



## **ABSTRACT**

# 1 Introduction

The field of international trade has undergone a transformation in the last decade, as attention has shifted to heterogeneous firms as drivers of foreign trade. Until recently, however, research on the labor market effects of international trade has been heavily influenced by the Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factors models, which provide predictions about relative wages across skill groups, occupations and sectors. In contrast to the predictions of these theories, empirical studies find increased wage inequality in both developed and developing countries, growing residual wage dispersion among workers with similar observed characteristics, and increased wage dispersion across plants and firms *within* sectors. In a large part due to this disconnect, previous studies have concluded that the contribution of international trade to growing wage inequality is modest at best (see for example the survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007).

This paper argues that these apparently discordant empirical findings are in fact consistent with a trade-based explanation for wage inequality, but one rooted in recent models of firm heterogeneity rather than neoclassical trade theories. For this purpose we develop a theory-based structural model and a methodology for estimating it, and illustrate with Brazilian data how to use this model to quantify the contribution of trade to wage inequality.

To motivate our structural model, we first report reduced-form evidence on the level and growth of wage inequality in Brazil. First, much of overall wage inequality occurs *within sectors* and *occupations* rather than between sectors and occupations. Second, a large share of this wage inequality within sectors and occupations is driven by wage inequality *between* rather than within firms. Third, both of these findings are robust to controlling for observed worker characteristics, suggesting that this wage inequality between firms within sector-occupations is *residual* wage inequality. These features of the data motivate our theoretical model's focus on wage inequality between firms for workers with similar observed characteristics.

To quantify the overall contribution of firm-based variation in wages to wage inequality, we first estimate the firm component of wages by including a firm-occupation-year fixed effect in

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a given firm over time as it switches in and out of exporting.

To account for these features of the data, we extend the theoretical framework of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) to include two additional sources of heterogeneity across firms besides productivity: the cost of screening workers and the size of the fixed cost of exporting. Heterogeneous screening costs allow for variation in wages across firms after controlling for their employment size and export status, while idiosyncratic exporting costs allow some small low-wage firms to profitably export and some large high-wage firms to serve only the domestic market. Nevertheless, in this model, exporters are on average larger and pay higher wages than non-exporters, both due to *selection* into exporting and due to the additional revenue from foreign *market access*. Using Brazilian data on firm wages, employment, and export status, we estimate the parameters of the model with maximum likelihood. We show that the parameterized model provides a good fit to the data, both for a wide set of moments as well as for the overall employment and wage distributions across firms.

We further show that our explicit modelling of firm export status contributes in an important way to the overall fit of the model. In particular, a nested version of the model without the link between export participation and firm size and wages fares substantially worse in explaining the cross-sectional employment and wage distributions. This allows us to conclude that trade participation is indeed an important determinant of the overall wage distribution, and in particular of various measures of wage inequality. We then use the estimated model to undertake a counterfactual exercise that illustrates the effects of trade on wage inequality.

Our paper is related to a number of strands of the existing literature. As mentioned above, several empirical studies have suggested that the Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factors models—as conventionally interpreted—provide at best an incomplete explanation for observed wage inequality. First, changes in the relative returns to observed measures of skills (e.g., education and experience) and changes in sectoral wage premia account for a limited share of change in overall wage inequality, leaving a substantial role for residual wage inequality.<sup>1</sup> Second, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts a rise in the relative skilled wage in skill-abundant countries and a fall in the relative skilled wage in unskilled-abundant countries in response to trade liberalization. Yet wage inequality rises following trade liberalization in both developed and developing countries (e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007).<sup>2</sup> Third, much of the change in the relative demand for skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries has occurred within sectors and occupations rather than across sectors and occupations (e.g., Katz and Murphy 1992 and Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994). Fourth, while wage dispersion between plants and firms is an empirically-important source of wage inequality (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 1991

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<sup>1</sup>For developed country evidence, see for example Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Lemieux (2006). For developing country evidence, see for example Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004), Ferreira, Leite, and Wai-Poi (2010), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Gonzaga, Menezes-Filho, and Terra (2006), and Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey (2008).

<sup>2</sup>Increasing wage inequality in both developed and developing countries can be explained by re-interpreting the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem as applying within sectors as when production stages are offshored (see for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Treffer and Zhu (2005)).

and Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen 2010), neoclassical trade theory is not able to elucidate it. Each of these features of the data can be explained within the class of new trade models based on firm heterogeneity.

Models of firm heterogeneity suggest two sets of reasons for wage variation across firms. One line of research assumes competitive labor markets, so that all workers with the same characteristics are paid the same wage, but wages vary across firms as a result of differences in workforce composition (see for example Yeaple 2005, Verhoogen 2008, Bustos 2011, Burstein and Vogel 2003 and Monte 2011). Another line of research introduces labor market frictions so that workers with the same characteristics can be paid different wages by different firms. For example, search and matching frictions and the resulting bargaining over the surplus from production can induce wages to vary across firms (see for example Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko 2008, Coşar, Guner, and Tybout 2011, Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding 2010).<sup>3</sup> Efficiency or fair wages are another potential source of wage variation, where the wage that induces worker effort, or is perceived to be fair, varies with revenue across firms (see for example Egger and Kreickemeier 2009, Amiti and Davis 2011 and Davis and Harrigan 2011).

Following Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997), empirical research using plant and firm data has provided evidence of substantial differences in wages and employment between exporters and non-exporters. More recent research has used linked employer-employee datasets to examine the determinants of the exporter wage premium, including Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007), Munch and Skaksen (2008), Frías, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009), Davidson, Heyman, Matusz, Sjöholm, and Zhu (2011), Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2011), and Baumgarten (2011). These empirical studies typically find evidence of both unobserved differences in workforce composition and wage premia for workers with identical characteristics, with the relative importance of these two forces varying across studies. By focusing on the overall firm wage component, including both these sources of wage differences across firms, we are not required to make the assumption of conditional random matching of workers to firms commonly invoked in this literature and can allow for the assortative matching of workers across firms. Furthermore, while these studies typically estimate a time-invariant wage fixed effect for each firm, a key feature of our approach is that the firm component of wages can change over time with firm trade participation.

In contrast to the above empirical literature, which is focused on estimating the exporter wage premium, our objective is to develop a theory-based methodology for estimating a structural model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which employment and wages are jointly determined with export status, and to show how this model can be used to quantify the contribution to wage inequality of firm-based variation in wages. Using a structural model, we estimate the extent of heterogeneity in productivity, screening and fixed export costs across firms and isolate their impact through employment and wages on wage inequality. Our paper is therefore related to two recent papers structurally estimating models of heterogeneous firms and trade: Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010) on patterns of trade across firms and destina-

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<sup>3</sup>Search and matching frictions may also influence income inequality through unemployment, as in Davidson and Matusz (2010), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).

tions and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2011) on multinational activity across firms and destinations.<sup>4</sup>

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data and some background information. In Section 3, we report reduced-form evidence on wage inequality in Brazil. Motivated by these findings, Section 4 sets up and estimates a structural heterogeneous-firm model of trade and inequality using the Brazilian data. Section 5 concludes. A supplementary web appendix contains detailed derivations, description of the data, and additional results.<sup>5</sup>

## 2 Data and Background

Our main dataset is a linked employer-employee dataset for Brazil from 1986-1998, which we briefly describe here and provide further details in the web appendix. The source for these administrative data is the *Relação Anual de Informações Sociais* (RAIS) database of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, which requires by law that all formally-registered firms report information each year on each worker employed by the firm. The data contain a unique identifier for each worker, which remains with the worker throughout his or her work history as well as the tax identifier of the worker’s employer.

We focus on the formal manufacturing sector, because manufacturing goods are typically tradable and there is substantial heterogeneity across sectors, occupations and firms within manufacturing. Therefore this sector provides a suitable testing ground for traditional and heterogeneous firm theories of international trade. Manufacturing is also an important source of employment in Brazil, accounting in 1990 and 1998 for around 23 and 19 percent of total employment (formal plus informal) respectively. Of this manufacturing employment, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) estimate that the formal sector accounts for around 84 percent of the total.

Our annual earnings measure is a worker’s mean monthly wage, averaging the worker’s wage payments over the course of a worker’s employment spell during a calendar year.<sup>6</sup> For every worker with employment during a calendar year, we keep the worker’s last recorded job spell and, if there are multiple spells spanning into the final month of the year, the highest-paid job spell (randomly dropping ties). Therefore our definition of firm employment is the count of employees whose employment spell at the firm is their final (highest-paid) job of the year.

We undertake our analysis at the firm rather than the plant level, because recent theories of firm heterogeneity and trade are concerned with firms, and wage and exporting decisions are arguably firm based. For our baseline sample, we focus on firms with five or more employees,

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<sup>4</sup>Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz together with Raul Sampognaro have been working contemporaneously on extending their structural model to account for wage variation across firms. Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011) provide evidence on the wage inequality predictions of a model of firm heterogeneity and fair wages.

<sup>5</sup>Access at [http://www.princeton.edu/~itskhoki/papers/TradeInequalityEvidence\\_appendix.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~itskhoki/papers/TradeInequalityEvidence_appendix.pdf).

<sup>6</sup>Wages are reported as multiples of the minimum wage, which implies that inflation that raises the wages of all workers by the same proportion leaves this measure of relative wages unchanged. Empirically, we find a smooth left tail of the wage distribution in manufacturing, which suggests that the minimum wage is not strongly binding in manufacturing during our sample period. RAIS does not report hours or overtime.

Table 1: Occupation Employment Shares and Relative Mean Log Wages, 1990

CBO	Occupation	Employment share (percent)	Relative mean log wage
1	Professional and Managerial	7.8	1.08
2	Skilled White Collar	11.1	0.40
3	Unskilled White Collar	8.4	0.13
4	Skilled Blue Collar	57.4	-0.15
5	Unskilled Blue Collar	15.2	-0.35

*Note:* Share in total formal manufacturing-sector employment; log wage minus average log wage in formal manufacturing sector.

since we analyze wage variation within and across firms, and the behavior of firms with a handful of employees may be heavily influenced by idiosyncratic factors. But we also show that we find a similar pattern of results using the universe of firms. As discussed further in the web appendix, our baseline sample includes around 7 million workers and around 100,000 firms in each year.

Each worker is classified in each year by her or his occupation. In our baseline empirical analysis, we use five standard occupational categories: (1) Professional and Managerial, (2) Skilled White Collar, (3) Unskilled White Collar, (4) Skilled Blue Collar, (5) Unskilled Blue Collar. The employment shares of each occupation and the mean log wage in each occupation relative to the overall manufacturing mean log wage are reported in Table 1. Skilled Blue Collar workers account for almost 60 percent of employment, while Professional and Managerial workers account for the smallest share of employment. Over our sample period, the employment share of Unskilled Blue Collar (Unskilled White Collar) workers falls (rises) from 16 to 10 percent (from 8 to 15 percent), while the employment shares of the other occupations remain relatively stable. In robustness checks, we also make use of the more disaggregated *Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações (CBO)* definition of occupations, which breaks down manufacturing into around 350 occupations, as listed in the web supplement.

Each firm is classified in each year by its main sector according to a classification compiled by the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)*, which disaggregates manufacturing into twelve sectors roughly corresponding to two-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sectors. Sectoral employment shares and the mean log wage in each sector relative to the overall manufacturing mean log wage are reported in Table 2. Apparel and Textiles and Food, Beverages and Alcohol are the largest sectors (each about 16 percent of employment) and have relatively low wages (along with Wood Products and Footwear). Two other large sectors are Metallic Products and Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, which have relatively high wages (along with Transport Equipment). Most other sectors are of roughly the same size and each accounts for about 6 percent of employment. The employment shares of sectors are relatively constant over our sample period, with the exception of Food, Beverages and Alcohol (which increases from around 16 to 23 percent) and Electrical and Telecommunications Equipment (which decreases from roughly 6 to 4 percent). From 1994 onwards, firms are classified according to

Table 2: Sectoral Employment Shares and Relative Mean Log Wages, 1990

IBGE	Sector	Emplmnt share (percent)	Relative mean log wage	Exporter share (percent)	
				Firms	Emplmnt
2	Non-metallic Minerals	5.5	-0.12	2.3	32.3
3	Metallic Products	9.8	0.27	6.1	49.9
4	Mach., Equip. and Instruments	6.6	0.38	12.3	54.1
5	Electrical & Telecomm. Equip.	6.0	0.37	11.8	56.3
6	Transport Equip.	6.3	0.61	11.2	70.6
7	Wood & Furniture	6.5	-0.48	3.2	23.5
8	Paper & Printing	5.4	0.14	2.5	30.6
9	Rubber, Tobacco, Leather, etc.	7.0	-0.04	8.6	50.8
10	Chem. & Pharm. Products	9.9	0.40	11.2	50.6
11	Apparel & Textiles	15.7	-0.32	2.5	34.8
12	Footwear	4.4	-0.44	12.2	65.7
13	Food, Bev. & Alcohol	16.9	-0.30	3.9	38.0

*Note:* Share in total formal manufacturing-sector employment; log wage minus average log wage in formal manufacturing sector; share of firms that export; employment share of exporters.

the more finely-detailed *National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE)*, which breaks down manufacturing into over 250 industries, as listed in the web supplement. In robustness checks we use this more detailed classification when it is available.

From Tables 1–2, there is substantial variation in average wages across both occupations and sectors. For example, Skilled White Collar workers are paid on average 55 and 75 log points over respectively Skilled and Unskilled Blue Collar workers, which correspond to wage premia of roughly 70 and 110 percent respectively. Similarly, machinery and equipment sectors 4–6 pay an average wage premium of around 50 percent compared to the typical manufacturing wage, while furniture and footwear sectors (7 and 12) pay on average less than two thirds of the typical manufacturing wage. Occupations and sectors are therefore consequential for wages, leaving open the possibility that reallocations across sectors and occupations could be important for understanding the evolution of overall wage inequality. We provide evidence on the extent to which this is the case below.

