ESSET
European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

A CEPR Conference
Gerzensee, 14/18 July 2003

 
Monday 14 July

 

08:30 – 11:30 Focus Session: Computer Science and Economics

 

Rationality as Paradigm for Internet Computing

Noam Nisan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

 

Communication Complexity and Mechanism Design

Timothy van Zandt (INSEAD, Fontainebleau and CEPR)

 

TBC

Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 – 21:30 Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queuing Problems - [PDF 227 kb]

Manipushpak Mitra (Indian Statistical Institute)

 

20:30 – 21:30 Complexity as a Barrier to Competitive Imitation

Nabir Al-Najjar (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)

 

Tuesday 15 July

 

08:30 – 10:30 Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium - [PDF 408 kb]

*Motty Perry (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
*Philip Reny (University of Chicago)

 

Auction Based Queue Disciplines - [PDF 271 kb]

*Thomas Kittsteiner (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 – 21:30 Rationalization and Incomplete Information - [PDF 441 kb]

*Pierpaolo Battigalli (Universita Bocconi)
Marciano Siniscalchi

 

20:30 – 21:30 Innovation Timing Games: A General Framework with Applications - [PDF 372 kb]

Ulrich Lehmann Grube (Universität Hamburg)
*Heidrun Hoppe (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

 

Wednesday 16 July

 

08:30 – 11:30 Focus Session: Biology and Economics

 

A "Bioeconomic" View of the Neolithic and Recent Demographic Transitions - [PDF 291 kb]

Arthur Robson (University of Western Ontario)

 

Storage for Good Times and Bad: Of Squirrels and Men - [PDF 291 kb]

Ted Bergstrom (University of California)

 

Evolution of Focal Points - [PDF 355 kb]

*Kenneth Binmore (University College London)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 – 21:30 The Evolution of Coordination under Inertia - [PDF 362 kb]

Thomas Norman (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

 

20:30 – 21:30 Matching, Time and Ageing

Avner Shaked (Universität Bonn)

 

Thursday 17 July

 

08:30 – 11:30 Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations - [PDF 319 kb]

Martin Cripps (Washington University, St Louis)
*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

 

Valuation Equilibrium - [PDF 209 kb]

*Philippe Jehiel (CERAS, Paris, University College London and CEPR)
Dov Samet (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 – 21:30 Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments - [PDF 240 kb]

*Christian Groh (Universität Bonn)
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn and CEPR)
Aner Sela (Ben-Gurion University)

 

20:30 – 21:30 The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options - [PDF 496 kb]

Deszö Szalay (HEC, University of Lausanne)

 

Friday 18 July

 

08:30 – 10:30 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

*Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

 

Social learning with Private and Common Values

Jacob Goeree (University of Amsterdam)

 

* denotes speaker
Organizers:

Mark Armstrong (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, and CEPR)
Philippe Bacchetta (Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Université de Lausanne and CEPR)
Leonardo Felli ( London School of Economics and CEPR)
Philippe Jéhiel (CERAS, Paris, University College London and CEPR)

Patrick Legros (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université de Liège and CEPR)
Margaret A Meyer (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, and CEPR)

Benny Moldovanu (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)

Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)

Xavier Vives (INSEAD, Fontainebleau and CEPR)