit of observation is the state-census year, for all census years from 1850. A state drops from the sample once compulsory schooling laws are passed. The year of passage of compulsory school attendance laws is extracted from Landes and Solomon [1972]. Population share groupings are defined in effect sizes, where this is calculated using population shares from census-years prior to the introduction of compulsory schooling law. The European countries defined to have had compulsory schooling laws in place in 1850 are Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The hazard rate specification controls for the following characteristics of each group (American born, non-European, European with and without compulsory schooling laws in 1850): the share aged 0-15, the share of adults (aged 15 and over) that are illiterate, the labor force participation rate, the enrolment rate of 8-14 year olds (in effect sizes) and the share residing on a farm. We also control for the following state characteristics: the total population and the average occupational score of the population. Each estimated set of hazards across population groups is based on a sample of states from three of the four census regions. The x-axis indicates the regions included for each estimate. The y-axis indicates a hazard of one, and also shows the baseline estimate on the same population grouping when all regions are included in the sample. Regions (by census division groupings) are defined as follows. The Northeast includes Division 1 (New England): Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Division 2 (Mid-Atlantic): New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey. The Midwest includes Division 3 (East North Central): Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Division 4 (West North Central): Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa. Note that prior to June 1984, the Midwest Region was designated as the North Central Region. The South includes Division 5 (South Atlantic): Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Division 6 (East South Central): Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Division 7 (West South Central): Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana. The West includes Division 8 (Mountain): Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico and Division 9 (Pacific): Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii.

Figure A4: Foreign Population by US County, 1880