RAIS also reports information on worker educational attainment, which we group into the following four categories: (i) Less than High School, (ii) High School, (iii) Some College, (iv) College Degree. Over our sample period, the employment shares of the two highest educational categories are relatively constant over time, while the share of workers with (without) high-school education rises (declines) by around 10 percentage points. In addition to these data on educational attainment, RAIS also reports information on age and gender for each worker. Finally, we also construct a measure of potential labor market experience for each worker equal to his or her age less the typical age for completing his or her education level.

We combine the linked employer-employee data from RAIS with trade transactions data from *Secretaria de Comércio Exterior* (SECEX) that are available from 1986-1998. These trade



transactions data report for each export and import customs shipment the tax identifier of the firm, the product exported and the destination country served. We merge the trade transactions and linked employer-employee data using the tax identifier of the firm.

Our sample period includes changes in both trade and labor market policies in Brazil. Tariffs are lowered in 1988 and further reduced between 1990 and 1993, whereas non-tariff barriers are dropped by presidential decree in January 1990. Following this trade liberalization, the share of exporting firms nearly doubles between 1990 and 1993, and their employment share increases by around 10 percentage points.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, following Brazil’s real exchange rate appreciation of the mid-1990s, both the share of firms that export and the employment share of exporters decline by around the same magnitude. In 1988, there was also a reform of the labor market.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the late 1980s and early 1990s also witnessed some industrial policy initiatives, which were mostly applied on an industry-wide basis.<sup>9</sup>

The main focus of our analysis is quantifying the contribution of the firm wage component to the cross-sectional dispersion in worker wages. Accordingly, our structural model is a model of cross-sectional differences in wages between firms within sectors. As shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 2, there are substantial differences in the share of firms that export and the employment share of exporters across sectors, which we exploit in our empirical analysis. To ensure that the estimates of our structural model are not driven by the changes in trade and labor market policies discussed above, we estimate the model separately for each year from 1986-1998, which includes years both before and after the reforms. Additionally we report some results that make use of the time-series variation in the data. In our structural estimation, we examine the fit of the model over time to see whether changes in the measures of trade openness in the model can capture changes in wage inequality in the data. In our reduced form estimation, we report results for both the level and growth of wage inequality over time.

### 3 Reduced-form Evidence

In this section, we use a non-structural approach that imposes relatively few restrictions on the data to provide evidence on the determinants of wage inequality. We use a sequence of variance decompositions to quantify the importance of different components to the level and growth of Brazilian wage inequality.

Specifically, in each year we decompose overall wage inequality ( $T$ ) into a within ( $W$ ) and a between component ( $B$ ) as follows:

$$T_t = W_t + B_t \tag{1}$$

with

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<sup>7</sup>For an in-depth discussion of trade liberalization in Brazil, see for example Kume, Piani, and Souza (2003).

<sup>8</sup>The main elements of this labor market reform include a reduction of the maximum working hours per week from 48 to 44, an increase in the minimum overtime premium from 20 percent to 50 percent, and a reduction in the maximum number of hours in a continuous shift from 8 to 6 hours, among other institutional changes.

<sup>9</sup>Some tax exemptions differentially benefit small firms while foreign-exchange restrictions and special import regimes tend to favor select large-scale firms until 1990.

$$\begin{aligned}
T_t &= \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{\ell} \sum_{i \in \ell} (w_{it} - \bar{w}_t)^2, \\
W_t &= \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{\ell} \sum_{i \in \ell} (w_{it} - \bar{w}_{\ell t})^2, \\
B_t &= \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{\ell} N_{\ell t} (\bar{w}_{\ell t} - \bar{w}_t)^2,
\end{aligned}$$

where workers are indexed by  $i$  and time by  $t$ ;  $\ell$  denotes sector, occupation or sector-occupation cells depending on the specification;  $N_t$  and  $N_{\ell t}$  denote the overall number of workers and the number of workers within cell  $\ell$ ;  $w_{it}$ ,  $\bar{w}_{\ell t}$  and  $\bar{w}_t$  are the log worker wage, the average log wage within cell  $\ell$  and the overall average log wage. We undertake this decomposition using the log wage because this ensures that the results of the decomposition are not sensitive to the choice of units for wages, and it also facilitates the inclusion of controls for observable worker characteristics below.

Taking differences relative to a base year, the proportional growth in overall wage inequality can be expressed as the following weighted average of the proportional growth of the within and between components of wage inequality

$$\Delta T = \Delta W + \Delta B \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{\Delta T}{T} = \frac{W}{T} \frac{\Delta W}{W} + \frac{B}{T} \frac{\Delta B}{B}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\Delta$  is the difference operator and the weights are the initial-period shares of the within and between components in overall wage inequality. In our exercises below, we focus on changes relative to a base year, so that for example  $\Delta W = W_t - W_0$  for year  $t$  and base year 0.

In Section 3.1, we decompose overall wage inequality into within and between components, using sector, occupation and sector-occupation cells. In Section 3.2, we control for observable worker characteristics and apply the within-between decomposition to residual wage inequality. In Section 3.3, we further decompose wage inequality within sector-occupations into wage dispersion between and within firms. In Section 3.4, we examine the relationship between firm wages, employment and export status.

### 3.1 Within versus between sectors and occupations

We start by decomposing overall wage inequality into within and between components using the decomposition (1) for sector, occupation and sector-occupation cells. In Panel A of Table 3, we report the contribution of each within component to the level (in 1990 using (1)) and growth (from 1986-1995 using (2)) of overall wage inequality. Although the contribution of the within component inevitably falls as one considers more and more disaggregated categories, it accounts for 80, 83 and 67 percent of the level of overall wage inequality for occupations, sectors and sector-occupations respectively (first column). Therefore the wage variation within these types of categories is larger than the wage variation between them upon which much existing empirical research has focused. From 1986-1995, the variance of log wages increases by 17.4 percent (corresponding to a 8.3 percent increase in the standard deviation of log wages). Almost none of this increase is accounted for by rising wage inequality between occupations (first row, second column). While inequality between sectors increases substantially over this period (by more

Table 3: Contribution of the Within Component to Log Wage Inequality

	Level (percent)	Change (percent)
A. Main Period	1990	1986–95
Within occupation	80	92
Within sector	83	73
Within sector-occupation	67	67
Within detailed-occupation	58	60
Within sector–detailed-occupation	52	54
B. Late Period	1994	1994–98
Within sector-occupation	68	125
Within detailed-sector–detailed-occupation	47	140

*Note:* Decomposition of the level and growth of wage inequality. 12 sectors and 5 occupations as in Tables 1 and 2. Detailed occupations are based on the CBO classification, which assigns manufacturing workers into 348 occupations. Detailed sectors are based on the CNAE classification, which disaggregates manufacturing into 283 industries (starting in 1994). Each cell in the table reports the contribution of the within component to total log wage inequality. In the first column, the contribution of the within component ( $W$ ) to total wage inequality ( $T$ ) is calculated as  $100 \cdot W/T$  based on equation (1). In the second column, the contribution of the within component to the growth in total wage inequality is calculated according to (2) as  $100 \cdot (W/T)(\Delta W/W)/(\Delta T/T) = 100 \cdot \Delta W/\Delta T$ . The unreported between component is 100 percent minus the reported within component. The change in the between component can be negative, so the within component can exceed 100 percent. Given our large number of observations on individual workers, all the changes in variance shown in Table 3 are statistically significant at conventional critical values. More generally, the equality of the wage distributions in 1986 and 1995 is rejected at conventional critical values using a nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.

than 20 percent), the between-sector component accounts for only around 17 percent of the level of wage inequality in the base year, which results in a modest contribution of the between-sector component to the growth of wage inequality (second row, second column). Finally, using sector-occupation cells, the within components of wage inequality increase slightly faster than the between component over this period. Since the within component accounts for around two thirds of the level of wage inequality in the base year, it also accounts for around two thirds of the growth of wage inequality (third row, second column).<sup>10</sup>

In Figure 1, we display changes in overall wage inequality and its components using sectors (Panel A), occupations (Panel B) and sector-occupations (Panel C). For each variable, we subtract the 1986 value of the variable to generate an index that takes the value zero in 1986, which allows us to quantify the contribution of the within and between components to the *change* in overall wage inequality after 1986. Whether we use sectors, occupations or sector-occupations, we find that the within component of wage inequality closely mirrors the time-series evolution of overall wage inequality and accounts for most of its growth over our sample period. For each within component, we observe the same inverted U-shaped pattern as for overall wage inequality.

<sup>10</sup>For example, the quantitative decomposition of inequality (2) into between and within sector-occupations components over this period is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta T/T &= W/T \cdot \Delta W/W + B/T \cdot \Delta B/B \\ 17.4\% &= 0.67 \cdot 17.7\% + 0.33 \cdot 16.8\%.\end{aligned}$$




Figure 1: Changes in Log Wage Inequality and its Components

*Note:* Decomposition of overall log wage inequality into within and between components based on (2). 1986 is used as the base year, that is each series expressed as difference from its 1986 value.

This finding is also robust to the use of alternative base years to 1986.

We summarize these findings as follows:

**Fact 1** *The within sector-occupation component of wage inequality accounts for over two thirds of both the level and growth of wage inequality in Brazil between 1986 and 1995.*

While our baseline results use the IBGE classification of twelve manufacturing sectors and five occupations, the importance of the within component is robust to the use of alternative more detailed definitions of sectors and occupations. In Panel A of Table 3, we report results using detailed occupation cells based on more than 300 occupations in the CBO classification (fourth row) and using sector-detailed-occupation cells defined using IBGE sectors and CBO occupations (fifth row). As a further robustness check, Panel B of Table 3 reports results using the more finely-detailed CNAE sector classification, which is available from 1994 onwards and breaks down manufacturing into more than 250 disaggregated industries. Since this classification is available for a more limited time period, we show results for the level (1994) and growth (between 1994 and 1998) of overall wage inequality. To provide a point of comparison, the

first row of Panel B reports results for this later period using our twelve IBGE sectors and five occupations (compare with row three of Panel A for the earlier time period). In the second row of Panel B, we report results using detailed-sector–detailed-occupation cells based on more than 300 CNAE sectors and more than 250 CBO occupations. While some occupations do not exist in some sectors, there are still around 40,000 sector-occupation cells in this specification, yet we continue to find that the within component accounts for around 50 percent of the level and all the growth of wage inequality.<sup>11</sup>

Our results are consistent with prior findings in the labor economics literature. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) show that between-plant wage dispersion within sectors accounts for a substantial amount of the level and growth of wage inequality in U.S. manufacturing from 1975–86.<sup>12</sup> Katz and Murphy (1992) find that shifts in demand within sector-occupation cells are more important than those across sector-occupation cells in explaining changes in U.S. relative wages for different types of workers from 1963–87. Our findings show the importance of wage inequality within sector-occupations in accounting for the level and growth of wage inequality in Brazil.

Neoclassical theories of international trade emphasize wage inequality between different types of workers (Heckscher-Ohlin model) or sectors (Specific Factors model). Our findings suggest that this focus on the between component abstracts from an important potential channel through which trade can affect wage inequality. Of course, our results do not rule out the possibility that Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific-Factors forces play a role in the wage distribution. As shown in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Treffer and Zhu (2005), the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem can be re-interpreted as applying at a more disaggregated level within sectors and occupations such as production stages. But these neoclassical theories emphasize *dissimilarities* across sectors and occupations, and if their mechanisms are the dominant influences on the growth of wage inequality, we would expect to observe a substantial between-component for grossly-different occupations and sectors (e.g., Managers versus Unskilled Blue-collar workers and Textiles versus Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals). Yet the within component dominates the growth in wage inequality in the final column of Table 3, and this dominance remains even when we consider around 40,000 disaggregated sector-occupations. Therefore, while the forces highlighted by neoclassical trade theory may be active, there appear to be other important mechanisms that are also at work.

### 3.2 Worker observables and residual wage inequality

We now examine whether the contribution of the within-sector-occupation component of wage inequality is robust to controlling for observed worker characteristics. To control for worker

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<sup>11</sup>In fact, the between and the within components of inequality move in the opposite direction in this period, with the movement in the within component dominating the movement in the between component.

<sup>12</sup>See also Barth, Bryson, Davis, and Freeman (2011) for other evidence using U.S. plant-level data and Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen (2010) for results using U.K. firm-level data.

Table 4: Worker Observables and Residual Log Wage Inequality

	Level (percent) 1990	Change (percent) 1986–95
Residual wage inequality	57	48
— within sector-occupation	88	91

*Note:* Decomposition of the level and growth of overall log wage inequality into the contributions of worker observables and residual (within-group) wage inequality according to (4), based on a Mincer regression of log wages on observed worker characteristics (3). The unreported contribution of worker observables to overall wage inequality equals 100 percent minus the reported residual wage inequality component in the first row. The second row reports the within sector-occupation component of the residual wage inequality, applying decompositions (1) and (2) to the residuals,  $\hat{\nu}_{it}$ , from the Mincer regression (3), using the 12 sectors and 5 occupations reported in Tables 1 and 2.

observables, we estimate the following OLS Mincer regression for log worker wages:

$$w_{it} = z'_{it}\vartheta_t + \nu_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where  $i$  still denotes workers,  $z_{it}$  is a vector of observable worker characteristics,  $\vartheta_t$  is a vector of returns to worker observables, and  $\nu_{it}$  is a residual.

We control for worker observables nonparametrically by including indicator variables for the following categories: education (high school, some college, and college degree, where less than high school is the excluded category), age (where 10–14, 15–17, 18–24, 25–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–64, 65+ are the included categories), experience quintiles (where the first quintile is the excluded category), and gender (where male is the excluded category). We estimate the Mincer regression for each year separately, allowing the coefficients on worker observables ( $\vartheta_t$ ) to change over time to capture changes in the rate of return to these characteristics.

The empirical specification (3) serves as a conditioning exercise, which allows us to decompose the variation in log wages into the component correlated with worker observables and the orthogonal residual component:

$$T_t = \text{var}(w_{it}) = \text{var}(z'_{it}\hat{\vartheta}_t) + \text{var}(\hat{\nu}_{it}), \quad (4)$$

where the hat denotes the estimated value from regression (3). We refer to  $\text{var}(\hat{\nu}_{it})$  as *residual*, or *within-group*, wage inequality. This measure of residual wage inequality can further be decomposed into its within and between components using sector, occupation or sector-occupation cells, by applying (1) and (2) above to the estimated residuals  $\hat{\nu}_{it}$ .

Table 4 reports the results of the variance decomposition (4). We find that the worker observables and residual components make roughly equal contributions towards both the level (1990) and growth (1986–1995) of overall wage inequality (first row). We next decompose the level and growth of residual wage inequality into its within and between sector-occupation components. We find that the within sector-occupation component dominates, explaining around 90 percent




Figure 2: Changes in Observable and Residual Log Wage Inequality

*Note:* Left panel: Decomposition of overall log wage inequality into the contributions of the worker observables and residual components based on (4). Right panel: Decomposition of residual log wage inequality into within and between components based on (2) applied to the residual  $\hat{\nu}_{it}$  from the Mincer regression (3). 1986 is used as the base year.

of both level and growth of the residual wage inequality (second row).<sup>13</sup> Comparing the results in Tables 4 and 3, we find that the within sector-occupation component is more important for residual wage inequality than for overall wage inequality, which is consistent with the fact that much of the variation in worker observables is between sector-occupation cells.

Figure 2 further illustrates these findings by plotting the changes in the components of wage inequality over time taking 1986 as the base year. The left panel plots the change in overall wage inequality, as well as its worker-observable and residual components according to (4). While both components of overall wage inequality initially increase from 1986 onwards, overall wage inequality inherits its inverted U-shaped pattern from residual wage inequality, which rises until 1994 and declines thereafter. The right panel uses (2) to decompose changes in residual wage inequality into its within and between sector-occupation components, again relative to the base year of 1986. The time-series evolution of residual wage inequality is entirely dominated by the evolution of the within sector-occupation component, while the between component remains relatively stable over time.<sup>14</sup> As is clear from the two panels of the figure, our conclusions are not sensitive to the choice of the base year, and if anything the role of the residual inequality becomes more pronounced as we move forward the base year.

Note that residual wage inequality is measured relative to the worker characteristics included in the regression (3). In principle, there can be other unmeasured worker characteristics that matter for wages and that are observed by the firm but are uncorrelated with the worker characteristics available in our data. To the extent that this is the case, the contribution of worker

<sup>13</sup>Repeating the robustness tests in Table 3, we find a similar dominance of the within component using alternative definitions of sectors and occupations. For example, we find that over 80 percent of both level and growth of residual wage inequality is within detailed-sector-detailed-occupations.

<sup>14</sup>Since the within component dominates using sector-occupation cells, it follows that it also dominates using sector and occupation cells separately, and hence for brevity we do not report these results.

characteristics could be larger than estimated here. On the other hand, the decomposition (4) projects all variation in wages that is correlated with the included worker characteristics on worker observables. Therefore, if the firm component of wages is correlated with these worker characteristics, some of its contribution to wage variation can be attributed to worker observables. In the next subsection, we use a different decomposition, in which we explicitly control for firm fixed effects and find a smaller contribution from worker observables towards overall wage inequality. Keeping these caveats in mind, we state:

**Fact 2** *Residual wage inequality is at least as important as worker observables in explaining the overall level and growth of wage inequality in Brazil from 1986-1995. Around 90 percent of both the level and growth of residual wage inequality is within-sector-occupation.*

Our estimates of the role played by worker observables are in line with the existing empirical literature, which finds that observed worker characteristics typically account for around one third of the cross-section variation in worker wages, as discussed in Mortensen (2003). Our finding that worker observables contribute towards the rise in overall wage inequality following Brazilian trade liberalization is corroborated by other studies that have found an increase in the estimated returns to schooling during our sample period, such as Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) and Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey (2008).<sup>15</sup> Our finding that residual wage inequality shapes the time-series evolution of overall wage inequality is consistent with the results of recent studies using U.S. data, as in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Lemieux (2006). The enhanced dominance of the within-sector-occupation component after controlling for worker observables implies that the majority of residual wage inequality is a within sector-occupation phenomenon.

One potential source of wage inequality within sector-occupations for workers with the same observed characteristics is regional variation in wages.<sup>16</sup> To show that our results for wage inequality within sector-occupations are not driven by regional effects, we have replicated the results in Tables 3 and 4 controlling for region. In Table 5, we first report results for the state of São Paulo, which accounts for around 45 percent of formal manufacturing employment in our sample (compare the first and second rows). We next report results using sector-occupation-region cells instead of sector-occupation cells, where we define regions in terms of either 26 states (third row) or 133 meso regions (fourth row). These specifications abstract from any variation in wages across workers within sector-occupations that occurs between regions. Nonetheless, in each specification, we continue to find that a sizeable fraction of wage inequality is a within phenomenon. This is particularly notable for residual wage inequality, where the within component still accounts for over two thirds of the level and around half of the growth of residual inequality even for the detailed meso-regions.

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<sup>15</sup>From the estimated coefficients on worker observables in the Mincer log wage equation (3) for each year, we find an increase in the rate of return to both education and experience over time, as reported in the web appendix.

<sup>16</sup>For empirical evidence of wage variation across Brazilian states, see for example Fally, Paillacar, and Terra (2010) and Kovak (2011).



Table 5: Regional Robustness

	OVERALL INEQUALITY		RESIDUAL INEQUALITY	
	Level 1990	Change 1986–95	Level 1990	Change 1986–95
Within sector-occupation	67	67	88	91
Within sector-occupation, São Paulo	66	49	91	71
Within sector-occupation-state	57	38	73	57
Within sector-occupation-meso	53	30	69	49

*Note:* All entries are in percent. The first line duplicates the baseline results from Table 3 (overall inequality) and 4 (residual inequality). The second line reports the same decomposition for the state of São Paulo. The last two lines report the within component using sector-occupation-region cells, where regions are first 26 states and second 133 meso regions.

Another potential concern is that our findings for wage inequality could be influenced by changes in workforce composition. Residual wage inequality is typically higher for older, more experienced and more educated workers. Therefore changes in the composition of the workforce according to age, experience and education can influence the magnitude of residual wage inequality and its contribution to overall wage inequality. To address this concern, we follow Lemieux (2006) in using the fact that our controls for worker observables take the form of indicator variables for cells (e.g. age 25-29, college degree etc.), which implies that all residual inequality is within cells. As a result, the variance of the residuals in the Mincer regression (3) can be expressed as:

$$\text{var}(\nu_{it}) = \sum_{\ell} s_{\ell t} \text{var}(\nu_{it}|z_{\ell t}), \quad (5)$$

where  $\ell$  now indexes the cells for observable worker characteristics (education  $\times$  age  $\times$  experience  $\times$  sex),  $z_{\ell t}$  are common observables for all workers in cell  $\ell$ , and  $s_{\ell t}$  is the share of workers in cell  $\ell$  at time  $t$ .

To examine the role of changes in workforce composition, we use (5) to construct a counterfactual measure of residual wage inequality ( $\text{var}(\hat{\nu}_{it})$ ), in which workforce composition across cells  $\{s_{\ell t}\}$  is held constant at its beginning of the sample values. As reported in the web appendix, we find that counterfactual residual wage inequality displays the same time-series pattern as actual residual wage inequality and, if anything, exhibits greater variation over time. Our findings for residual wage inequality are therefore not driven by changes in observable workforce composition.

### 3.3 Between versus within-firm wage inequality

Having established the importance of wage inequality within sector-occupations, we now further decompose this source of wage inequality into within-firm and between-firm components. We undertake this decomposition using both the average firm wage and the estimated firm effect from a Mincer regression for worker wages that controls for observable worker characteristics.

In both cases, we consider each sector-occupation-year cell in turn and decompose wage

Table 6: Decomposition of Log Wage Inequality *within* Sector-Occupations

	UNCONDITIONAL AVERAGE WAGE, $\bar{w}_{j\ell t}$		WORKER OBSERVABLES FIRM FIXED EFFECT, $\psi_{j\ell t}$	
	Level 1990	Change 1986–1995	Level 1990	Change 1986–1995
Between-firm wage inequality	55	115	38	86
Within-firm wage inequality	45	−15	34	−11
Worker observables			17	2
Covar observables–firm effects			11	24

*Note:* All entries are in percent. Decomposition of the level and growth of wage inequality within sector-occupations (employment-weighted average of the results for each sector-occupation). The decomposition in the first two columns is based on the average firm-occupation-year log wage,  $\bar{w}_{j\ell t}$ , and does not control for worker observables. The decomposition in the last two columns is based on (7) using the firm-occupation-year fixed effects,  $\psi_{j\ell t}$ , from the Mincer regression (6). Figures may not sum exactly to 100 percent due to rounding.

inequality across workers in that cell into within and between-firm components. In our first decomposition, we use the unconditional average log wage paid by each firm to its workers in that sector-occupation-year cell ( $\bar{w}_{j\ell t}$ ) to construct the within and between-firm components by analogy to (1), where cells now correspond to individual firms. We summarize the aggregate results from this decomposition as the employment-weighted average across sector-occupation cells in each year, and report the results in the first two columns of Table 6.<sup>17</sup> While between-firm and within-firm wage inequality make roughly equal contributions to the level of wage inequality within sector-occupations (first column), we find that changes in wage inequality within sector-occupations are almost entirely dominated by wage inequality between firms (second column). While for brevity Table 6 focuses on the years 1990 and 1986–1995 and uses our baseline specification of sectors and occupations, we find similar results using other years and definitions of sectors and occupations. And while for brevity we concentrate on aggregate results, this same pattern is pervasive across sectors and occupations.

To show that the role of between-firm wage dispersion within sectors and occupations is robust to controlling for observed worker characteristics, we estimate the following fixed effects Mincer regression for log worker wages separately for each sector-occupation-year:

$$w_{it} = z'_{it}\vartheta_{\ell t} + \psi_{j\ell t} + \nu_{it}, \quad (6)$$

where  $i$  again indexes workers,  $j$  indexes firms,  $\ell$  indexes sector-occupation cells;  $\psi_{j\ell t}$  is a firm-occupation-year fixed effect; and  $\nu_{it}$  is the residual.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>This average firm wage is equivalent to a fixed effect estimate from  $w_{it} = \bar{w}_{j\ell t} + \nu_{it}$ , which is a restricted version of our specification (6) with worker observables. The decompositions in Table 6 are based on  $\text{var}(w_{it}) = \text{var}(\bar{w}_{j\ell t}) + \text{var}(\nu_{it})$ . Again we work with log wages ( $w_{it}$ ) so that the results of the decomposition are not sensitive to the choice of units for wages and to facilitate the inclusion of controls for observable worker characteristics below.

<sup>18</sup>Firms are assigned to a single main sector and we estimate the Mincer regression (6) separately for each sector-occupation-year so that the fixed effects  $\psi_{j\ell t}$  vary by firm-occupation-year. We abuse notation slightly by adopting  $\nu_{it}$  as a residual in both (3) and (6).

We use the estimated firm-occupation-year fixed effects  $\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}$  as our baseline measure of the firm component of wages in the structural estimation of our model below. This baseline measure controls for worker observables ( $z'_{it}\vartheta_{\ell t}$ ), where we allow the effects of these observables to vary across sector-occupations  $\ell$  and time  $t$ . Our baseline specification also allows the firm-occupation-year fixed effects to be correlated with worker observables, as will be the case, for example, if there is assortative matching on worker observables across firms.<sup>19</sup>

The firm-occupation-year fixed effects capture both firm wage premia for workers with identical characteristics and unobserved differences in workforce composition across firms (including average match effects). The theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms and labor markets considers both these sources of wage differences across firms, and our objective is to quantify the overall contribution of the firm component to wage inequality, rather than sorting out further its different components. Since we focus on the overall firm component, we are not required to assume conditional random matching of workers to firms as often invoked using linked employer-employee datasets, and can allow for assortative matching of workers and firms.<sup>20</sup>

Our second decomposition splits overall wage inequality into the following four terms:

$$\text{var}(w_{it}) = \text{var}(z'_{it}\hat{\vartheta}_{\ell t}) + \text{var}(\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}) + 2\text{cov}(z'_{it}\hat{\vartheta}_{\ell t}, \hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}) + \text{var}(\hat{\nu}_{it}). \quad (7)$$

These four terms are: (1) worker observables; (2) the between-firm component (firm-occupation year fixed effects); (3) the covariance between worker observables and the firm component; (4) the within-firm component (residual), which by construction is orthogonal to the other terms.

We undertake this decomposition separately for each sector-occupation-year. In the final two columns of Table 6, we summarize the aggregate results from this decomposition as the employment-weighted average of the results for each sector-occupation-year cell. In the third column, we find that the between-firm (firm effects) and within-firm (residual) components account for roughly equal amounts of the level of wage inequality within sector-occupations (38 and 34 percent respectively). Of the other two components, worker observables account for around one sixth, and the covariance between worker observables and the firm component of wages accounts for the remaining one tenth. In contrast, in the fourth column, changes in between-firm wage dispersion account for the lion's share (86 percent) of the growth in wage inequality within sector-occupations. The next largest contribution (around one quarter) comes from an increased covariance between worker observables and the firm component of wages,

<sup>19</sup>In Table 6, we treat the average firm wage ( $\bar{w}_{j\ell t}$ ) and the firm-occupation-year fixed effect ( $\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}$ ) as data. In the model developed below, we make the theoretical assumption that the firm observes these wage components and that the model is about these wage components, which can be therefore taken as data in its estimation. In contrast, without this theoretical assumption,  $\bar{w}_{j\ell t}$  and  $\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}$  should be interpreted as estimates, in which case the variance of these estimates equals their true variance plus the variance of a sampling error that depends on the average number of workers employed by a firm. Since this average is around twenty workers in our data, the resulting correction for the variance of the sampling error is small, as discussed further in the web appendix.

<sup>20</sup>For a subsample of firms in RAIS that are covered by a separate annual survey, data on total firm revenue are available that can be used to construct revenue-based productivity. For this subsample of firms, Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey (2008) show that the estimated firm effect from a similar Mincer regression is closely related to revenue-based productivity, consistent with findings using linked employer-employee data for other countries.




Figure 3: Changes in Log Wage Inequality *within* Sector-Occupations and its Components

*Note:* Decomposition of log wage inequality within sector-occupations (employment-weighted) based on (7); changes relative to the base year of 1986.

which is consistent with increased assortative matching on worker observables across firms. Changes in the residual within-firm wage dispersion make a small negative contribution. Notably, now that we focus on wage inequality within sector-occupations and control for firm effects, changes in the variance of worker observables account for a negligible share of the growth of wage inequality within sector-occupations, in sharp contrast to our findings in Section 3.2.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 3 further illustrates these findings by plotting the change in wage inequality within sector-occupations and its components in (7) relative to the base year of 1986. We confirm that between-firm wage dispersion dominates the evolution of wage inequality within sector-occupations and drives the inverted U-shaped pattern in wage inequality within sector-occupations (which in turn drives the inverted U-shaped pattern in overall wage inequality). This is the component of wage inequality that we aim to capture in our structural model of Section 4.

<sup>21</sup>This reduced contribution from worker observables is explained by two differences from the specification in Section 3.2. First, the Mincer regression (6) is estimated separately for each sector-occupation-year, instead of pooling observations across sectors and occupations within each year. Since much of the variation in worker observables occurs across sectors and occupations (sorting across sectors and occupations), this generates a smaller contribution from worker observables. Second, the Mincer regression (6) includes firm-occupation-year fixed effects, which can be correlated with worker observables (sorting across firms). Once we allow for this correlation, we again find a smaller contribution from worker observables. Empirically, these two differences are of roughly equal importance in explaining the reduction in the contribution from worker observables: When we re-estimate the Mincer regression (6) for each sector-occupation-year, excluding the firm-occupation-year fixed effects, we find a contribution from worker observables halfway in between the results in this section and Section 3.2.

We summarize the findings above as follows:

**Fact 3** *Between-firm and within-firm dispersion make roughly equal contributions to the level of wage inequality within sector-occupations, but the growth of wage inequality within sector-occupations is largely accounted for by between-firm wage dispersion.*

These findings are also consistent with existing results in the labor economics literature. For example, Lazear and Shaw (2009) summarize evidence from linked employer-employee data for several OECD countries and conclude that the firm fixed effect explains a large and growing share of the wage distribution. This importance of between rather than within firm variation points towards theories of heterogeneity between firms as the relevant framework for understanding both the overall wage distribution and the wage distribution across workers with similar observed characteristics.

### 3.4 Size and exporter wage premia

Having established the importance of wage variation *between* firms *within* sector-occupations for overall wage inequality, we now examine the relationship between firm wages, employment and export status. We first construct a measure of firm wages in each year by aggregating our firm-occupation-year wage measures from the previous subsection to the firm-year level using employment weights. We next estimate the following cross-section regression of firm wages on employment and export status for each year:

$$\omega_{jt} = \lambda_{\ell t}^o + \lambda_t^s h_{jt} + \lambda_t^x \iota_{jt} + \nu_{jt}, \quad \text{for } \omega_{jt} \in \{\bar{w}_{jt}, \hat{\psi}_{jt}\}, \quad (8)$$

where we again index firms by  $j$ ,  $\ell$  now denotes sectors,  $h_{jt}$  is log firm employment,  $\iota_{jt} \in \{0, 1\}$  is a dummy for whether a firm exports, and  $\nu_{jt}$  is the residual. The dependent variable is the firm-year average log wage  $\bar{w}_{jt}$  or the firm-year effect  $\hat{\psi}_{jt}$  constructed from the Mincer regression (6) by aggregating the firm-occupation-year fixed effects using employment weights. We estimate a sector-time fixed effect  $\lambda_{\ell t}^o$ , a time-varying employment size wage premium  $\lambda_t^s$ , and a time-varying firm export premium  $\lambda_t^x$ .

Columns one and three of Table 7 report these estimated size and exporter wage premia for 1990 using the firm average log wage and the firm wage component from the Mincer regression respectively. Consistent with a large empirical literature in labor economics (e.g. Oi and Idson 1999) and international trade (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997), we find positive and statistically significant premia for employment size and export status. In the third column, using the firm wage component from the Mincer regression ( $\hat{\psi}_{jt}$ ), we find a size premium of  $\hat{\lambda}^s = 0.12$  and an exporter premium of  $\hat{\lambda}^x = 0.09$ .<sup>22</sup> We emphasize that the exporter wage premium in this reduced-form specification cannot be given a causal interpretation, because omitted unobserved

<sup>22</sup>Augmenting regression (8) with firm employment growth has little effect on either the estimated size and exporter wage premia or on the regression fit.

Table 7: Size and Exporter Wage Premia

	UNCONDITIONAL AVERAGE WAGE, $\bar{w}_{jt}$		WORKER OBSERVABLES FIRM FIXED EFFECT, $\hat{\psi}_{jt}$	
	Cross-Section	Panel	Cross-Section	Panel
	1990	1986–1998	1990	1986–1998
Firm Employment Size	0.126*** (0.008)	−0.003* (0.002)	0.118*** (0.006)	0.048*** (0.001)
Firm Export Status	0.202*** (0.046)	0.216*** (0.004)	0.088*** (0.027)	0.012*** (0.002)
Sector Fixed Effects	yes	no	yes	no
Firm Fixed Effects	no	yes	no	yes
Within R-squared	0.164	0.007	0.146	0.013
Observations	93, 392	1, 229, 133	93, 392	1, 229, 133

*Note:* The first two columns use average firm-occupation-year wages without conditioning on worker observables, while the last two columns use the firm-occupation-year fixed effects from the Mincer regression (6); in both cases firm-occupation variables are aggregated to the firm level by using firm-occupation employment weights. Columns one and three report parameter estimates from the cross-section specification (8). Columns two and four report estimated coefficients from the panel data specification (9) which controls for firm fixed effects. \* and \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10 and 1 percent levels respectively. Standard errors in columns one and three are heteroscedasticity robust; standard errors in columns two and four are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level.

variables (e.g. firm productivity imperfectly correlated with employment) could induce firms to both pay high wages and export. That is, the reduced-form exporter wage premium ( $\hat{\lambda}^x$ ) captures both the non-random selection of high-wage firms into exporting (beyond that captured by firm size) and the impact of exporting on the wage paid by a given firm. In our structural model below, we separate out these two components of the exporter wage premium by explicitly modeling a firm’s endogenous decision of whether or not to export.

Before developing the structural model, we consider a panel data reduced-form specification that partially alleviates concerns about unobserved firm heterogeneity by including time-invariant firm fixed effects:

$$\omega_{jt} = \lambda_j^o + \lambda_t^o + \lambda^s h_{jt} + \lambda^x \iota_t + \nu_{jt}, \quad \text{for } \omega_{jt} \in \{\bar{w}_{jt}, \hat{\psi}_{jt}\}, \quad (9)$$

where  $\lambda_j^o$  is a firm fixed effect,  $\lambda_t^o$  is a year fixed effect, and the other variables are defined as in the cross-section specification (8). In this panel data specification, the exporter wage premium ( $\lambda^x$ ) is identified solely from firms that switch in and out of exporting.

Columns two and four of Table 7 report the results from this specification using the firm average log wage and the firm wage component from the Mincer regression respectively. In both columns, we find an employment size wage premium that is much smaller in magnitude and becomes negative (though close to zero) in column two. This pattern of results is consistent with the idea that the employment-size wage premium in the cross-section specifications in columns one and three is largely driven by selection on time-invariant firm characteristics that

result in both higher firm employment and higher firm wages.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, in column four using the firm-occupation-year fixed effects, we find a much smaller exporter wage premium, which is in line with the selection of high-wage firms into exporting. In contrast, in column two using the firm average log wage, we continue to find an exporter wage premium of a similar size to our cross-section specification above. This contrast between the two columns, suggests that some of the increase in a firm’s average log wage in column two when it enters export markets is due to a change in the composition of its workforce in terms of observable worker characteristics that is controlled for in column four.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, although the employment size and exporter wage premia are statistically significant in both specifications, the correlations between firm wages, employment and export status are far from perfect. In the cross-section regression, the within R-squared after netting out the sector fixed effects is around 0.15, while in the panel data regression the within R-squared after netting out the firm fixed effects is an order of magnitude smaller. In the structural model developed below, we explicitly model these imperfect correlations between firm wages, employment size and export status. We summarize our empirical findings in this section as:

**Fact 4** *Larger firms on average pay higher wages; controlling for size, exporters on average pay higher wages than non-exporters. Firms switching into exporting increase their wage, even after controlling for the associated increase in firm size. Nonetheless, controlling for size and export status, residual wage inequality across firms is substantial.*

Taken together, the findings of this section have established a number of key stylized facts about wage inequality in Brazil. We have shown that within-sector-occupation inequality accounts for much of overall wage inequality in Brazil. Most of this within-sector-occupation inequality is residual wage inequality. Furthermore, between-firm variation in wages accounts for 86 percent of wage inequality within sector-occupations, even after controlling for worker observables. Finally, there are statistically significant employment size and exporter wage premia, but the correlations between firm wages, employment size and export status are imperfect. These findings are encouraging for recent theories of wage inequality based on firm heterogeneity. In the next section, we structurally estimate such a model to provide further evidence on its ability to account quantitatively for the patterns observed in the data.

## 4 Structural Estimation

Guided by the empirical findings in the previous section, we now develop an extension of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010, HIR henceforth). In the HIR model, wages vary between

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<sup>23</sup>Indeed, in models of wage bargaining, variation in employment around the desired size of the firm results in a negative correlation between employment and wages, which can explain the smaller or even negative size wage premium estimated off time-series variation.

<sup>24</sup>Regressing log firm employment on export status in an analogous panel data specification, we find that entry into export markets is also associated with a statistically significant increase in firm size by around 25 percent.

firms within sector-occupations and are correlated with firm employment size and export status.<sup>25</sup> Our non-structural evidence suggests that these are essential ingredients for a model to capture the empirical patterns of inequality and its relationship with trade openness. In what follows we first describe and generalize the HIR model; we then develop a method for structurally estimating this enhanced model; and lastly we apply the model to the Brazilian data.

#### 4.1 Theoretical framework

We begin by briefly describing the theoretical framework of HIR, emphasizing the modifications we make in order to take the model to the data. Motivated by our empirical findings above, the model focuses on between-firm variation in wages for workers with the same observed characteristics. Therefore workers are *ex ante* identical and all workers employed by a firm are paid the same wage. We augment HIR with two additional sources of heterogeneity to capture the overlap in the employment and wage distributions across exporters and non-exporters, as well as the substantial dispersion in firm wages after controlling for firm employment size and export status. Although we make strong assumptions about the economic relationships between firm revenue, employment and wages and about the statistical distributions for the three sources of heterogeneity, we show that our parsimoniously parameterized model fits the data well.

The economy consists of many sectors, some or all of which manufacture differentiated products. The model's predictions for wages and employment across firms within each differentiated sector hold regardless of general equilibrium effects. Therefore we focus on variation across firms and workers within one such differentiated sector. Our goal is to explain the observed cross-section dispersion in wages and employment across firms and we develop a static model to characterize such cross-section dispersion.

Within the sector there is a large number of monopolistically competitive firms, each supplying a distinct horizontally-differentiated variety. Demand functions for varieties emanate from constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. As a result, a firm's revenue in market  $m$  (domestic or foreign) can be expressed in terms of its output supplied to this market ( $Y_m$ ) and a demand shifter ( $A_m$ ):

$$R_m = A_m Y_m^\beta, \quad m \in \{d, x\},$$

where  $d$  denotes the domestic market and  $x$  the export market. The demand shifter  $A_m$  depends on aggregate sectoral expenditure and the sectoral price index in market  $m$ . Since every firm is small relative to the sector, the firm takes this demand shifter as given. The parameter  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties.

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<sup>25</sup>We focus our structural analysis on firm exporting rather than firm importing. While the mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in our theoretical model is driven by firm export-market participation as in Melitz (2003), the model can also be extended to capture firm selection into importing as in Amiti and Davis (2011). To the extent that firm importing increases productivity and raises revenue per worker, it results in a similar *importer* wage premium, and our methodology could be applied to this other dimension of firm selection. In practice, firm exporting and importing are strongly positively correlated in the cross section, and hence in our estimation we capture most of the overall effect of firm trade participation.



In order to export, a firm has to incur a fixed cost  $e^\varepsilon F_x$ , where  $\varepsilon$  is firm-specific and  $F_x$  is common to all firms in the sector. In addition, there are iceberg-type variable trade costs:  $\tau > 1$  units of a variety have to be exported for one unit to arrive in the foreign market. An exporting firm allocates its output between the domestic and export market to maximize revenue. As a result, the firm's revenue ( $R = R_d + R_x$ ) can be expressed as a function of its output ( $Y = Y_d + Y_x$ ), the demand shifter in the domestic market, and a market access variable ( $\Upsilon_x$ ):

$$R = [1 + \iota(\Upsilon_x - 1)]^{1-\beta} A_d Y^\beta, \quad (10)$$

where the market access variable is

$$\Upsilon_x = 1 + \tau^{\frac{-\beta}{1-\beta}} \left( \frac{A_x}{A_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$$

and  $\iota$  is an indicator variable, equal to one when the firm exports and equal to zero otherwise. The revenue of a non-exporter is  $R = A_d Y^\beta$ , while the revenue of an exporter is  $R = \Upsilon_x^{1-\beta} A_d Y^\beta$ . The firm revenue premium from exporting is decreasing in the variable trade cost parameter and increasing in the foreign demand shifter relative to the domestic demand shifter.

We assume that firm output ( $Y$ ) depends on firm productivity ( $\theta$ ), the measure of workers hired by the firm ( $H$ ), and the average ability of these workers ( $\bar{a}$ ):

$$Y = e^\theta H^\gamma \bar{a}, \quad 0 < \gamma < 1. \quad (11)$$

HIR show that this production function can be derived from human capital complementarities (e.g., production takes place in teams and the productivity of a worker depends on the average productivity of her team), or from a model of a managerial time constraint (e.g., a manager with a fixed amount of time who needs to allocate some time to every worker, as in Rosen 1982). Importantly, the production technology (11) exhibits complementarity between the firm's productivity and average worker ability.

Firms and workers are matched in a labor market that exhibits search and matching frictions of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type. A firm bears a search cost  $bN$  in order to randomly match with  $N$  workers. The hiring cost  $b$  is endogenously determined by the tightness of the labor market and is taken as given by each firm in the sector.<sup>26</sup>

Upon matching with a firm, a worker draws a match-specific ability  $a$  from a Pareto distribution  $G(a) = 1 - (a_{\min}/a)^k$  for  $a \geq a_{\min} > 0$  and  $k > 1$ . This distribution is identical and independent across workers and matches. Although a firm cannot observe the match-specific abilities of its  $N$  workers, it can invest resources in screening in order to obtain a signal of these abilities. By choosing an ability threshold  $a_c$ , a firm can identify workers with abilities below  $a_c$ , but it cannot identify the precise ability of every worker. Screening costs increase with the ability threshold and equal  $e^{-\eta} C(a_c)^\delta / \delta$ , where  $\eta$  is firm specific while  $\delta$  and  $C$  are common to

<sup>26</sup>In our econometric model, labor market tightness is absorbed in the constants of the estimation equations. For this reason we do not elaborate these details below. The interested reader can find them in HIR.

all firms. The incentive to screen workers results from the complementarity of firm productivity and worker abilities in the production function (11). We also assume  $\delta > k$ , which ensures a positive size-wage premium (i.e., the empirically-observed positive relationship between firm wages and employment).

Note that all workers are ex ante identical, but their ex post outcomes depend on their match-specific ability and the productivity of the firm they are matched with. This modeling assumption is consistent with our empirical focus on the firm component of wages for workers with similar observable characteristics. In HIR we extend the framework to explicitly account for observable worker heterogeneity and different occupations, but here we do not attempt to explain this additional dimension of wage variation and keep the analysis focused on residual wage dispersion within occupations.

The timing of decisions is as follows. Each firm in a given sector has a draw  $(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon)$ , which represents its idiosyncratic components of productivity, screening costs, and fixed export costs. Given this triplet, the firm chooses whether to serve only the domestic market or to also export, where each firm in the sector serves the domestic market.<sup>27</sup> All firms in the sector post vacancies. Based on these vacancies, firms are matched with workers. After the matching, every firm chooses its screening threshold and hires the workers with match-specific abilities above this threshold. Therefore, a firm that has been matched with  $N$  workers and has chosen the ability cutoff  $a_c$  hires

$$H = N(1 - G(a_c)) = N(a_{\min}/a_c)^k \quad (12)$$

workers whose expected ability is

$$\bar{a} = \mathbb{E}\{a|a \geq a_c\} = \frac{k}{k-1} a_c, \quad (13)$$

by the properties of the Pareto distribution. Neither the firm nor its hired workers have information on the match-specific abilities of individual workers beyond the fact that they are above the cutoff  $a_c$ .

After the firm has paid all the costs—exporting, matching and screening—it engages in multilateral bargaining with its  $H$  workers over wages, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). HIR show that the outcome of this bargaining game is a wage rate

$$W = \frac{\beta\gamma}{1 + \beta\gamma} \frac{R}{H},$$

so that the wage bill is a fixed fraction of firm revenue. Workers who have not been matched with firms, or whose match-specific abilities have fallen below their firm's threshold, become unemployed and are not observed in our data.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup>All firms serving the domestic market can be rationalized by a fixed number of potential firms as in Chaney (2008) and no fixed costs of domestic production. In our empirical implementation, we condition on firm entry into production and analyze a firm's decision to serve the export market and its choice of employment and wages. Therefore we do not model the firm's entry decision here.

<sup>28</sup>Therefore sectoral employment is determined by firm labor demand given the hiring cost  $b$ . We do not

Anticipating this bargaining outcome, a firm maximizes its profits by choosing the number of workers to match with ( $N$ ), the screening threshold ( $a_c$ ), and whether to export:

$$\Pi = \max_{N, a_c, \iota \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ \frac{1}{1 + \beta\gamma} R(N, a_c, \iota) - bN - \frac{Ce^{-\eta}}{\delta} (a_c)^\delta - \iota F_x e^\varepsilon \right\},$$

where the revenue function  $R(N, a_c, \iota)$  is derived from (10)–(13). HIR show that the solution to this problem yields (see (S16) in the online supplement to HIR, and the web appendix):

$$R = \kappa_r [1 + \iota (\Upsilon_x - 1)]^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta\Gamma}}, \quad (14)$$

$$H = \kappa_h [1 + \iota (\Upsilon_x - 1)]^{\frac{(1-\beta)(1-k/\delta)}{\Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta(1-k/\delta)}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)(1-k/\delta)}{\delta\Gamma} - \frac{k}{\delta}}, \quad (15)$$

$$W = \kappa_w [1 + \iota (\Upsilon_x - 1)]^{\frac{k(1-\beta)}{\delta\Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta k}{\delta\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{k}{\delta} \left(1 + \frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta\Gamma}\right)}, \quad (16)$$

where  $\Gamma \equiv 1 - \beta\gamma - \beta(1 - \gamma k)/\delta > 0$  is a derived parameter and the  $\kappa_s$ 's ( $s = r, h, w$ ) are combinations of variables and parameters that are common to all firms in the sector. Given these solutions, a firm chooses to export in addition to serving the domestic market if the additional profits from exporting are positive:

$$\kappa_\pi \left( \Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} - 1 \right) (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta\Gamma}} \geq F_x e^\varepsilon, \quad (17)$$

where  $\kappa_\pi$  is constant across firms. This condition derives from the fact that operational profits are a constant fraction,  $\Gamma/(1 + \beta)$ , of revenues (14). When this inequality fails, the firm serves only the domestic market. A firm is more likely to export the higher are its production and screening productivity draws,  $\theta$  and  $\eta$ , and the lower is its fixed export cost productivity draw  $\varepsilon$ . When condition (17) holds,  $\iota = 1$ ; otherwise  $\iota = 0$ .

Equations (15)–(17) describe firm employment, wages, and export participation. This model features two sources of firm heterogeneity that do not exist in HIR: heterogeneity in fixed export costs and heterogeneity in screening costs. Without heterogeneous export-market entry costs, a firm's revenue and wage bill would perfectly predict its export status. This prediction is inconsistent with the data, in which there is considerable overlap in the wage and employment distributions between non-exporters and exporters. Without heterogeneous screening costs, employment and wages are perfectly correlated across firms, whereas in the data this correlation is imperfect. Incorporating these two additional sources of heterogeneity enables the model to match the empirical cross-sectional distribution of firm employment, wages and export status.

Our theoretical model predicts that firms with higher productivity  $\theta$  hire more workers, are more likely to export, and pay higher wages.<sup>29</sup> However, while firms with higher productivity

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explicitly model a worker's decision whether to search for employment in the sector here. In HIR we embed the sector in general equilibrium and show that workers are indifferent between the sectors in which to search for employment.

<sup>29</sup>In this model with Stole-Zwiebel bargaining, equilibrium wages are equalized with the firm's outside option

in screening  $\eta$  also pay higher wages and are more likely to export, they may hire more or fewer workers. The reason for this ambiguity stems from two opposing effects on hiring. On the one hand, lower screening costs raise overall profitability, thereby raising the incentive to expand and hire more workers. On the other hand, lower screening costs make selectivity in hiring more attractive, thereby lowering employment. On net, lower screening costs may increase or reduce employment.

Lower fixed export costs make exporting more profitable and induce more firms to export. In the model, an exporter has higher employment and wages than a non-exporter with the same productivity. An exporter employs more workers because it has access to a larger market, which justifies a larger scale of operation. The higher wage results from the greater labor market selectivity (tougher screening for hiring) of exporters, implied by the complementarity between a larger scale of operation and higher average worker ability. Since exporters screen more intensively and have workforces of higher average ability, their workforces are more costly to replace, which improves the workers' stance in the wage bargaining. Consequently, exporters pay higher wages. This export wage premium is important for matching the model to the data.

The heterogeneity in fixed export costs implies that the productivity draws in production and screening only imperfectly determine a firm's export status. As a result, some small and low-wage firms find it profitable to export while some large and high-wage firms prefer to serve only the domestic market. Yet on average, exporters are larger and pay higher wages than non-exporters, as observed in the data. As we show below, firm-specific heterogeneity in the triplet  $(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon)$  is crucial for the empirical success of the model.

## 4.2 Econometric model

Having described the theoretical structure of the model, we now adapt it for empirical estimation. Our econometric model consists of two equations for employment and wages, and a selection equation for export status. Taking logarithms of (15)–(17), we obtain a linear selection model:

$$\begin{aligned} h &= \alpha_h + \mu_h \iota + \frac{\beta(1 - k/\delta)}{\Gamma} \theta + \left(1 - \frac{k}{\delta}\right) \left[ \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma} - \frac{k/\delta}{1 - k/\delta} \right] \eta, \\ w &= \alpha_w + \mu_w \iota + \frac{\beta k}{\delta \Gamma} \theta + \frac{k}{\delta} \left(1 + \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma}\right) \eta, \\ \iota &= \mathbb{I} \left\{ \frac{\beta}{\Gamma} \theta + \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma} \eta - \varepsilon \geq \sigma f \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

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to replace a worker. As a result, firms that are more selective in the labor market end up paying higher wages. Due to complementarity in production, more productive firms choose to be both larger and more selective, and hence pay higher wages. Through this mechanism, exporters are larger and pay higher wages than non-exporters.

where  $h$  and  $w$  are the natural logarithms of employment and wages respectively,  $\mathbb{I}\{\cdot\}$  denotes an indicator function,

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_h &= (1 - k/\delta) \log \Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}}, \\ \mu_w &= \frac{k/\delta}{1 - k/\delta} \mu_h, \\ f &= \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( -\alpha_\pi + \log F_x - \log \left[ \Upsilon_x^{(1-\beta)/\Gamma} - 1 \right] \right),\end{aligned}$$

and  $\alpha_s = \log \kappa_s$  for  $s = h, w, \pi$ . Lastly, we use  $\sigma$  to denote the standard deviation of the composite firm-specific shock in the selection equation above (see the web appendix for the explicit expression), which we use below as a constant of normalization. To complete the model we impose a distributional assumption on the firm-specific shocks  $(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon)$ , which we assume are drawn from a joint normal distribution with an arbitrary covariance matrix; we normalize the means of the shocks to zero which is without loss of generality because of the presence of the constants denoted by  $\alpha_s$ .

In order to estimate the model, we make a substitution of variables and rewrite the system as an exactly-identified reduced form:

$$\begin{cases} h &= \alpha_h + \mu_h \iota + u, \\ w &= \alpha_w + \mu_w \iota + \zeta u + v, \\ \iota &= \mathbb{I}\{z \geq f\}, \end{cases} \quad (u, v, z)' \sim \mathcal{N} \left( \mathbf{0}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_u^2 & 0 & \rho_u \sigma_u \\ 0 & \sigma_v^2 & \rho_v \sigma_v \\ \rho_u \sigma_u & \rho_v \sigma_v & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right), \quad (18)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}u &= \frac{1}{1 + \chi} \left( \frac{\beta}{\Gamma} \theta + \left( \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma} - \chi \right) \eta \right), \\ v &= \chi(\eta - \mathbb{E}\{\eta|u\}) = \chi(\eta - \pi u), \\ z &= \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{\beta}{\Gamma} \theta + \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma} \eta - \varepsilon \right) = \frac{1}{\sigma} ((1 + \zeta)u + v - \varepsilon),\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\chi = \frac{k/\delta}{1 - k/\delta} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \zeta = \chi(1 + \pi),$$

with  $\pi$  denoting the projection coefficient of  $\eta$  on  $u$ . The details of this derivation are provided in the web appendix, which also relates the parameters of the distributions of the reduced-form shocks  $(\sigma_u, \sigma_v, \rho_u, \rho_v)$  to the covariance matrix of the structural shocks  $(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon)$ . In general, not all of the model's structural parameters can be recovered from the reduced-form (18), the web appendix discusses additional assumptions resulting in identification. Furthermore, the estimated reduced-form parameters are sufficient to undertake model-based counterfactuals quantifying the contribution of trade openness to wage inequality, as we do below.

The only additional parameter restriction on the econometric model (18) implied by the

theory is positive employment and wage premia in exporting firms.<sup>30</sup>

$$\mu_h, \mu_w > 0. \quad (19)$$

Note that the two premia are linked by the following relationship,  $\mu_w = \chi\mu_h$ . This however does not impose an additional constraint on the model, since  $\chi$  is not identified separately.

We now discuss two special cases of the model with additional parameter restrictions. First, we note that in general the selection correlations  $(\rho_u, \rho_v)$  can be positive or negative, depending on the covariance matrix of the structural shocks. It is sufficient to require, however, that the productivity shocks  $(\theta, \eta)$  are not too strongly positively correlated with the exporting cost shock  $\varepsilon$  for these correlations to be non-negative. In particular, if we assume that  $\varepsilon$  is orthogonal to  $(\theta, \eta)$ , the two selection correlations must be positive and, in addition, constrained by the following relationship:<sup>31</sup>

$$\frac{\rho_u}{\rho_v} = (1 + \zeta) \frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma_v}. \quad (20)$$

There is no strong *a priori* economic reason why the productivity and screening shocks  $(\theta, \eta)$  should be uncorrelated with the exporting cost shock  $\varepsilon$ , and hence we do not impose (20) as a default parameter restriction.

underlying productivity distribution, where more productive firms are larger, pay higher wages and are more likely to export. The second channel—the *market access effect*—ensures that exporting firms are larger and pay higher wages even after controlling for productivity.<sup>32</sup> We test below whether either or both effects are important in the data. In particular, we evaluate the hypothesis of no relationship between trade and the employment and wage distributions across firms by estimating the model under the parameter restriction:

$$\mu_h = \mu_w = \rho_u = \rho_v = 0. \quad (22)$$

**Likelihood function** Our econometric model (18) takes a form similar to a Tobit Type 5 model in Amemiya (1985) or a switching regression model with endogenous switching in Maddala (1983). This model admits a closed-form likelihood function, which we now describe.

A unit of observation in the model is a firm  $j$ , and each observation is a triplet of firm log employment, log wages and binary export status,  $x_j = (h_j, w_j, \iota_j)'$ . We denote the data by  $\mathbf{X} = \{x_j\}_j$ , and we use it to estimate the parameter vector  $\Theta = (\alpha_h, \alpha_w, \zeta, \sigma_u, \sigma_v, \rho_u, \rho_v, \mu_h, \mu_w, f)'$ . We denote the likelihood of the data  $\mathbf{X}$  given the parameter vector  $\Theta$  by:

$$\mathcal{L}(\Theta|\mathbf{X}) = \prod_j \mathbb{P}\{x_j|\Theta\}. \quad (23)$$

In the web appendix we show that

$$\mathbb{P}\{x_j|\Theta\} = \frac{1}{\sigma_u} \phi(\hat{u}_j) \frac{1}{\sigma_v} \phi(\hat{v}_j) \left[ \Phi\left(\frac{f - \rho_u \hat{u}_j - \rho_v \hat{v}_j}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_u^2 - \rho_v^2}}\right) \right]^{1-\iota_j} \left[ 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{f - \rho_u \hat{u}_j - \rho_v \hat{v}_j}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_u^2 - \rho_v^2}}\right) \right]^{\iota_j},$$

where  $\phi(\cdot)$  and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  are respectively the density and cumulative distribution functions of a standard normal, and

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{u}_j &= (h_j - \alpha_h - \mu_h \iota_j) / \sigma_u, \\ \hat{v}_j &= [(w_j - \alpha_w - \mu_w \iota_j) - \zeta(h_j - \alpha_h - \mu_h \iota_j)] / \sigma_v. \end{aligned}$$

This simple expression for the density of the data  $x_j$  is intuitive: the first two terms reflect the likelihood of the continuous distribution of shocks which result in the observed employment and wages, while the last two terms are a standard Probit likelihood for binary export status given the employment and wages of the firm.

We estimate the parameters of the model by maximizing the likelihood function (23), subject to the structural constraint (19). Additionally, we evaluate the maximized likelihood of an unconstrained model, as well as the maximum likelihood under the various parameter restrictions discussed above. The model is identified through functional form and distributional assumptions.

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<sup>32</sup>In the literature following Melitz (2003), and in particular in HIR, the two effects are typically not separated because firm productivity perfectly predicts export status. Our framework emphasizes the distinction between the two effects as a result of idiosyncratic differences in exporting costs across firms.

As a check on our functional form assumptions, we show that the estimated model provides a good fit of the empirical cross-section distributions of employment and wages.

While the maximum likelihood estimation uses efficiently all possible moments of the data, the first and second moments of the joint distribution of employment, wages and export status provide intuition for the identification of the model's parameters.<sup>33</sup> The parameters  $\alpha_w$ ,  $\alpha_h$ ,  $\sigma_u$ ,  $\sigma_v$  and  $f$  can be identified from the first and second moments of employment and wages as well as the fraction of exporting firms;  $\zeta$  is pinned down by the wage-employment covariance. The key parameters of interest— $\mu_w$ ,  $\mu_h$ ,  $\rho_u$  and  $\rho_v$ —are identified from the first and second moments of employment and wages conditional on export status, with their separate identification coming from the model's functional form assumptions including the discrete increase in wages and employment upon entry into export markets.

We focus on cross-section dispersion in wages, employment and export status across firms and hence estimate the model's parameters using data on a cross-section of firms. To ensure that our results are not driven by changes in policies or other aspects of the market environment over time, we estimate the parameters of the model separately for each year in our sample and examine the extent to which the parameters change over time. We allow all parameters to vary over time in an unrestricted manner, since all the parameters are functions of endogenous aggregate variables which in the data are likely to change over time. For example, exporter premia ( $\mu_h, \mu_w$ ) depend on variable trade costs ( $\tau$



log linear model of firm employment, wages and selection into exporting, which can be further augmented to allow for reduced-form variation in  $\sigma_u$ ,  $\sigma_v$  and  $\zeta$  with export status. A theoretical underpinning of the econometric model is desirable, however, because it helps to form priors and identify the parameters of interest, as well as conduct internally-consistent counterfactual exercises using the estimated reduced-form model. The next section illustrates both of these points.

### 4.3 Maximum Likelihood results

We estimate the econometric model (18) using data on firm export status, employment, and wages. Since the theory focuses on the firm-specific wages of workers with similar ex-ante characteristics, we use the firm-occupation-year fixed effects  $\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t}$  from the Mincer regression (6) in Section 3.3 for wages. Noting that the equation for selection into exporting is defined at the firm level, we also aggregate the firm-occupation-year fixed effects to the firm-year level ( $\hat{\psi}_{jt}$ ), using the firm’s employment in each occupation as weights, as in Section 3.4.<sup>35</sup> For employment and export status we use the actual data.

In the first two columns of Table 8, we summarize the results of the maximum likelihood estimation. We report results for 1990, but the pattern of results is robust across years. The web appendix reports all the results for 1994 for comparison. We consider five specifications—the unconstrained specification, three structurally constrained specifications corresponding to the parameter restrictions (19), (20) and (21) respectively, and one counterfactual specification in which we shut down the effects of trade altogether by imposing (22). For each specification, we report the log of the likelihood function, and for the four constrained specifications, we report the likelihood ratio test statistic ( $LR$ ) that assesses the validity of the constraints.<sup>36</sup> Given our large sample of about 100,000 firms per year, we reject every conceivable constraint on the parameters of the econometric model. For example, the  $LR$  test statistic for the structural specification (ii) subject to the theoretical requirement (19) equals 62.8 while the 1 percent critical value for a  $\chi^2(1)$ -test is 6.6.

Since a constraint can be statistically rejected and yet have little impact on the economic fit of the model, the final column of Table 8 reports the square root of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) objective based on the first and second moments of wages, employment and export status.<sup>37</sup> This GMM objective can be interpreted as the distance from a perfect fit in

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<sup>35</sup>As discussed in footnote 19, we assume that the firm controls the average wage conditional on observed worker characteristics ( $\hat{\psi}_{jt}$ ), which we therefore treat as data in our estimation of the model. The web appendix described the estimation procedure under the alternative assumption that this wage component is measured with error. Further, as a robustness check, we estimate the model using the firm average log worker wage  $\bar{w}_{jt}$  instead and find qualitatively similar results, as discussed in the web appendix.

<sup>36</sup>The  $LR$  test equals twice the difference between the log likelihood of the unconstrained and constrained models and has an asymptotic  $\chi^2(r)$  distribution when  $r$  parameter restrictions are imposed. We also considered alternative information criteria, such as  $BIC$ , and they suggest similar conclusions.

<sup>37</sup>As discussed in footnote 33 and the web appendix, the model’s parameters can be also estimated with GMM using 11 first and second moments to identify the ten parameters of the model. Here we use the ML parameter estimates to evaluate these eleven moments, which include the fraction of exporters, the mean employment and wage conditional on exporting and non-exporting, and the variance-covariance matrix of employment and wages

Table 8: Maximum Likelihood of Unconstrained and Restricted Models, 1990

	Specification	$\log \mathcal{L}$	$LR$	Sqrt. GMM Obj.
(i)	Unconstrained	-39,349.6	—	0.013
(ii)	$\mu_h, \mu_w > 0$	-39,381.0	62.8	0.021
(iii)	$\mu_w = \zeta \mu_h$	-39,441.3	183.4	0.034
(iv)	Orthogonal structural shocks	-39,445.2	191.1	0.035
(v)	No trade effects $\mu_h = \mu_w = \rho_u = \rho_v = 0$	-49,543.6	20,387.9	0.370

*Note:* Unconstrained model (i) maximizes the likelihood function imposing no constraints on the parameters. Structural specification (ii) imposes the inequality constraint (19) implied by the theoretical model. Specification (iii) imposes constraint (21), while inequality (19) turns out to be non-binding. Specification (iv) imposes the orthogonality constraint (20), while both inequality (19) and  $\rho_u, \rho_v > 0$  turn out to be non-binding. The no-trade-effects specification (v) sets both selection correlations ( $\rho_u$  and  $\rho_v$ ) and exporter premia ( $\mu_h$  and  $\mu_w$ ) to zero, implying that firm employment and wages are independent of export status. Column one reports the value of the log-likelihood function. Column two reports the  $LR$  statistic equal to twice the difference between the log likelihood of unconstrained and constrained models. Column three reports the square root of the GMM objective, which is the square of 11 first and second moments of firm employment, wages and export status, weighted by the diagonal of the efficient GMM weighting matrix, as discussed in the text and web appendix.

terms of the standard deviations of the moments, so that 0.02 corresponds to a discrepancy in the moment fit of 2% of the moment's standard deviation in the sample. Under exact identification the value of this GMM objective is equal to zero, and it is in general positive under over-identification. The restricted specifications impose an extra degree of over-identification (10 parameters minus one restriction compared to the 11 moments). As reported in the table, the loss in the GMM objective in moving from the unconstrained specification (i) to the constrained specifications (ii)-(iv) is around the same magnitude as the initial loss in the GMM objective in the unconstrained specification (i). Therefore, according to the GMM objective, the fit of the structurally constrained specifications is nearly as good as the fit of the unconstrained model. We further explore the fit of the model below by looking at the individual moments of the data, as well as the overall employment and wage distributions.

In contrast, the likelihood ratio test statistic for the no trade specification ( $\mu_h = \mu_w = \rho_u = \rho_v = 0$ ) in (v) is two orders of magnitude larger than for the structurally constrained

also conditional on exporting and non-exporting. We normalize the deviation of the theoretical moments from their data counterparts by the standard deviation of the respective moment in the data. The square root of the GMM objective is therefore a Euclidian distance in the space of normalized moments:

$$\text{Sqrt. GMM Obj.} = \left( \sum_{s=1}^S \frac{\left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_j m_s(x_j | \hat{\Theta}_R) \right)^2}{\widehat{\text{var}}(m_s(x_j | \hat{\Theta}_U))} \right)^{1/2}, \quad \text{where} \quad \widehat{\text{var}}(m_s(x_j | \Theta_U)) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_j m_s(x_j | \Theta_U)^2$$

where  $s$  indexes the moments (the number of moments in our case is  $S = 11$ ),  $m_s(x|\Theta)$  is the value of the moment- $s$  function for data vector  $x$  given parameter vector  $\Theta$ ,  $\widehat{\text{var}}(\cdot)$  is the sample variance estimator for a mean-zero variable,  $\hat{\Theta}_U$  is the unconstrained ML parameter estimate and  $\hat{\Theta}_R$  is the (constrained) parameter vector of interest. For example, for moment  $s = 1$  (fraction of exporters) we have  $m_1(x_j|\Theta) = \iota_j - \mathbb{E}\{\iota|\Theta\}$ , where  $\mathbb{E}\{\iota|\Theta\} = \mathbb{E}\{\mathbb{I}\{z \geq f\}|\Theta\} = 1 - \Phi(f)$ . Note that  $\mathbb{E}\{m_s(x_j|\Theta)|\Theta\} = 0$  for all  $s$  under the correct model specification.

specifications. In terms of the GMM objective, the fit of the no-trade specification (v) is an order of magnitude worse than the unconstrained specification (i) or the constrained specifications (ii)-(iv). We therefore conclude that firm trade participation—through the combination of the selection effects  $(\rho_u, \rho_v)$  and the market access effects  $(\mu_h, \mu_w)$ —is important for explaining the observed distributions of wages and employment. Some other constraints on the parameters are equally strongly rejected. For example, the data strongly rejects the constraint of no market access effect  $\mu_h = \mu_w = 0$  or no exporter wage premium  $\mu_w = \rho_v = 0$ .<sup>38</sup> The data also strongly rejects the hypothesis that the observed variation in wages is due to pure measurement error. This hypothesis is tested by imposing (21) implied by the HIR model without screening shocks and additionally imposing  $\rho_v = 0$  since measurement error in wages should not correlate with export status.

Comparing specifications (i)-(iv), the estimated wage-equation parameters  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  differ substantially across specifications:  $\mu_w$  varies from  $-0.2$  to  $0.8$ , while  $\rho_v$  changes from  $0.5$  to  $-0.5$ , as we report in the web appendix. Recall that  $\mu_w$  is the structural exporter wage premium, while the correlation parameter  $\rho_v$  measures the strength of the selection of high-wage firms into exporting. The joint effect results in the reduced-form exporter wage premium which can be fitted with either a high  $\mu_w$  or a high  $\rho_v$ , explaining the negative relationship between the two across specifications. In contrast, the estimated employment-equation parameters  $(\mu_h, \rho_u)$  exhibit limited variation, with the data favoring both positive market access and positive selection effects ( $\mu_h$  varies from  $2.1$  to  $2.5$ , while  $\rho_u$  changes from  $0.1$  to  $0.0$ ). Additionally, the remaining parameters  $(\alpha_h, \alpha_w, \zeta, \sigma_u, \sigma_v, f)$  correspond closely to the first and second moments of employment and wages and the fraction of exporters, and hardly change across specifications. Given this pattern of parameter variation across specifications, we proceed to visualize the shape of the log likelihood in the  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$ -space—the two parameters that change the most across specifications.

Figure 4 displays the contour plot of the log likelihood function in the space of the two parameters  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$ . Specifically, we fix the values of  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  on a grid, and for each combination on the grid maximize the log likelihood with respect to the other eight parameters of the model. In line with our findings above, the estimates of these other eight parameters vary little across the alternative values of  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  on the grid. As illustrated in the figure for 1990, a generic feature of our estimates is the presence of a global maximum, which in 1990 has a negative  $\mu_w$  and a positive  $\rho_v$ , and a local maximum, which in 1990 has a positive  $\mu_w$  and a negative  $\rho_v$ .<sup>39</sup> Apart from these global and local maxima, there is a whole *ridge* in  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  space—a downward slopping yellow curve in the figure—that yields high levels of likelihood and model fit. Given

<sup>38</sup>Interestingly, the constraint of no selection effect  $\rho_u = \rho_v = 0$  is not strongly rejected, and in terms of fit is similar to the structural specification (iv). Also note that the model without screening shocks ( $\sigma_v = 0$ ) or without exporting cost shocks ( $\rho_u^2 + \rho_v^2 = 1$ ) have a likelihood of zero (log-likelihood of  $-\infty$ ) since in the former case wages must perfectly correlate with employment, while in the latter case export status must be perfectly predictable by a linear combination of employment and wages. In the data, both these correlations are far from perfect.

<sup>39</sup>The global maximum remains in the negative  $\mu_w$  region in 1990-93 and 1995-98, while it shifts to the negative  $\rho_v$  region in 1986-89 and 1994. In the web appendix, we also present the results for 1994.




Figure 4: Contour plot of the log likelihood, 1990

*Note:* Log likelihood, normalized by 10,000, as a function of  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  with the remaining eight parameters optimized given  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$ . The values of the log likelihood 500 log points below the peak are censored (blue area in the figure). The downward sloping yellow curve (dashed and solid) depicts the high likelihood ridge: for a given value of  $\mu_w$  the curve displays the value of  $\rho_v$  that maximizes the log likelihood function. The solid segment of the curve represents the economically meaningful range of parameters in the first quadrant (while only  $\mu_w > 0$  is required by the theory,  $\rho_v > 0$  is also favored in view of previous empirical evidence on the importance of selection into exporting). The five yellow squares indicate the location of the estimates under the specifications (i)-(iv) considered in Table 8 and the text as well as a local maximum; the reported numbers correspond to the value of the log likelihood function, normalized by 10,000.

our large number of observations, the global maximum is statistically distinguishable from other points along the ridge. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 8, the economic fit of the model is good at any point on the ridge and close to the fit at the global maximum. In particular, the model can successfully account for the reduced-form exporter wage premium observed in the data with a strong selection effect ( $\rho_v \gg 0$  and  $\mu_w \approx 0$ ), a strong market access effect ( $\mu_w \gg 0$  and  $\rho_v \approx 0$ ), or both positive selection and positive market access effect ( $\mu_w, \rho_v > 0$ ).<sup>40</sup>

When we only impose constraint (19) corresponding to positive market access effects (spec-

<sup>40</sup>The reason why the data favors either a large negative  $\rho_v$  or a large positive  $\rho_v$ , which by consequence results either in large positive  $\mu_w$  or moderately negative  $\mu_w$ , has to do with the fact that our theoretical model is parsimonious and sparsely parameterized. As becomes clear from Tables 9–10 and Figure 6, the conditional variance of wages for exporters is lower than for non-exporters, and the only way the model can accommodate this difference is by blowing up the (absolute value of) selection correlation of high-wage firms into exporting. Lower absolute values of  $\rho_v$  result in a poorer fit of this moment, but in fact better fit of most other moments.

ification (ii)), we estimate  $\mu_w$  close to zero. Alternatively, when we impose (20) emanating from the assumption of orthogonal structural shocks (specification (iv)), we estimate  $\rho_v$  close to zero.<sup>41</sup> Finally, when we impose (21), implying no effects of screening shocks on employment (specification (iii)), we estimate both  $\mu_w > 0$  and  $\rho_v > 0$ . The points corresponding to these three alternative structural restrictions are shown in Figure 4, along with the unconstrained global and local maxima. Each of these five points lies along the ridge of high likelihood in the parameter space  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  and provides almost as good a fit to the data as the unconstrained model, as reported in Table 8 and further shown below.

Any departures from this one-dimensional line of values of  $(\mu_w, \rho_v)$  in the 10-dimensional parameter space lead to a steep decline in the likelihood function. In other words, the data strongly identifies a compact segment in the parameter space, but beyond this does not sharply discriminate between different points along this segment. The reason is that the market access ( $\mu_w$ ) and selection ( $\rho_v$ ) components of the exporter wage premium are only separately identified in our model through the functional form assumptions, and specifically the discontinuous effect of foreign market access on wages in contrast to the smooth selection effect. While the discrete increase in employment ( $\mu_h$ ) as firms enter export markets and expand to meet export demand is large, the discrete increase in wages ( $\mu_w$ ) as firms enter export markets is substantially smaller, which makes it harder to separately identify the market access and selection effects for wages. Hence, in what follows we use economic reasoning to select a point along the segment shown in Figure 4.

Our theoretical model imposes the restriction that  $\mu_w, \mu_h > 0$ . Additionally, a number of empirical studies find that future exporters are larger and pay higher wages than other non-exporters even before they enter export markets (see for example Bernard and Jensen 1997, 1999), which suggests selection into export markets ( $\rho_u, \rho_h > 0$ ). Therefore we adopt the structural restriction (21),  $\mu_w = \zeta \mu_h$  or specification (iii), as our preferred specification, which generates both positive market access effects ( $\mu_w, \mu_h > 0$ ) and positive selection effects ( $\rho_u, \rho_v > 0$ ). Under this restriction, the reduced-form model has an attractive structural interpretation, in which wages and employment depend on two orthogonal structural shocks—one to productivity ( $\theta$ ) that enters both the employment and wage equations, and another to screening ( $\eta$ ) that enters only the wage equation, where both can be correlated with the shock in the export selection equation ( $z$ ). Finally, this constrained specification also generates a similar level of fit as the unconstrained specification, as shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10 below.

Before analyzing further the fit of the model, Figure 5 presents the ML parameter estimates for our preferred specification (iii) for each year during our sample period 1986–98. We estimate the model using the cross-section data on firms for each year separately without imposing restrictions on the evolution of the parameters over time. The figure also shows the 98 percent confidence intervals (two standard-deviation bands) using a robust (sandwich) covariance matrix, which are tight around the estimated parameter values given our large sample size. The

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<sup>41</sup>This is a robust outcome of constraint (20). The reason is somewhat mechanical, arising from the fact that the data favors estimates that satisfy  $0 < \rho_u < \rho_v$  and  $\sigma_u > \sigma_v$ , which is inconsistent with (20) unless  $\rho_u, \rho_v \approx 0$ .




Figure 5: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates Across Years

*Note:* ML estimates from the structural specification (iii) under constraint (20), based on separate cross sections of firm employment, firm wages and export status for each year; and two standard-error bands based on ML asymptotic sandwich covariance matrix.

estimated parameters evolve smoothly over time, consistent with the idea that our model captures systematic cross-section dispersion in wages and employment. The parameter estimates feature substantial employment and wage export premia ( $\mu_h$  and  $\mu_w$ ), as well as positive selection correlations ( $\rho_u$  and  $\rho_v$ ). In other words, our constrained specification suggests that both selection and market access effects are present in the data.<sup>42</sup> The estimated dispersion of  $u$  ( $\sigma_u$ ) falls over time, which is driven by the decline in the dispersion of firm employment observed in the data. The estimated dispersion of  $v$  ( $\sigma_v$ ) follows an inverted U-shape pattern over time, which reflects the inverted U-shape pattern in the dispersion of firm wages observed in the data. Finally, the estimated export threshold parameter  $f$  follows a U-shape, which captures the inverted U-shape in the observed share of exporters over time.

**Fit of the model** In Tables 9 and 10, we provide further evidence on the model's fit in the cross-section for 1990. We find a similar pattern for other years and report results for 1994 in the web appendix. In each table, the first column reports cross-section moments in the data, while

<sup>42</sup>Note however that the estimated selection correlations are small, with  $\rho_u$  fluctuating around 0.02 and  $\rho_v$  ranging between 0.1 and 0.2. The overall strength of the selection effect can be measured by  $\sqrt{\rho_u^2 + \rho_v^2}$ , and it fluctuates around 0.17 over the years.

Table 9: Model Fit for Firm-level Moments, 1990

	Data	Model	
		Unconstrained	Structural
A. Full Sample			
Mean Employment	2.97	2.97	2.97
Mean Wages	−0.340	−0.341	−0.341
St. Dev. Employment	1.27	1.27	1.27
St. Dev. Wages	0.424	0.424	0.423
Covar Emplmnt and Wages	0.352	0.354	0.352
Fraction of Exporters	5.5%	5.5%	5.5%
B. Non-exporters			
Mean Employment	2.83	2.83	2.83
Mean Wages	−0.359	−0.360	−0.360
St. Dev. Employment	1.12	1.14	1.14
St. Dev. Wages	0.419	0.419	0.416
Covar Emplmnt and Wages	0.306	0.309	0.304
C. Exporters			
Mean Employment	5.28	5.29	5.29
Mean Wages	−0.010	−0.010	−0.006
St. Dev. Employment	1.52	1.14	1.14
St. Dev. Wages	0.366	0.373	0.417
Covar Emplmnt and Wages	0.322	0.289	0.304

*Note:* Moments of the log wage and log employment distributions across firms in 1990. The log wage measure in the data is the firm-occupation-year fixed effect estimated from (6), aggregated to the firm-year level using occupation employment weights. Model moments are calculated in the same way in an artificial cross-section of firms generated from ML estimated model (18) under the unconstrained specification (i) and structural specifications (iii) respectively.

the next two columns report model-predicted moments from the unconstrained specification and our preferred structural specification (iii) respectively. To calculate the moments in the model, we simulate the data based on (18) given the estimated parameter vector  $\hat{\Theta}$ .

Table 9 presents firm-level moments: first and second moments for employment and wages—for the full sample and conditional on exporting and non-exporting—as well as the fraction of exporting firms. These are the moments used in calculating the GMM objective in Table 8.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, Table 10 presents the worker-level moments of the wage distribution. Since we focus on the firm component of wages, abstracting from wage variation within firms, the distribution of wages across workers in our analysis is the firm-employment-weighted distribution of wages across firms. That is, wage observations for a large firm in terms of employment receive a proportionately larger weight in the worker-wage distribution. Panel A of Table 10 reports the mean and variance of worker wages for the full sample, as well as for workers employed by

<sup>43</sup>Note that the full sample moments for employment and wages in Table 9 are linear combinations of the 10 moments for exporters and non-exporters and the fraction of exporters, and hence we exclude them in calculating the GMM objective.

Table 10: Model Fit for Worker-level Moments, 1990

	Data	Model	
A. First and Second Moments		Unconstrained	Structural
Mean Log Wage	0.000	−0.085	−0.072
Non-exporters	−0.122	−0.213	−0.215
Exporters	0.152	0.109	0.140
St. Dev. Log Wages	0.404	0.429	0.450
Non-exporters	0.407	0.415	0.416
Exporters	0.345	0.374	0.414
Emplmnt Share of Exporters	44.6%	40.0%	40.3%
B. Wage Inequality Measures			
Gini	0.215	0.236	0.250
90/10	2.77	3.00	3.18
90/50	1.54	1.70	1.79
50/10	1.80	1.76	1.78
C. Size and Exporter Wage Premia			
Size premium	0.111	0.112	0.111
Exporter premium	0.077	0.075	0.082

*Note:* Moments are calculated across workers in 1990; the wage measures are the firm-occupation-year fixed effects estimated from (6), aggregated to the firm-year level using occupation employment weights, and weighted by the number of workers employed by the firm. The firm-occupation-year fixed effects are normalized, so that in every year their mean is zero across workers within each sector-occupation cell; for this reason the mean worker wage equals zero. Simulated moments for log wages and log employment generated using ML estimates for 1990 from the unconstrained specification (i) and structural specification (iii). 90/10 denotes the 90-10 wage percentile ratio (the ratio of the exponents of the log wage percentiles), and similarly for 90/50 and 50/10. Size and exporter premia are coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of log firm wages on log firm employment and a dummy for export status, without including sector fixed effects, which explains the small difference in the exporter premium from the results reported in Section 3.4.

exporters and non-exporters; this panel also reports the share of workers employed by exporters. Panel B then reports additional measures of wage inequality, namely the Gini coefficient and the 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 percentile ratios. Finally, Panel C reports the coefficients from the size-exporter wage premium regression parallel to (8) in Section 3.4.

Judging by the moments in Tables 9 and 10, the model provides a close fit to the data. Both firm and worker moments generated by the structural model closely match the moments in the data, and this match is not noticeably worse than the moments generated by the unconstrained model. As discussed in footnote 40, the one moment that the unconstrained model fits better is the standard deviation of wages across exporting firms and across workers employed in exporting firms. The structural model provides a tight fit to all moments across the full sample of firms and across non-exporters; it does slightly worse on the dispersion of employment and wages across exporters. The fit of the model is good but less than perfect for the worker-level moments in Table 10. Of particular interest is the fact that the model fits not only the first and second



moments of firm employment and wage distributions, but also nonlinear transformations of the worker wage distribution such as the 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 wage percentile ratios and the Gini coefficient. In fact, the model generates a Lorenz curve that closely fits the Lorenz curve in the data. Finally, the structural model matches the size and exporter wage premia estimated in the data. We conclude that our parsimonious theoretical model provides a very reasonable fit to a rich set of empirical moments of employment and wage distributions across firms and workers. Furthermore, the constrained structural specification is almost indistinguishable in terms of economic fit from the unconstrained model that has a superior statistical fit.

Figures 6–7 provide further evidence of the quality of the cross-sectional fit of the structural model. They display kernel density estimates of the distributions of employment and wages across firms and the distribution of wages across workers in our data and in artificial data generated from the estimated structural model. We provide the comparison for 1990 and report the results for 1994 in the web appendix; results for other years are again similar.

Figure 6 displays kernel densities for the firm distributions while Figure 7 displays kernel densities for the worker distributions, which again weight firm wages by firm employment. The left two panels of Figure 6 report results for firm employment while the right two panels report results for firm wages. The upper panels report results for all firms while the lower panels report separate estimates for exporters and non-exporters. Our log-normal assumption for the distribution of shocks allows us to nearly perfectly fit the distribution of wages across the full sample of firms. The fit of the distribution of employment across the full sample of firms is good but imperfect, because the distribution in the data is skewed and has a fatter tail than the distribution in the model.

A striking feature of the data is the substantial overlap between the employment and wage distributions of exporters and non-exporters, although the distributions of both employment and wages are shifted to the right for exporters relative to non-exporters. Our theoretical model with firm heterogeneity in export costs can accommodate the overlap in the empirical wage and employment distributions (lower panel of Figure 6). However, as discussed in footnote 40, the model is sparsely parameterized and cannot fit the different dispersion of employment and wages for exporters versus non-exporters. In the data, employment is more dispersed among the exporters, while wages are more dispersed among non-exporters. Given our theoretical assumption that  $\sigma_u$  and  $\sigma_v$  are common for both exporters and non-exporters, the structural model cannot fully capture these two features of the data.

In Figure 7, the model fits well the distribution of wages across all workers, as well as across workers employed by exporting firms and non-exporting firms. However, the model slightly overstates the variance of wages among exporters. Overall, Figures 6–7 confirm our earlier results for selected moments of the worker and firm distributions, and further illustrate that the model provides a good fit to the empirical cross-sectional distributions.

Taken together, the results in Tables 9–10 and Figures 6–7 support our structural model. Despite the model’s sparsity and its strong functional form assumptions, we find that it approximates the data well. The model captures both the higher average employment and wages of




Figure 6: Model Fit for the Distribution of Log Firm Employment and Log Firm Wages, 1990

*Note:* Kernel densities of the employment and wage distributions across firms (using normal kernels with optimal bandwidth). Simulated data generated from the estimated model under structural specification (iii).




Figure 7: Model Fit for the Distribution of Log Worker Wages, 1990

*Note:* Kernel densities of the wage distribution across workers, in which firm wages are weighted by firm employment (using normal kernels with optimal bandwidth). Simulated data generated from the estimated model under structural specification (iii).




Figure 8: Model Fit of Log Wage Inequality over Time

*Note:* Change in the variance of log worker wages relative to 1986, where the worker wage distribution weights firm wages by firm employment. The data curve corresponds to the between-firm component in Figure 3. The model curve is based on simulated data generated separately for each year using the respective ML estimates of the parameters under the structural specification (iii), as reported in Figure 5.

exporters relative to non-exporters, and the substantial overlap in the distributions of employment and wages between these two groups of firms.

Figure 8 reports one final measure of fit, by displaying the true and predicted evolution of log wage inequality over time. Specifically, we simulate the model in every year between 1986 and 1998 using the parameters estimated year-by-year from our preferred structural specification (iii), as reported in Figure 5. Figure 8 then reports the change over time in the variance of log worker wages relative to 1986, both in the data and in the model-simulated cross sections. Although the model slightly overstates the variance of log worker wages (Table 10), this discrepancy is relatively stable over time and, as a result, the model tracks closely the evolution of wage inequality. In particular, the model captures the hump shape in log wage inequality over our sample period, 1986-1998.

**Counterfactual exercise** In closing this section, we discuss the results from a model-based counterfactual exercise that illustrates the effects of trade on wage inequality in the estimated structural model. Specifically, we consider the effect of a reduction in variable trade costs  $\tau$  on export participation and the cross-sectional distributions of employment and wages, with a focus on the variance of log worker wages.

Recall from Section 4.1 that the market access variable is related to variable trade costs according to

$$\Upsilon_x = 1 + \tau^{\frac{-\beta}{1-\beta}} \left( \frac{A_x}{A_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}},$$

and the exporter employment and wage premia are given respectively by

$$\mu_h = \frac{1}{1+\chi} \log \Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} \quad \text{and} \quad \mu_w = \frac{\chi}{1+\chi} \log \Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}}.$$

Another parameter affected by variable trade costs is the reduced-form threshold for export participation:

$$f = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( -\alpha_\pi + \log F_x - \log \left[ \Upsilon_x^{(1-\beta)/\Gamma} - 1 \right] \right).$$

The remaining seven estimation parameters are not directly affected by variable trade costs, and hence we hold them constant in our counterfactual exercise. Specifically, we take the estimated parameters  $\hat{\Theta}$  under our preferred structural specification (iii) for 1990, and then vary  $(\mu_h, \mu_w, f)$  in a way consistent with variation in  $\Upsilon_x$ , as summarized in the equations above.<sup>44</sup> We change  $\Upsilon_x$  from the value of 1, corresponding to autarky, to a very large value for which nearly all workers are employed by exporting firms. Then for every given counterfactual parameter vector  $\Theta_C$ , corresponding to a particular value of  $\Upsilon_x$ , we simulate the model and calculate various moments of the firm and worker distributions.

Figure 9 displays the resulting variance of log worker wages as a function of the market access measure,  $\mu_h + \mu_w = \log \Upsilon_x^{(1-\beta)/\Gamma}$ . Wage inequality displays a hump-shape in response to a reduction in variable trade costs, consistent with the theoretical prediction in HIR. Therefore, once the economy is open to trade, further trade liberalization can either raise or reduce wage inequality depending on the initial level of trade openness. As variable trade costs decline from autarky, employment reallocates from non-exporters to exporters along both the extensive margin of export market entry and the intensive margin of an expansion of employment at exporters, and the fraction of workers employed by exporters changes from zero to one. This, in turn, first increases and later decreases wage inequality, with the peak attained when the majority of workers are employed at exporting firms.

In Figure 9, the dashed lines represents the estimated market access measure ( $\mu_h + \mu_w = \log \Upsilon_x^{(1-\beta)/\Gamma}$ ) in 1986 and 1990, while the red square represents the within-sample point in 1990, which is the benchmark for our counterfactual exercise. The change in variable trade costs which would move the market access measure from its 1986 to its 1990 levels leads to an increase in inequality that corresponds to a quarter of the inequality increase in Brazil between these years. Furthermore, the change in inequality shown in Figure 9 as the economy goes from autarky to the peak of trade-induced inequality is quite substantial, corresponding to three quarters of the increase in inequality in Brazil between 1986 and 1995.

In the web appendix we report a number of robustness checks to show how sensitive the

<sup>44</sup>The only complication arises due to the fact that  $\sigma$  in the expression for  $f$  is not identified, as discussed in the web appendix. Under the assumption that  $(u, v)$  are orthogonal to  $\varepsilon$ , we have  $\sigma^2 = [(1+\zeta)^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2] / (\rho_u^2 + \rho_v^2)$ , which we use in our benchmark calculation displayed in Figure 9. This overstates the true value of  $\sigma$  if  $(u, v)$  are positively correlated with  $\varepsilon$ , which in turn would understate the effect of  $\Upsilon_x$  on  $f$ . As a sensitivity check, in the web appendix we consider a smaller value of  $\sigma$  and find very similar results to those displayed in Figure 9. This is because in our estimated model variation in  $f$  and the fraction of exporting firms is quantitatively not the dominant channel through which variable trade costs affect inequality.




Figure 9: Counterfactual Reduction in Variable Trade Costs and Log Wage Inequality

*Note:* Counterfactual variation in the variance of log worker wages in response to a reduction in variable trade costs  $\tau$  from its autarky level to the limit of trade openness when almost all workers are employed by exporting firms. The distribution of wages across workers weights firm wages by firm employment. The variance of log worker wages is plotted against the market access measure,  $\mu_h + \mu_w = \log \Upsilon_x^{(1-\beta)/\Gamma}$ , where  $\Upsilon_x$  increases as  $\tau$  decreases. Dashed lines correspond to the estimated values of  $\mu_h + \mu_w$  in 1986 and 1990, under structural specification (iii). The red square indicates the prediction of the model given the baseline 1990 estimated parameter vector.

quantitative predictions of the model are to variations in its parameters. While the quantitative results are robust to many variations in the parameters, they are sensitive to the relative strength of the market access and selection effects: the response of inequality is largest when  $\mu_w$  is large and smallest when  $\mu_w$  is close to zero, although the qualitative inverted U-shape is preserved as long as  $\mu_w > 0$ .

To summarize, this counterfactual exercise illustrates that in our estimated structural model variation in variable trade costs can have sizeable effects on wage inequality. This is true both for large changes from autarky to intermediate degrees of openness, as well as for local changes in variable trade costs around the estimated value in our sample.

It is important to note that this counterfactual exercise is likely to provide a lower bound on the potential size of trade effects on inequality. This is because in the model we have allowed for only one extensive margin—a given firm either exports or does not. In contrast, in the data firms can choose to export to a number of destinations, and access to each additional destination results in incremental employment and wage premia. A reduction in variable trade costs is likely to trigger effects along multiple extensive margins and raise market access premia for a variety of destinations, which would amplify the inequality effects of greater trade openness. We leave to future research the generalization of the present model to multiple exporting destinations and the quantification of the resulting trade effects on wage inequality.

## 5 Conclusion

Recent theories of firm heterogeneity and trade emphasize variation in wages with firm productivity and trade participation as sources of wage inequality. Guided by these theories, we use linked employer-employee data for Brazil to examine the empirical relevance of these sources of wage inequality.

In contrast to neoclassical trade theory, which stresses wage inequality between sectors and occupations, we find that around two thirds of overall wage inequality occurs within sector-occupations. Residual wage inequality is as important as worker observables in explaining overall wage inequality, and occurs predominantly within sector-occupations. Consistent with recent theories of firm heterogeneity and trade, between-firm differences in wages account for much of the observed wage inequality within sector-occupations and are particularly influential for residual wage inequality. These between-firm differences in wages are strongly but imperfectly related to firm employment and trade participation.

Motivated by these findings, we estimate a structural econometric model of firm export status, employment and wages, which is derived from an augmented version of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010). This augmented model incorporates three sources of firm heterogeneity in productivity, fixed exporting costs and worker screening, each of which is central to matching the data. We show that the estimated model is empirically successful in accounting for the observed distributions of wages and employment for parameter values consistent with theoretical restrictions. We find that firm trade participation—through a combination of market access and firm selection effects—is important for the model’s explanatory power. We show that counterfactual changes in variable trade costs can have sizeable effects on wage inequality through this mechanism of wage dispersion between firms.

Trade expands the set of opportunities available to firms and workers, which is the source of welfare gains from trade. But only some firms find it profitable to take advantage of these opportunities, which is the mechanism behind trade’s effect on wage inequality that we emphasize. When only a few firms export, further trade liberalization increases wage inequality, but once the fraction of firms exporting becomes sufficiently large, wage inequality reaches a peak and starts to fall back.

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